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WHY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES JOIN UNIONS:
A STUDY OF AFGE LOCAL 916
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years this nation has experi­
enced a rapid change in the state of technology which has 
led to a high rate of economic growth. Under these circum­
stances the government plays a dual role as a regulator 
of economic and social activities and as a producer and 
consumer of a significant part of this nation's final out­
put of goods and services. This growth in governmental 
activities and responsibilities has resulted in a signifi­
cant increase in the number of government employees.
The total number of government employees increased 
to more than 3 million, or by 26 percent between 1958 and 
1969»^ The rate of increase was considerably faster in 
the government than in the private sector. Along with this 
increase in employment there has been a striking change in 
the occupational composition of government employees.
^United States Civil Service Commission, Annual 
Report, 1969, Table A-1, p. 52.
Historically, blue-collar workers have accounted for over
50 percent of the government’s employees. By I968 white-
collar workers numbered 1.9 million accounting for nearly
270 percent of the government's employees.
Manpower projections for the 1965-1975 decade
indicate that only a 10.8 percent increase in government
3employment is anticipated. However, the percentage of
blue-collar workers will continue to decline and the need
for technical and professional white-collar workers will
expand to meet the demands of an increasing population
4and massive government commitments.
The government has always perceived relations with 
its employees as being unique when compared to labor- 
management relations in the private sector. This uniqueness 
is manifested in the concept of sovereign immunity. The 
relevance of the sovereignty doctrine to government employees 
derives from the notion that employee pressure upon the 
government employer by the same methods legally accorded 
workers in the private sector would represent a derogation
^Ibid., Tables A-1, A-3, pp. 52, 55*
3 United States Department of Labor, Manpower Report 
of the President. April 196? (Washington, D. C.: I967),
Table E-9.
4B. Yabroff, "Trends and Outlook for Employment in 
Government," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 88 (March I965),
p. 287.
of the sovereign integrity of government authority.^
A comparison of the legal and philosophical 
environment surrounding unionism and collective bargaining 
between the federal government and the private sector shows 
that only a limited correlation exists. The present legal 
philosophical environment of labor-management relations in 
the government does not actively encourage government 
employees to join unions nor does it facilitate a meaning­
ful collective bargaining relationship between labor and 
management. Exceptions to this condition exist in the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Government Printing Office, and 
the Interior Department. Meaningful collective bargaining 
does not exist because of the following; the legally 
sanctioned institutionalized belief in government sovereignty 
coupled with the legal sanctioning of management's rights 
appears to have reinforced a historically negative attitude 
towards collective bargaining on the part of government 
management. The government's legal and philosophical atti­
tudes toward meaningful collective bargaining is manifested 
in Executive Order 11491 issued on October 29» 1969* This 
Order specifically denies government employees the right to 
strike, establishes no provisions for collective bargaining 
over wages or hours, and strongly asserts management's 
rights.
In another respect the government's relationship
^Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the 
United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public
Personnel Association, 1966), p. I7.
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to its employees is unique when compared to the private 
sector. In I883, the government established a civil ser­
vice merit system under the administration of the Civil 
Service Commission. Since its inception the philosophy 
underlying the civil service system has been the develop­
ment and maintenance of policies and procedures designed 
to protect government employees from management or politi­
cal attack. Many of the subjects covered within the scope 
private sector collective bargaining were covered under 
civil service system regulations and procedures before 
collective bargaining's widespread adoption. It would 
appear that the civil service system would minimize gen­
eral employee dissatisfaction through its establishment 
and protection of employees' rights and thereby reduce 
employees motivation to join unions.
Government employees have had the legal right to 
join unions since 1912 when Congress passed the Lloyd- 
LaFollette Act. Historically union membership among non­
postal government employees has been relatively low. 
According to a Civil Service Assembly survey of 1939» only 
19 percent of the government nonpostal employees were 
union members.^
When Executive Order IO988 was issued in January 
1962, it represented the first government wide official
^Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public 
Service; A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge, Massa- 
chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 94-95»
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labor-management relations policy. Although the Order 
restricts the rights of unions and clearly protects govern­
ment sovereignty, it had a major effect on union growth 
in the government. By 1963» 25.8 percent of the govern­
ment's nonpostal employees were union members. For the 
period 1963 to 1970 nonpostal government employees repre­
sented by unions increased from l80,000 to 916,000.^ As
of November 1970, 48 percent of the government's eligible
ononpostal employees were represented by unions.
Along with the increases in union membership there 
has been a shift in the membership composition. Historic­
ally the organizing appeals of government unions (excluding 
the postal unions) have primarily attracted blue-collar 
workers. In the past decade white-collar workers have been 
responsible for the majority of the increases in union mem­
bership. Today, 35 percent of the government's white- 
collar workers are union members. They account for over
n50 percent of total union membership.
The American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE), an industrial type union, has over the past decade 
experienced the highest growth rate of any union. In I96O
^United States Civil Service Commission, Office of 
Labor Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Govern­
ment (Washington, D.C.: November, 1970), Table k, p. 21.
Q
Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee 
Relations Report. No. 390, March 1, 1971, p. D-5.
^Ibid.
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AFGE membership was 70,300. By 1970 actual membership had 
increased by over 400 percent to 304,000. Government 
employees represented by the AFGE reached 530,550.^^ 
White-collar workers accounted for most of the AFGE's 
growth over the past decade and presently approximate 
50 percent of actual membership, and 59 percent of the 
government employees represented by the union. Today, the 
AFGE is the largest union in the government.
The rapid increases in government union membership, 
coupled with the decreases in private sector union member­
ship have led people to speculate about why government 
employees join unions. Generalizations have been made that 
government employees join unions for the same reasons as 
workers in the private sector.
Conditions of work in the government preclude many 
explanations about the reasons why people join unions. The 
first condition is the historical role of the civil service 
system. The second condition is the government's mainte­
nance of the sovereignty doctrine which is reflected in
United States Civil Service Commission, Office 
of Labor Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Gov­
ernment , op. cit., Table K, p. 21.
^^For a detailed discussion, see H. J. Christrup, 
"Why Do Government Employees Join Unions," Personnel Admin- 
istration, September-October, 1966, pp. 49-54; W. D, Heisel 
and J. D. Hallihan, Questions and Answers on Public Employee 
Negotiations (Chicago, Illinois: Public Personnel Associa­
tion, 19^7). These articles represent the only sources 
uncovered by the author that discuss why government employ­
ees join unions.
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its labor-management relations policies. These legal and 
philosophically restrictive policies do not facilitate mean­
ingful collective bargaining. The third condition is that the 
high proportion of white-collar union members in the gov­
ernment is in sharp contrast with the low proportion of 
white-collar union members in the private sector. It is 
also commonly believed that the traditional appeals of 
unions do not attract white-collar workers.
Hypotheses
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, 
the following testable hypotheses have been formulated.
1. The reasons why the sampled blue-collar and 
white-collar AFGE Local 916 members joined the union are 
significantly different than the reasons why workers in 
the private sector join unions.
2. The sampled blue-collar and white-collar AFGE 
Local 916 members joined the union for the same reasons.
Research. Plan
The research plan for this study is divided into 
three parts. The first part involves a discussion of 
unionism in the private sector. The writings of the labor 
historians and contemporary empirical research studies 
that establish why workers in the private sector join 
unions will be examined. Current literature will be 
examined and discussed to establish the reasons why
8
white-collar workers are not inclined to join unions.
The second part centers around an examination and 
discussion of the books, monographs, articles, research 
studies, government documents and publications, and other 
published information that relate to government labor- 
management relations. The examination will include an 
evaluation of the factors which are believed by many 
authors to differentiate the operational environment of 
the government from that of firms in the private sector.
These factors underlie the government’s perception of its 
relationship with its employees as being different than 
the relationships between labor and management in the 
private sector.
The third part of this study will consist of an 
examination and evaluation of empirical data derived from 
a systematic random sample of AFGE Local 9l6 members' 
responses to a questionnaire that was sent to their 
homes. Local 9i6 was selected as the study group because 
of its convenient location and that it is the largest 
local in the government.
To determine why the sampled members joined the 
union and to test hypotheses 1 and 2, a questionnaire has 
been developed. The questionnaire was developed with 
advice and assistance from the following: Dr. Donald Woolf,
the author's chairman. Dr. Marion Phillips, market researcher 
and committee member, Mr. Michael Bodi, former government
9
research psychologist and fellow graduate student, Mr. 
Kermit Tull, AFGE National Vice-President, 9th District, 
and Mr, Norman Nance, President, Local 916. The question­
naire was pre-tested with a group of workers to obtain a 
measure of its validity and reliability.
Specific subject areas in the questionnaire include 
the following;
1. Social background
2. Job environment factors
3. AFGE membership and participation
4. Reasons for joining the union
5. The civil service system
6. The scope of collective bargaining
7. The right to strike issue.
Chi-square analysis and any other appropriate 
statistical tests have been used in analyzing the data.
Sample
A brief outline of the proposed study was presented 
to AFGE National and Local 916 officials. After a number 
of meetings, officials of Local 916 agreed to participate 
in the study.
The author and his chairman examined the general 
characteristics of Local 916's .blue-collar and white-collar 
members and decided that a .10 .«percent sample would be 
adequate to achieve the objectives of this study.
Except for 68 nonappropriated funds workers, Local
10
916's membership consists entirely of blue-collar and 
white-collar Tinker Air Force Base employees. At the time 
that the sample was established the union had 7,355 active 
members. The sample was determined by selecting every 
tenth blue-collar and every tenth white-collar worker 
carried in the union's active membership file. The sample 
consisted of $l6 blue-collar and 220 white-collar workers. 
The sample's composition indicated that the union's member­
ship is 70 percent blue-collar and 30 percent white-collar 
workers.
On June 3, 1971, copies of the Confidential Ques­
tionnaire were sent to the homes of the 736 members who 
comprised the sample. Each of the sampled members received 
a letter of introduction explaining the purpose of the 
study, guaranteeing individual anonymity, and urging his 
cooperation; a Confidential Questionnaire; and a postage- 
paid, addressed envelope for returning the questionnaire 
to the University of Oklahoma's Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research (See Appendix I for the introductory 
letter and the questionnaire). In addition, the union 
published an article in the Tinker Take Off on June 3 and 
June 11 explaining the purposes of the study and urging 
the sampled members' cooperation.
The responses to the mailing were lower than were 
expected. The author and members of his committee decided 
that a second mailing would be necessary to increase the
11
reliability of the study. Since the questionnaires were
uncoded, it was impossible to know who had responded to
the questionnaire. The cover letter used in the second
mailing explained this situation, thanked those who had
responded to the first mailingi asked that they disregard
this questionnaire, and urged those who had not previously
responded to participate in the study. On June 17, the
sampled members were sent the second cover letter, a copy
of the questionnaire, and a postage-paid return envelope.
(See Appendix I for the cover letter used in the second
mailing). On June l8, the union published another article
in the Tinker Take Off urging the sampled members who had
not responded to the first mailing to take advantage of
this opportunity to participate in the study.
As a result of the second mailing the responses
increased from 33 percent to 44.5 percent. The usable
responses and the response rate for the blue-collar and
12the white-collar members are shown in Table 1.
12Questionnaires sent to the homes of 4 blue-collar 
and 2 white-collar members were returned unanswered for 
various reasons. This reduced the sample size to 730. 
Thirteen responses were not usable for various reasons.
12 
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF USABLE RESPONSES AND RESPONSE 
RATE BY EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION
Group N
AFGE Members' Responses 





Except for questions 24 and 25» the responses to 
the questions are discrete. Discrete data limits the 
statistical tests that can be used for analysis purposes. 
Because the Chi-Square test requires no assumptions about 
the shape of the parameter distribution, Chi-Square was used 
for analyzing the responses to the questionnaire.^^
In the first part of the data analysis the sampled 
members* responses to each question were tabulated by 
group» and tested for statistical significance» first by 
group response and then by total response. (See Appendix 
II, Tables 34 through 60)« In Chapter VI the responses to 
the general background questions 1 through 8 were compared 
by group and question categories with information known 
about all Local 916 members and all Tinker employees.
13N. M. Downie and R« Heath, Basic Statistical 
Methods (New York: Harper and Row, I965), p. 160.
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The results of the comparison were used as a check 
of the representativeness of the sampled members to the union 
population and to determine whether certain factors were 
present in the members' background that may have had either 
a positive or a negative influence on their joining the 
union.
The responses to questions 9 through 25 were 
analyzed to establish the reasons why the blue-collar and 
the white-collar members joined the union.
In the second part of the data analysis the responses 
of the blue-collar and the white-collar members to each ques­
tion were compared. The Chi-Square test was used to deter­
mine whether any significant differences existed in the 
responses of the two groups. The results of this comparison 
were used to determine whether the reasons why the blue-collar 
and the white-collar members joined the union differed 
significantly.
Limitations
The scope of this study is subject to a number of 
limitations :
1. The findings of this study are based upon the 
assumption that the sampled members' responses to the 
questionnaire were a truthful reflection of their feelings.
2. Only Local 916 members participated in the 
study. The variance in operational environments primarily 
due to the differences in the objectives of government
14
agencies limits the findings of the study to the Local and 
Agency that has been studied.
Definition of Terms
Throughout this study certain terms are used 
repeatedly. For continuity of the meaning, the following 
definitions are applicable.
Collective Bargaining
The legal definition of the term collective bar­
gaining is the following:
To bargain collectively is the performance of the 
mutual obligations of the employer and the repre­
sentative of the employees to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
and other terms, and conditions of employment, or in 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question there­
under , and the execution of a written contract incor­
porating any agreement reached if requested by either 
party, but such obligation does not compel either party 
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con­cession.
Employees
Employees means any individual either white-collar 
(general schedule) or blue-collar (wage board) employed by 
the federal government except those individuals who under 
the law are ineligible to join unions.
Government
Unless specifically stated as meaning otherwise
l4Section 8(d) Labor-Management Relations Act,
1947. Underlining of the words "wages" and "hours" is mine.
15
the term government refers only to the federal government 
as used in this study. The federal government would 
include the following: executive branch, all executive
departments, legislative branch, judicial branch, and all 
independent agencies.
Private Sector 
Private sector refers to all legally sanctioned 
formal organizations where labor-management relationships 
exist exclusive of those in federal, state, and local 
governments.
Public Sector 
In this study the term may be used interchangeably 
with the term "government." The definition would be the 
same.
Strike
According to Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary a Strike is defined as : "a temporary stoppage
of work by a body of workers designed to enforce compliance 
with demands (as changes in wages, hours, or working con­
ditions) made on an e m p l o y e r . T h e  language of the 
Taft-Hartley Act is explicit in what action would be con­
sidered a strike.
^^Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Company, 19&7),
p . 2262.
16
The term "strike” includes any strike or concerted 
stoppage of work of employees (including a stoppage 
by reason of the expiration of a collective bargain­
ing agreement) and any concerted slow-down or other 
concerted interruption of operations by e m p l o y e e s .
Union
Executive Order IO988 (Section 2) used the term 
"employee organization” while Executive Order 11491 uses 
the term "labor organization” to describe what is commonly 
referred to as a "labor union” or a "union." The term 
"union” is germane to the private sector but its meaning 
is widely understood. The use of different terminology is 
the government's way of differentiating the legal environ­
ment between itself and the private sector. When discus­
sing government unions the term union means:
a lawful organization of any kind in which employees 
participate and which for the purpose, in whole or in 
part, of dealing with agencies concerning grievances, 
personnel policies and practices , or other matters 
affecting the working conditions of their employees; 
but does not include an organization which (l) con­
sists of management officials or supervisors, (2) asserts 
the right to strike against the government, (3) advo­
cates overthrow auid (4) discriminates with regard to 
membership because of race, color, creed, sex, or 
national origin.17
Organization of the Study
Summaries of pertinent writings relating to labor- 
management relations in the government are examined in
^^Section 501(a) Labor-Management Relations Act,
1947.
1969.
17Section 2(e), Executive Order 11491, October 29»
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Chapter II.
In Chapter III contributions of labor historians, 
and the empirical studies found by the author are examined 
to establish why workers in the private sector join unions. 
The reasons why white-collar workers in the private sector 
are not inclined to join unions are also examined.
Chapter IV consists of an examination and evalua­
tion of the uniqueness of the government as an employer 
from the following bases:
A. The Sovereignty Concept
B. Past and Present Legal Environment
C. The Role of the Civil Service Commission
D. Existing Limitations on Collective Bargaining.
In Chapter V the AFGE, Local 916, and the environ­
ment of labor-management relations at Tinker Air Force 
Base are examined and evaluated.
Chapter VI consists of an examination and evalu­
ation of the findings of the survey. The results of the 
comparison are used to determine if the sampled members' 
reasons for joining the union are significantly different 
from the reasons why workers in the private sector join 
unions. The responses to the survey of the sampled blue- 
collar and white-collar members are compared to determine 
if their reasons for joining the union are different.
Chapter VII contains a summary presentation of the 
findings of this study with concluding implications for
18
government, Air Force management, and the union, based 
upon the responses of the members who participated in this 
study. Appendices of relevant materials and a Bibliography 
conclude this study.
CHAPTER II
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Books and Monographs
Prior to the 1960's little if any attention was 
given to the area of labor-management relations in the 
government.^ One of the most comprehensive studies was
2conducted by a committee of the Civil Service Assembly.
The intent of this study was to develop a framework within 
which the labor problems of government employees might be 
investigated. The controversiality of the subject limited 
the successful achievement of the study's objective.
Sterling D. Spero's Government as Employer is 
considered an authoritative source on the historical
^A comprehensive bibliography may be found in the 
following: U.S. Civil Service Commission, Employee-Man-
agement Relations in the Public Service, Personnel Bibli- 
ography Series No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Commission
Library). Additional sources may be found in Morton 
R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A
Study of Political Pluralism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1951), ppT 289-301.
2Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee 
Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chair­
man, Employee Relations in the Public Service (Chicago:
C.S.A. of the U.S. and Canada, 19^2).
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development of unions in the Postal Service and other
3government agencies and departments, Spero presents an 
excellent insight into the philosophical basis of govern­
ment labor-management conflict. According to Spero, the 
base of conflict centers around the need for the unions to 
check management's authority and the need of management to
see to it that the government services operate for the
4benefit of the whole public.
Morton R. Godine's The Labor Problem in the Public 
Service; A Study in Political Pluralism is both historical 
and analytical in its investigation of government labor-
5management relations. His primary emphasis in the study
is in the determination:
. . . of the extent to which the civil service may be 
accorded a measure of functional recognition without 
impairment of the inalienable duty of a representa­
tive government to retain ultimate control over the 
administrative machinerygcreated for the accomplish­
ment of public purposes.
In effect Godine views the labor-management problem in
government essentially the same as Spero views it. Godine's
study is more analytical than Spero’s in its consideration of
the basic philosophical problem in government labor-management
3Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New 
York: Remsen Press, 1948).
^Ibid., pp. 486-7.
^Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public 
Service: A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge: Har­
vard University Press, 195l)«
^Ibid., p. xii.
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relations. Godine bases his analysis on the hypothesis:
that the establishment of employee relations programs 
in which explicit provision is made for staff partici­
pation may (a) enheince operating efficiency and 
(b) advance the purposes which a democratic society 
seeks to achieve.7
He does not offer any conclusive proof that his hypothesis
is correct.
The last study prior to the issuance of Executive 
Order 10988 is Wilson Hart's Collective Bargaining in the
QFederal Civil Service. This study is an excellent updat­
ing of the developments, issues, and trends in government 
labor-management relations that had taken place since the 
studies of Spero and Godine. Starting from a historical, 
social and legal base Hart develops a comparative analysis 
of labor-management relations in the private sector and in 
the government.
Numerous other texts pertaining to government or 
civil service published prior to 19Ô2 were found to have 
little to add to the information already available in the 
writings of Spero, Godine, and Hart.^ Since 1962 interest 
in government labor-management relations increased at an 
accelerating rate reflecting a growing interest in the field.
^Ibid., p. 60.
gWilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Fed­
eral Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19&2).
gDiscussions on government labor-management rela­
tions may be found in texts by Blackburn, Carpenter,
Gregory, Stahl, Nigro, Mayer, Mosher, and others listed 
in the Bibliography.
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Stimulus in part has been provided by (l) the rapid growth 
in size of the government's labor force and (2) the rapid 
growth of government unions since the issuance of Execu­
tive Order IO988.
Since I963 the Public Personnel Association (for­
merly known as the Civil Service Assembly of the United 
States and Canada) has published eight monographs on col­
lective bargaining in the public sector from I963 to 1967, 
covering both theory and practice. The Association has 
also published three books in a series titled, Policies 
and Practices of Public Personnel Administration. Sum­
maries of those monographs and books whose contents are 
relevant to this study are as follows;
Management's Relations with Organized Public Employ­
ees , edited by Kenneth 0. Warner, is a collection of the 
attitudes and concepts about government labor-management 
relations as held by public administrators, consultants, 
union representatives, and scholars.
Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal
Civil Service, by Willem Vosloo, is based on two interre- 
11lated themes.
Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.) , Management Relations 
with Organized Public Employees: Theory, Policies. Prob­
lems (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 19^3)•
^^Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the 
United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public
Personnel Association, 1966).
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One theme deals with the description and analysis of 
the collective actions engaged in by both the federal 
government and organized public employees under the 
Kennedy program and it analyzes the conditions deter­
mining the nature, scope, and effects of these actions. 
The other is concerned with the development of criteria 
by which the significance of the consequences of this 
program can be clarified.12
Vosloo concludes that modified collective bargaining rights 
can be granted to government employees because the differ­
ences between government management and private sector man-
13agement is one of degree rather than of kind. He does 
note that in the private sector•every collective bargaining 
agreement is a result of both reason and potential force 
whereas in government the division of authority and the 
influence of political consideration exert a strong influ­
ence upon the determination of the final settlement.
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service;
Theory and Practice, edited by Kenneth 0. Warner, is a 
collection of papers presented at the Canadian Seminar on 
labor-management relations by American and Canadian pub­
lic officials and consultants. This monograph examines
the scope of the current practices and•experiences in the
IkUnited States and Canada.
Management-Employee Relations in the Public Service
l^Ibid., p. 3. 
l^Ibid., p. 158.
^^Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Service; Theory and Practice (Chicago; Public 
Personnel Association, 1967).
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by Felix Nigro considers the present status of labor- 
management relations in the United States and Canada.
Nigro's coverage of labor-management problems is wider in 
scope than other publications of the Public Personnel 
Association. Specific consideration is given to the 
experiences and problems of labor and management under 
Executive Order IO988 with a comparative analysis of the 
methods and processes utilized by the private sector and 
foreign governments for handling labor-management relations 
problems.
The most comprehensive collection of information 
about the developments of the igGO's at federal, state, 
and local levels of government is in Harold S. Robert's 
Labor-Management Relations in the Public Service. T h i s  
book is actually an updating and expansion of a publication 
prepared by Roberts in February, 1964, with revisions in 
August, 1964, and again in January, I967, entitled, A 
Manual for Employee-Nanagement Cooperation in the Federal 
Service. The earlier publication is devoted primarily to 
developments on the federal level. This book enlarges the 
scope to include state and local developments as well.
Unlike the works of Spero, Godine, and Hart,
^^Felix A. Nigro, Management-Employee Relations in 
the Public Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association,
I969I.
^^Harold S. Roberts, Labor-Management Relations in 
the Public Service (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1970).
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Roberts does not develop a historical analysis of labor- 
management relations in the government. This book is an. 
excellent reference source for arbitration decisions issued 
under Executive Order 10988»
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment by 
Michael Moskow, Joseph Loewenberg, and Edward Koziaria is 
a comprehensive analysis of recent developments in govern­
ment employee bargaining with emphasis on collective bar­
gaining and labor relations rather than on government 
m a n a g e m e n t . T h e  authors' coverage includes federal, 
state, and local government employees, including teachers, 
police, and firefighters at the state and local levels. 
Comparisons are made among different levels of government 
as well as with collective bargaining in the private sec­
tor.
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations 
Over the past forty years very few dissertations 
have been written in the field of government labor-manage­
ment relations. Nearly every dissertation that has been 
written in the field has been written within the past ten 
years. The majority of these dissertations discuss labor- 
management relations outside of the federal service. Of 
those dissertations uncovered, only three gave specific
17M. Moskow, J, Loewenberg, and E. Koziaria, Col­
lective Bargaining in Public Employment (New York: Random
House, 1970).
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attention to federal government labor-management relations.
The first is Eldon Johnson's comprehensive analysis
18of"Unionism in the Federal Service." The central theme 
of Johnson's dissertation is the emergence, growth, objec­
tives, and achievements of government unions. In his dis­
sertation Johnson develops a very comprehensive analysis 
of the emergence and growth of government unions prior to 
193Ô. He discusses the social, economic, and political 
environment surrounding the rise and fall of the National 
Federation of Federal Employees and the emergence of the 
American Federation of Government Employees. He develops 
a well-documented chapter on the attitudes and objectives 
of government unions in their attempts to play a role in 
the operation of the government's personnel management sys­
tem. In another chapter Johnson discusses the tactics 
used by government unions in meeting their objectives. In 
this chapter he also gives an accounting of the unions' 
achievements.
The second dissertation is Murray Nesbitt's study
on "The Civil Service Merit System and Collective Bargain- 
19ing." Nesbitt examines the issue of the compatibility 
of collective bargaining by unions within the framework of
x8Eldon Johnson, "Unionism in the Federal Service" 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Wisconsin,
1938).
19Murray Bernard Nesbitt, "The Civil Service Merit 
System and Collective Bargaining" (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation. New York University, I962).
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the merit system. Specifically, Nesbitt studies the con­
flict of traditional union policies on recruitment, promo­
tion, and removal, to those developed under the civil 
service merit system at the federal, state, and local 
levels of government. Nesbitt concludes that union and 
management attitudes can be compatible under the merit 
system as long as neither side takes an extreme position. 
Extreme areas of union security, i.e., the closed shop and 
the union shop, were found to be incompatible with the 
merit system.
The third dissertation, by Mansour A. Mansour, is 
an analysis of the effects of Executive Order IO988, based 
upon pertinent Supreme Court decisions, and legal opinions 
issued by the Attorney General's office since 1962.^^ Man- 
sour »s objectives are (1) to point out the strengths and 
weaknesses in the existing legal environment and (2) to 
propose changes that will eliminate these weaknesses and 
strengthen government labor-management relations. Mansour 
concludes that both the wording and the interpretation 
of Executive Order IO988 do not provide the operational 
environment in which government employees can participate 
collectively in making decisions that affect their lives.
The government limits the rights of its employees under 
the guise of sovereignty and management supremacy. Mansour
20Mansour Ahmed Mansour, "The Legal Rights of Fed­
eral Employees to Unionize, Bargain Collectively, and Strike" 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State Univer­
sity, 1969).
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recommends a number of additions be made to the existing
laws to bring about the equality of rights between govern­
ment employees and workers in the private sector.
In view of the limited amount of research that 
has been conducted on government employees, it is useful 
to examine the research that has been conducted on workers
in the private sector.
CHAPTER III
WHY DO WORKERS IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR JOIN UNIONS
This chapter examines three important questions 
about why people join unions. The first is, what contri­
bution did the labor historians make toward the develop­
ment of a theory of why people join unions. The second is, 
why blue-collar workers in the private sector join unions. 
The third question is why white-collar workers in the pri­
vate sector have not joined unions in significant numbers.
The Contribution of the Labor Historians 
Until the 1930’s the answer to the question why 
people join unions varied with the opinions of the labor 
historians. The historians did not adequately answer the 
question because they integrated an accounting of all of 
the factors that underlie the emergence of unions with 
the specific reasons why individual workers join unions.
The labor historians' analysis of history from social, 
economic, political, and legal perspectives leads each to 
a personal philosophy of why workers, feeling the need to 
collectively organize over time resulted in the emergence
29
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of a permanent labor movement.^
The writings of Karl Marx centered around both the 
emergence of unions and their relationship to capitalistic 
society. Marx was the first person to develop the signifi­
cance of group action. He used group action to build a 
theory of social change around the bourgeoisie, the capi­
talistic entrepreneurs, and the proletariat, the emerging
2class of wage-earners.
Marx's bourgeoisie through their ownership of the 
means of production dominate society and exploit the wage- 
earners. Their factories and mills operating on classical 
economic doctrines view the workers as an interchangeable 
factor of production. In effect this system oppresses the 
workingmen. The government, the embodiment of society 
exists to protect the rights of private property and is
3used by one class to oppress the other. The working class, 
and therefore the individual worker, only has labor power 
at his disposal. The union is the functional organization 
of the working class and is the vehicle which will bring 
about social change. Social change will be brought about
Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister (eds.). 
Insights into Labor Issues (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1948), Chapter 7» "The Development of Labor Organi­
zation," by John T. Dunlop, p. 1?4.
2Jack Ellenbogan, "Development of Labor Movement 
Theory" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of 
Wisconsin, 1954), p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5.
31
by overthrowing of the bourgeoisie class through a violent
Itclass struggle.
Marx realized that unions developed originally out 
of the spontaneous attempts of the workers to eliminate 
internal competition for jobs and wages for the purpose of 
obtaining contractual conditions which would raise them 
above the status of slaves.^ Marx emphasized the fact that 
workers must be taught that if they were to put an end to 
their misery then they must realize the futility of trying 
to reach some general agreement with the bourgeoisie.^ 
Throughout his writings, Marx insisted that "trade unions
7are schools of socialism" to bring about "class solidarity."
Marx's writings indicate that workers first form 
unions to "eliminate internal competition for jobs" but 
eventually the workers' actions through the union are for 
social change. Their primary emphasis is on the union's 
role in changing society.
John R. Commons believed that labor history should 
be understood in terms of the interaction of "economic, 
industrial, and political conditions with many varieties 
of individualistic, socialistic, and protectionistic
A. Lozovsky, Marx and the Trade Unions (New York; 
International Publishers, 1935)i p. 12.
^Ibid., p. l6.
^Jack Ellenbogan, jO£, cit., p. 7»
7A. Lozovsky, o£. cit. , p. I5.
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gphilosophies." From an appraisal of the writings of 
Marx, Schmoller, and Bûcher, Commons traced the gradual 
evolution of the employer-employee relationship from the 
merchant-capitalist dealings with the journeymen. The 
expansion of the market coupled with changes in the modes 
of production separated the traditional functions of the 
merchant-capitalist as employer producer, wholesaler, and 
retailer. The specialization of functions led to the 
emergence of new bargaining classes; the wage-earner and
9the employer. Commons ties the emergence of the new bar­
gaining classes to the emergence of unions in the following 
manner: Competition and continuing expansion of the market
limits the ability of the employer to pass increasing costs 
of production on to the market. The only way for the employer 
to remain competitive is to keep wages down. "The journeymen 
have no alternative but to organize into unions in order to 
resist the encroachments upon their standards of life."^^
Commons believes that the patterns of union growth are 
related to fluctuations in economic conditions. Periods of 
prosperity produced union growth while depression saw the 
labor movement subside or change its form to practical or 
social agitation.
g
John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor 
in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1918), Vol. 1, p. 3.




trade-union movement is an unconscious rebellion 
against the atomization of an industrial society on 
the one hand, and the divorce of owner and workers 
from their historical function as moral agents on the 
other.
The machine threatens the workers ' security euid it is the 
need for security that compels workers to join unions. 
However,
in the process of carrying out the implications of 
defense against the competitive character of the 
capitalist system the worker contributes to the well­
being of present-day society--a contribution which 
represents a by-product of the more conscious attempt 
to find security in an insecure world.12
According to Tannenbaum, a union is not a reform 
movement; it is not a political party; it is not revolu­
tionary in intent; and it is not a legislative activity.
It may, at times, contribute to all of these, but it is 
none of them.
The union has forced a structural change in our 
society. Tannenbaum believed that the union movement would 
eventually displace the capitalistic system.by buying it,
13and that ownership would cease to be fluid and impersonal.
Selig Perlman contended that manual labor groups
^^Frank Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 14, 105.
12Frank Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement, Its Conser­
vative Functions and Social Consequences (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s and Sons, 1921), p. 32.
13Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor, op. cit.,
p. 190.
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have had their economic attitudes basically determined by 
a consciousness of a lack of opportunity, which is char­
acteristic of these groups, and stands out in contrast with
14the businessmen's consciousness of unlimited opportunity.
Labor's consciousness of scarcity provided the
impetus for groups to:
practice solidarity, to an insistence upon "ownership" 
by the group as a whole of the totality of economic 
opportunity among the individuals constituting it, to 
a control by the group over its members in relation to 
the conditions upon which they as individuals are per­
mitted to occupy a portion of that opportunity.15
In addition to labor's perceived scarcity of oppor­
tunity , Perlman contended that the philosophies of the 
businessmen and the intellectual influenced the emergence 
and growth of the labor m o v e m e n t . T h e  expansion of 
business activity in a complex industrial structure causes
labor to recognize a scarcity of opportunity and to col-
17lectively organize. The attitudes of organized labor
towards the businessmen will be largely influenced by the
l8attitudes of the intellectuals.
In the broadest sense Robert P. Hoxie viewed 
unionism as a social grouping.
l4Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 6.
^^Ibid., p. 6.
^^Ibid., p. 238.
^^Ibid., p. 252. 
l^Ibid.. p. 5.
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It may exist wherever in society there is a group of 
men with consciousness of common needs and interests 
apart from the rest of the society. What distinguishes 
trade unionism from other forms is that it expresses 
the viewpoint and interpretation of groups of wagework­ers .^9
The union emerges because workers with common social,
economic, and technological backgrounds will tend to develop
a common interpretation of the social situation and a com-
20mon solution of a problem of living. The union's emerg­
ence may be spontaneous or evolutionary. The union is a 
means to an end not an end in itself. The union's objec­
tive is to put together a remedial program based on their 
common interpretation of the existing social situation.
Hoxie identified this type of unionism as functional union- 
21ism.
Hoxie contended that the union movement is non- 
unitary. He developed a classification of functional 
types of unions, i.e., business unionism, dependent union­
ism, predatory unionism, revolutionary unionism, and uplift
unionism. According to Hoxie, there is no one type of
22unionism which all union variants approximate. Hoxie's 
analysis of the emergence of unions centered around group 
psychology and he completely discounted the influence of
19Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United 





any environmental factors such as those emphasized by 
Commons.
According to Sidney and Beatrice Webb a trade
union is a "continuous association of wage-earners for the
purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their
23working lives." The union's function is to regulate the
conditions of employment in such a way as to ward off from
24the workers the evil effects of industrial competition.
The union accomplishes its objectives through mutual insur­
ance, collective bargaining, and protective legislation. 
Their course of action is largely determined by the social 
and economic stage of development of society. In this 
respect the union exists within the framework of society 
as a social institution. The union's permanent function 
is the democratization of industry in the industrial state.
The Webbs' theory of unionism is not a theory of 
development but rather an analysis of the consequences of 
a labor organization, essentially a theory of collective 
bargaining. Their theory of unionism centered around what 
they called the "Common Rule," a systematic raising of the 
minimal wages and working conditions of workingmen by
23Sidney and Beatrice Webb, History of Trade Union­
ism (New York; Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), p. 1.
24Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), p. 8o?.
B̂ Ibid., p. 821.
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collective bargaining and legislation.^^ In an abstract 
vray, their theory of unionism is tied to a country’s 
economic development. As industrialization increases, the 
union emerges as a social institution for the democratiza­
tion of society as a whole.
From the brief discussions of the contributions of 
the labor historians, it has been shown that there are 
many reasons underlying the emergence of unions.
Commons views the emergence of unions as being 
tied to a rebellion against the merchant-capitalist system 
while Tannenbaum views the emergence of unions as being 
tied to the workers’ need for security against the machine.
Except for differences in language, the writings 
of the Webbs and Commons share a common base. They see 
the manifestation of economic developments as being respon­
sible for the emergence of unions. Commons used the term 
expansion of the market while the Webbs used the term com­
mon rule to describe observable changes in economic insti­
tutions.
Perlman, Hoxie, and Tannenbaum, chose to emphasize 
the psychological state of mind of workingmen as being pri­
marily responsible for the emergence of unions. All of 
the historians emphasized the workers' need for security 
as being the motivating factor. Perlman emphasized the 
rationing of available opportunity while Hoxie emphasized
2^Ibid.. p. 795.
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a common interpretation of an existing social condition.
Because no singular theory emerged from the his­
torical writings, it was impossible for anyone to state 
with a high degree of validity, why individual workingmen 
join unions. It was not until the 1930's that primary 
research on this question was initiated.
Why Blue-Collar Workers in the Private 
Sector Join Unions
One of the earliest studies was conducted by Edwin
M. Chamberlin in 1935»^^ The purpose of his study was:
to attempt to determine the reactions of labor toward 
a number of institutions and policies which appear to 
be fundamental to the recently promulgated government 
plan to control industrial conditions of wages andhours.28
The sample group consisted of 100 union and 100 non­
union textile workers randomly selected from a number of
29Massachusetts textile plants. Chamberlin believed that 
his sample was representative of the textile industry as 
a whole. His research design centered around personal 
interviews with the sample group. He asked each sample 
member a series of twelve questions and noted their 
responses. His questions centered around the following 
subject areas:
^^Edwin M. Chamberlin, "What Labor Is Thinking," 
Personnel Journal, Vol. l4. No. 3 (September, 1935), pp.
118-125.
o AIbid., p. 116.
B^lbid., p. 119.
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1. union's ability to get results
2. trust and competence of union leaders
3. main reasons for joining a union
4. labor-management relations 
3* depression conditions
6. management's treatment of workers.
For the purposes of this study the following question 
asked by Chamberlin is significant: "What would be your
main reason for joining a union?"
Reactions
Number




2. Because that is the only way you think the 









4. Because you feel more secure as a union member 
Total 4?
Union members I6
Non-union workers 31 __
200
Union men give, in order of frequency of responses, 
as their reasons for joining; (1) results; (2 and 3) a 
liking for such organizations and a feeling of greater 
security; and (4) because fellow workers joined. 
"Results" was placed first three and one-&%lf times 
as often as the next most frequent cause.
3°Ibid., pp. 121-122.
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In the workers * responses to the other questions
Chamberlin found that union members' chief dissatisfactions
were with wages, working conditions, and management. He
also found that workers were not of the opinion that the
31only way to get results is to strike. From Chamberlin's 
study, it was concluded that the strongest reasons for 
workers to join unions have an economic base. The union 
was the organization that would get "results" in terms of 
solving the workers' dissatisfaction with low wages, work­
ing conditions, and management.
In the early 1940's the Labor-Management Center at 
Yale University conducted a series of extensive interviews 
with both union and itonunLon workers in an attempt to
learn why workers did or did not join a union after an
. . .  32organizing campaign.
Analysis of the series of interviews with workers
indicated:
almost universal recognition that one is living suc­
cessfully if he is making progress toward the experi­
ence and assurance of:
a. The society and respect of other people,
b . The degree of creature comforts and economic secur­
ity possessed by the most favored of his customary 
associates,
c. Independence and control over his own affairs,




32£. Wright Bakke, "Why Workers Join Unions," Per­sonnel , Vol. 22, No. 1 (July, 1945), p. 37.
33lbid.. p. 38.
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The researchers discovered that the foremost goal of work­
ers was the gratification of a social need, respect of other 
people, rather than increases in wages and security which 
are primarily economic needs. Although the journal report 
of the Yale Center's study did not provide any percentage 
breakdowns of the reasons why workers joined unions, they 
did indicate that the workers' need for economic gains,
i.e., "more wages, and more regular wages," was a strong
34motivating factor toward union membership. The research­
ers concluded that the economic appeal would not seem
35likely to lose its appeal in the near future.^
The results of the study are best expressed by the
following statement:
A worker's willingness to join a union varies directly 
with the degree to which associations with and parti­
cipation in the union would reinforce normal group 
attachments and interests, would involve practices 
consistent with the codes, the philosophy, the faith 
he shares with the group.3°
Since the researchers found that the dissatisfactions
expressed by many of the workers centered around wages,
working conditions, and hours, it can be concluded that
"normal and consistent group behavior would center around
37the alleviation of these dissatisfactions." Individual 





workers will react favorably to union membership in propor­
tion to how well the union, operating within the group's 
social system, is able to reduce worker frustration and 
anxieties and will further worker opportunities relevant to 
the achievement of the worker's standards of successful
living.38
In 1949-50 researchers at the University of Chicago's 
Industrial Relations Center conducted a study of a union 
having a membership of 14,000 workers who were employed in
39an integrated steel mill producing finished steel products. 
Approximately 95 percent of the workers in the plants from 
which the sample was drawn were union members. The purpose 
of the study was to determine why and under what circum­
stances does a worker join a union.
The research design was based on interviews with 
representative groups within the local-leaders and rank-
and-file active and inactive members supplemented by inten-
40sive observation.
The leadership group had a total of 36 of whom 28 
were interviewed. Active members were defined as 
those who had attended from four to seven meetings in 
the past year and 24 of the 43 in this group were 
interviewed. Finally, a 1 percent random sample was 
taken of the union members who had not attended any
38ibid.. p. 37.
39j. Seidman, J. London, B. Karsh, "Why Workers 
Join Unions," The Annals of the American Academy of Poli­
tical and Social Science, Vol. 274 (March, 1951), P» 75»
40^^Ibid.. p. 75.
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meetings during the previous year, and interviews were 
held with 62 of the 128 persons forming this group.41
The authors found that 86 percent of the leaders,
83 percent of the active members, and 6l percent of the 
inactive rank-and-file members had joined the union with 
some degree of conviction. The groups listed family back­
ground, prior experiences, and experiences in the plant 
as responsible for their pro-union orientation at the time 
of joining.
The authors did not give the percentage breakdown 
of the workers who listed family background as being a 
strong motivator toward joining. They did note that 39 
percent of the leaders, 21 percent of the actives, and 15
percent of the rank-and-file inactives had joined the
union because of their experiences in the plant. ^
Although 24 percent of the inactive members inter­
viewed indicated that they joined the union without con­
viction, the authors found a fairly large number of inac­
tive union members who reported joining the union because 
of informal group pressure. The authors suspected:
that had they been able to study the motives for join­
ing the union at the time the step was taken, then they
would have discovered that a larger number of the
respondents joined the union without conviction and 






The informal group pressures or threatened unfriendliness 
of the informal work group were found not only to be regu­
lators of union members' conduct but were able to coerce 
some workers who did not want to join the union into join-
ing.̂ 5
It was also found that not one of the union members 
in the sample groups stated that he joined the union to 
get higher wages.
In summary, this study found that the reasons for 
joining a union do not fit into any neatly preconceived 
motivational scheme. The social environment surrounding 
the work group in consonance with the worker's psychologi­
cal predisposition toward the union are of critical impor­
tance in determining what motivates an individual worker 
to join a union. Very often the decision to join a union 
is not based on logical reasoning in which self-interest 
figures to a degree but rather upon the existing social
46pressures.
In 1949 Arnold M. Rose conducted a comprehensive 
survey of the Teamster's Local 688's membership attitudes 
and opinions. From a total membership of 85OO Rose selected 
a systematic random sample from the 4100 Teamster members 
whose shops had been organized for at least seven years.




47interviewed 392 persons in their homes.
The questionnaire included 129 questions centering
around three topic areas :
(l) For what reasons can workers feel a sense of solidar­
ity with their union? (2) To what extent can union 
leaders and union experiences educate the rank-and- 
file to have attitudes considered by the leaders to be 
essential for successful trade unionism? (3) To what 
extent can a union buck a strong cultural pattern of 
which their members are a part when this opposition is 
deemed necessary.for union solidarity and successful 
union operation? °
In terms of this study two questions asked by Rose
to the union members are of particular importance. The
Lafirst is: "Why did you join the union?" The second is:
"What do you consider to be the purposes of your union? 
(What's a union for?)"^^
In response to the first question, the Teamster 
members' replied as follows:
REASONS FOR JOINING THE UNION
Reason Given Percentage of Members*
1. Had to--I work in a union shop 45.9
2. For my own benefit (general but not __ ^
personal)
3. It's a good cause (general but impersonal) l6.3
4?M. S. Viteles, Motivation and Morale in Industry 
(New York; John Wiley and Sons, 19&2), p. 345; citing A. 
M. Rose, Union Solidarity (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1952).
48Arnold M. Rose, Union Solidarity (Minneapolis: 




4. For higher wages 7»7
5. For better working conditions 6,6
6. For security 4.3
7. There is strength in numbers 3-3
8. The majority wanted it 2.8
9. No answer 1.3
Total Number 392 51
♦Figures add up to more than 100 percent because a 
person could give more than one smswer
From the members' responses Rose concluded that 
almost half of the members believed that they had Joined 
the union involuntarily. Another large proportion gave 
reasons indicating a belief in unions or for personal bene- 
fit as reasons for joining.
The union members' responses to the second ques­
tion, What do you consider to be the purposes of your 
union? (What's a union for?) are as follows;
OPINIONS OF UNION MEMBERS ON THE PURPOSES OF THE 




1. Get specific economic benefits __ .
(higher wages) 75
2. Get job security (including seniority) 31.1
3. Gain rights (e.g., fair deal, welfare) l6.6
4. Get benefits off the job (medical, legal) 10.7
5. Organize labor (get solidarity for _ „
bargaining)
6. Raise standards of living 7*9
7. Make labor and management more cooperative $.18. Increase fellowship among workers 3*0 -39. Miscellaneous, Don't know, No answer 2.6 ^
^^Ibid.. p. 61.
5^Ibid., p. 60.
53M. S. Viteles, op. cit. , citing A. M. Rose, op. cit., p. 348.
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According to Rose, 75*3 percent of the members' 
first response was to "get specific economic benefits," 
However, substantial proportions of the members spontane­
ously mentioned getting job security, gaining rights, and 
getting benefits in response to the question.
Initially, Rose concluded that most of the union's 
members viewed the primary function of the union to be 
collective bargaining to gain higher wages and better work­
ing conditions. Because many of the members gave spontane­
ous secondary answers Rose further explored the members' 
attitudes with two additional questions: "(1) What do you
think are the main things your union should work for right 
now, either through collective bargaining or through social 
action in the community?"^^ In response to this question
33.7 percent of the members (a significant majority com­
pared to the percent responses to other alternative 
answers) indicated higher wages and/or collective bargain- 
ing.5«
In the second question, Rose asked the members if they 
thought that the union "should put more time and money into 
getting higher wages from the employers or should it put more 
into a health plan, social and recreational activities, an insurance




•57plan, or other things of that kind?"
In response to this question 24.3 percent indicated
"higher wages" while 38.1 percent indicated "other things.
Rose concluded that the members of the union feel a greater
need for supplemental functions, but because they have not
been sufficiently educated to think in terms of these areas
59they align themselves with the traditional functions.
M. S. Viteles in his analysis of Rose's findings 
disagrees with Rose's conclusions and suggests that there 
has been a misinterpretation of the survey's data.^^
The author of this study concurs with Dr. Viteles' 
opinion because Rose himself later concludes that "worker 
loyalty to the union is proportional to the success that 
the union has in achieving its goals of increasing the 
worker's income, security, and job satisfaction."^^
In 1952 Walker and Guest published the results of 
their study on what workers in an automobile manufacturing 




S. Viteles, og. cit. , p. 349.
M. Rose, o£. cit., p. I83.
S. Viteles, og. cit. , p. 340, citing C. R. 
Walker and R. H. Guest, The Man on the Assembly Line 
(Harvard University Press, 1952).
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In an analysis of the relative importance of the union 
in comparison with other job conditions rated by 
employees, it was found that only 2 in the sample of 
180 employees gave the "union” as their first reason 
for liking their job at plant X, in contrast with the 
large number who gave "good pay" or "steady workU-as 
the most important reason for liking their jobs.
Walker and Guest suggested that it was not the 
usual reasons such as higher wages, hours, job security, 
etc. that motivated workers to join the union but rather 
that the union served to counterbalance a lack of satisfac­
tion with the work experience. They concluded that the
union met in part the social and psychological needs of the
64workers that the work environment left void.
A comparative analysis of the summarized studies' 
conclusions as discussed on the previous pages suggests 
that the reasons why individual workers in the private sec­
tor join unions are not uniform. However, the conclusions 
cited in the research studies are based on primary research 
and are somewhat more definite than the cited conclusions 
of the labor historians.
Chamberlin concluded that workers join unions 
because they view the union as the best way to get results 
from an economic base.^^ Rose also concluded that loyalty 
to the union was a function of how well the union satisfies
^^Ibid., p. 340, citing C. R, Walker and R. H. 
Guest, Ibid.
Ibid., p. 34l, citing C. R. Walker and R. H. 
Guest, Ibid.
6f*E. M. Chamberlin, o£. cit., p. 122.
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members' economic goals.
Bakke concluded that workers join unions for social,
economic, and psychological reasons in that order. The
strongest reasons centered around the need for economic
gains in terms of wages and hours of work as high values
6 7held by social groups within the organization.
Seidman, London, and Karsh concluded that individu­
als join unions because of only one or some combination of 
the following: family background, previous or present
work experiences, or group pressures. Seidman, et al.,
concluded that group pressures to join the union were a
68strong motivating influence. In a sense this means that 
an individual's joining a union may be an involuntary 
response to social pressure.
Rose also came to the conclusion that many union 
members felt that they had been coerced into joining the 
union. It is interesting to note that in Seidman, _et al. 
study 95 percent of the workers were organized and in Rose's 
study a union shop existed. Rose indicated that higher 
wages was a high group value but Seidman, ^1. did not 
indicate what were the values of the work groups that 
exerted social pressures upon nonunion workers to join 
the union. Because not one of the union members in the
M. Rose, _0£. cit., p. l83.
Wright Bakke, 0£. cit., p. 42.
68J. Seidman, J. London, B. Karsh, jO£. cit., p. 78.
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sample group indicated that he joined the union for higher 
wages we can infer that higher wages was not a high priority 
group value.
Walker and Guest concluded that the workers' moti­
vation to join the union were not based upon economic needs, 
but rather upon a lack of satisfaction with the work experi-
69ence.
The results of two studies indicate that many work­
ers in highly unionized organizations joined the union 
involuntarily. This suggests that a strong socializing 
force exists in highly organized work environments. If the 
group's values center along economic lines as indicated by 
Bakke and Rose in their respective studies, then individual 
values will tend to conform with the group's values.
Why White-Collar Workers in the Private Sector Have Not Joined Unions in Significant Numbers
Despite the fact that impressive gains in union mem­
bership have been made in the public sector over the past 
ten years, the overall growth of union membership has not 
kept pace with the growth of total employment. In 1955 
there were 17,7^9,000 union members or about 33«2 percent 
of the nonagricultural labor force. Of these 17,7^9*000 
union members, 2,463,000 or 13.6 percent were white-collar 
workers. In 1955 the labor force consisted of 24,585,000
S. Viteles, op. cit., citing C. R. Walker and 
R, H. Guest, o£. cit., p. 341.
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white-collar workers and 24,771*000 blue-collar workers.
In terms of the white-collar labor force only 10.0 percent 
were organized.
Over the past fifteen years this nation's economy 
has become increasingly service-oriented. White-collar 
occupational sectors as trades, services, finance, and gov­
ernment have been responsible for the majority of the 
increases in total employment while the blue-collar sectors-
excepting only construction— have actually registered rela-
71tive employment declines. The latest available figures 
for the fourth quarter of L.970-'indicate that there, are
38.126.000 white-collar workers and 27,625,000 blue-collar
72workers in the labor force.
In absolute numbers the labor union movement has 
continued to grow from 17,749*000 members in 1955 to
20.258.000 members in 1968. However, in relative terms
union membership has declined from 33.2 percent of the
7 3npnfarm labor force in 1955 to 27«9 percent in I968.
^^United States Department of Commerce, Statisti­
cal Abstract of the United States, 1970, p. 225, No. 334, 
and p. 238, No. 355» Statistics on white-collar union 
membership prior to 1955 are not available.
^^Arthur A. Sloane, "Prospects for the Unioniza­
tion of White-Collar Employees," Personnel Journal, Vol.
48 (December, 1969)* p. 9&5"
^̂ "Current Labor Statistics: Household Data 91,"Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94 (April, 1971)»
^^United States Department of Commerce, Statisti­
cal Abstract of the United States, 1970, op. cit., p. 238, 
No. 355. 1968 represents the latest available union mem­
bership figures.
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The principal reason for the relative decline in
union membership is the failure of unions to organize these
new white-collar workers in significant numbers. In 1968
the number of white-collar workers in the labor force was
35,902,000, an increase of 9,317,000 since 1955» Blue-
collar workers increased by 2 ,976,000 to 27,7^7,000 during
74the same period. White-collar union membership increased 
by 713,000 to 3 ,176,000 during the 1955 to I968 period. 
Although white-collar union membership increased from 13.6 
percent of total union membership to 15«7 percent during 
the same period, white-collar union membership as a per­
cent of total white-collar employment declined from 10.0 
percent in 1955 to 8.8 percent in I968.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics started collecting 
data on union membership by industry in 1956. In that 
year 915,000 federal, state, and local government workers 
were union members. They comprised 5.1 percent of organized 
labor's id,104,000 members. Total government employment in 
1956 was 7 ,277,000 of whom 915,000 or 12.6 percent were 
organized. By I968 federal, state, and local government 
employment increased to 12,202,000 with most of the gain 
occurring in white-collar occupations. Federal, state, and 
local government union membership climbed to 2,153,000
74"Current Labor Statistics," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94, ô. cit.
75United States Department of Commerce, Statistical 
Abstract, 1970, p. 238, 0£, cit.
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members or 17.6 percent of all government workers. By
1968, 10.7 percent of organized labor's 20,258,000 members
7 Awere federal, state, and local government workers.
Although some of the highest proportionate gains 
in government union membership were in white-collar occu­
pations, white-collar union membership as a percent of 
total union membership decreased between 1956 and I968.
During the period 1956 to 1968 membership in all unions 
increased by 2.1 million of whom more than 1.2 million 
were in federal, state, and local government. At the same, 
gains in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries were 
only 379,000 and 487,000 respectively. While federal, state, 
and local government unions combined increased by 135«5
77percent, private sector union gains were about 5 percent.
An analysis of numerous articles and research 
studies illustrated a number of beliefs pertaining to why 
white-collar workers are not attracted to labor unions.
According to Arthur Sloane, irresponsible strikes, 
union leaders criminality, featherbedding, and unstatesman­
like contract settlements all conveyed through the mass 
media to the public, have given labor unions a poor public
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, I969, Bul­
letin No. 1630 (Washington, D.C.), Tables 36 and 136.
P. Cohany and L. M. Dewey, "Union Membership 
among Government Employees," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 93 
(July, 1970), p. 15.
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i m a g e . " T h i s  poor image may well have alienated hundreds
of thousands--and conceivably even millions— of potential
79white-collar union joiners."
Publicity given to high wage settlements negotiated 
by unions have caused many white-collar workers to blame 
the unions for their low wages. In 1950 and again in 1957 
the Opinion Research Corporation asked a number of white- 
collar workers whether their salaries (determined by man­
agement) were as high as they should have been. In 1950,
6l percent of the white-collar workers believed that their
salaries were too low because of high union negotiated
Ô0wage settlements. In the 1957 study, the percentage 
increased.
The special nature and condition of white-collar
work has also helped retard unionism. White-collar work
has historically been less physically demanding, job
security has been higher, time clock pressures have been
in less evidence, fringe benefits have come at an earlier
8ldate, and salary versus wages has been a status symbol.
7ÔArthur Sloane, jO£. cit. , p. 966.
79lbid., p. 966. 
âoPapers from Industrial Relations Research Associ­
ation Meetings, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 87 (February, 
1964), pp. 125-131, citing Opinion Research Corporation, New 
Jersey, "White-Collar Employee Loyalty," pp. A-6 and A-7•
Ô1R. L. Rowann and H. R. Northrop (eds.). Readings in Labor Economics and Labor Relations (Homewood, Illinois: R. D. Irwin Co., 19̂ 8), No. 251 "New Union Frontier: White-Collar Workers," p. 265»
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According to Sayles and Strauss, "White-collar jobs are 
thought to have individuality in contrast to the mass char­
acter of factory work, to be 'middle class' as distinct
82from 'working class. '"
Because white-collar workers have perceived them­
selves as being different from blue-collar workers, they 
have tended to identify themselves with management. In 
the Opinion Research Corporation's 1957 study, more than 
three-fourths of the white-collar workers surveyed identi-
83fied more with management than with production workers.
In a number of studies about white-collar workers'
attitudes, the opportunity to train for higher skills and
merit system promotional policies rated near the top of
84desirable management programs. Historically, management 
has favored the merit system for promotion while unions
O c
have been more inclined to favor a seniority system. 
Although the claims of upward mobility of white-collar 
workers into the ranks of management may be exaggerated, 
white-collar workers are reluctant to join unions for fear
82Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, Human 
Behavior in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966) , p. 68.
8 3Papers from Industrial Relations Research Asso­
ciation Meeting, og. cit. , citing Opinion Research Corpora­
tion, _o£. cit. , pp. A-6, A-7.
84See C. Wright Mills, White-Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); ORC White-Collar Loyalty, p. 9. Charles Ginder, "Unionization in the Office,"Office Executive, January, I96I, p. 13.
85'Arthur Sloane, cit., p. 968.
57
of being identified with or constrained by the seniority 
system.
By its very nature unionism means collective action. 
In any group action there is always some loss of individu­
ality. White-collar workers with professional identifica­
tion continue to believe "that for them there is still much 
more to be gained from individual bargaining with their 
employer than from any form of collective bargaining.
Because the union is viewed as being contrary to individual 
merit rewards, the relatively few white-collar professionals 
having union membership are viewed as being marginal or 
mediocore by their associates.
There is some evidence that white-collar profes­
sionals have strong feelings against the use of the strike 
weapon. One notable union, the United Steelworkers of 
America, in their organizing brochure directed at office 
and technical workers, deplored strikes and emphasized that
strikes are not sanctioned until every possible means has
Ô7been tried in settling a problem.
In 1967, 5^*3 percent of the organizable white-collar 
workers were women. In clerical occupations the proportion 
was almost three-fourths and in professional and in techni­
cal occupations more than one-third. In contrast, only
G^ibid., p. 968.
87Bernard Goldstein, "The Perspective of Unionized 
Professionals," Social Forces, Vol. 37 (May, 1959), p. 325.
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8816.8 percent of all blue-collar workers were women. The 
labor force attachment of women is relatively weak and tends
89to vary significantly by age and family attachment.
H. M. Douty believes that the significantly higher propor­
tion of women in white-collar employment versus those in 
blue-collar employment increases the difficulty of organiz­
ing white-collar workers.
Technological change and rapid expansion of many 
industries particularly service oriented industries over 
the past ten years has caused an increase in the demand for 
many white-collar occupational skills. The supply has not 
kept pace with the demand and the wages of white-collar 
workers have steadily risen. Although there is recent evi­
dence to point to a change in this situation, the highly 
favorable job markets of the 1960's have been an inhibiting 
factor to the organization of white-collar workers.
Although white-collar unionism outside of the gov­
ernment is relatively low, a number of authors believe that 
there will be substantial increases in white-collar union­
ism over the next decade. White-collar union membership in 
the government exceeds $0 percent and within the AFGE white- 
collar accounts for 50 percent of the actual membership.
00H. M. Douty, "Prospects for White-Collar Union­
ism," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 92 (January, 19&9), P- 32.
^^Ibid., citing Vera C. Perella, "Women and the 
Labor Force," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 9I (February, I968),
pp. 1-12.
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One of the purposes of this study is to attempt to deter­
mine why white-collar workers in the government join 
unions in far more substantial numbers than their counter­
parts in the private sector.
In Chapter IV the writings of numerous authors 
will be examined to establish the environment of the gov­
ernment's labor-management relations.
CHAPTER IV
THE UNIQUENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT AS AN EMPLOYER
Numerous authors in the field of public sector 
labor-management relations have made the point that the gov­
ernment's relationship with its employees is unique when 
compared to the relationship between labor and management 
in the private sector.^ This chapter consists of an exami­
nation and evaluation of the uniqueness of the government 
as an employer from the following bases:
a. The Sovereignty Concept
b. Past and Present Legal Environment
c. The Role of the Civil Service Commission
d. Existing Limitations on Collective Bargaining.
The Sovereignty Concept
The most important and widely discussed difference 
between private and public sector labor relations lies in 
the concept of sovereignty.
The concept of sovereignty is inherent in the
0̂. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)• Dr. Stahl is the fore-most writer in the field of public administration holding this view.
60
61
supreme power of a political state. Any state that pos­
sesses and maintains supreme power can determine whether 
or not an individual or a group of individuals can initi­
ate a claim against the state. Sovereignty may be exer­
cised by an individual, as in the form of an absolute
monarchy, or by a body politic as is the case in contempor-
. . 2 ary society.
The concept of sovereignty was deeply rooted in 
English common law. Absolute power rested with the king 
and it was essential that belief in the infallibility of 
the king be maintained. Once this doctrine was accepted,
3the doctrine of sovereign immunity became self-evident.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity found its way 
into the American system of government not from a moral- 
legal base but rather from a political-legal base. At 
the time of this nation's independence the individual states 
who had financed the Revolutionary War were financially 
indebted to many private citizens of other states. In 
order to get the states to ratify the Constitution the 
founding fathers invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
whereby the states were exempted from lawsuits filed by
2Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public 
Management at the Bargaining Table (Chicago: Public Per-
sonnel Association, 1967), p. 248.
3Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Fed- 
eral Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962),
p. 41.
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private citizens unless the states consented to the suits.^
In 1893 the Supreme Court refused to uphold the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in a decision against the 
state of Georgia. As a result the eleventh amendment was 
passed by Congress. The amendment does not specifically 
mention sovereign immunity but it does exempt individual 
states from lawsuits filed in federal court by citizens of 
other states. Generally the courts have upheld this doc­
trine.^
The concept of sovereignty is difficult to under­
stand and over time this inherent difficulty has caused 
considerable misunderstandings in the area of government 
labor-management relations. Willem B. Vosloo has condensed 
the political studies of Andrew Hacker into an excellent 
discussion on sovereignty that resolves this concept's 
theoretical difficulty. The difficulty of the concept 
lies in the fact that sovereignty conveys two ideas: legal
sovereignty and political sovereignty. In the legal sense 
sovereignty means that a governmental source of law must 
exist which is final and definitive.^
Political sovereignty is the exercise of sover­
eignty in an independent government system. The operation
^Ibid.y p. 42.
^Ibid., pp. 4 2 - 3 .
^Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the 
United States Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel
Association, 1966), p. 19.
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of the government is organized around a system of checks 
and balances that delimit the exercising of power by an 
individual or group. The check and balance system exists 
because of federalism, separation of power, periodic elec­
tions, and the Constitution itself. Therefore, the search 
for the sovereign does not stop at any one element. It 
must follow a continuous circular path.^
Andrew Hacker concludes that:
sovereignty is not something that can be identified or 
discovered. It is, on the contrary, a process. In 
other words it is the interaction of specified indi­
viduals and institutions according to specified rules 
and procedure.
With regard to the government's relationship with 
its employees, the theoretical application of the sovereignty 
doctrine permits only the government to establish the terms 
and conditions of employment. Any system of collective 
bargaining under which unions jointly determine the terms 
and conditions of employment is incompatible with this
9doctrine.
The theoretical interpretation of the sovereignty 
doctrine as applied to government employees has been 
advanced for nearly one hundred years by government
?Ibid., p. 19.
QAndrew Hacker, Political Theory; Philosophy, 
Ideology, Science (New York: The Macmillan Company, I96I),
p. 213.
9 'M. Moskow, J. Lowenberg, £. Koziaria, Collective 
Bargaining in Public Employment (New York: Random House,
1970), p. 17.
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officials who believed that there could be no questioning 
of the decisions made by the state. Their logic was based 
upon the belief that: "Government service is public in
character, belonging to and responsible to the people of 
our country.
Around the turn of this century the government 
attempted to implement the sovereignty doctrine on a prac­
tical basis in an attempt to restrict the efforts of orga­
nized employees in the Post Office.
The first Presidential order of this kind was 
issued by Theodore Roosevelt in 1902. It forbade "federal 
employees on pain of dismissal to seek legislation in their 
behalf, 'directly or indirectly or through associations' 
except through the departments in which they were employed. 
In 1906 this order was reissued in a more broadened form to
cover not only employees of executive departments but also
12employees of independent government establishments.
Again in 1909 President Taft supplemented Roose­
velt's orders with a regulation of his own that prohibited 
any government employee from responding to any request for 
information from Congress except through departmental
^^United States Civil Service Commission, The Gov­
ernment Personnel System, Personnel Management Series No.
4, November, I960, p. 1.
^^Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New 
York: Remsen Press, 1948), p. 122.
^^Ibid., p. 122.
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13channels. These Presidential orders commonly known as 
the "gag rule" were in effect from 1902 to 1912, In 1912 
they were repealed by Congress with the passage of the 
Lloyd-LaFollette Act.
Presidents Wilson, Coolidge, and Hoover all issued 
statements which in effect held that a strike by government 
employees amounted to insurrection. In 1937 President 
Roosevelt clearly asserted the historical contention that 
the government is sovereign in the letter to Luther C. 
Steward, president of the National Federation of Federal 
Employees (NFFE):
The process of collective bargaining, as usually 
understood, cannot be transplanted into the public 
service. It has its distinct and unsurmountable lim­
itations when applied to public personnel management. 
The very nature and purposes of Government make it 
impossible for administrative officials to represent 
fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions 
with Government employee organizations. The employer 
is the whole people who speak by means of the laws 
enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accord­
ingly administrative officials and employees alike 
are governed and guided, and in many instances, restric­
ted, by laws which establish policies, procedures or 
rules in personnel matters. Particularly, 1 want to 
emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no 
place in the functions of any organization of Govern­
ment employees.
The intent of this letter was to make a political 
point in specifically asserting that the right to strike 
against the government cannot exist in government
^^Ibid., p. 136.
lAMorton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public 
Service; A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge; Har­
vard University Press, 1951)» P» 84.
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labor-management relations. There was no intent upon the 
part of President Roosevelt to eliminate the attempts of 
organized government employees to have a voice in the 
determination of their terms and conditions of employment. 
However, this author supports the opinion of Morton R.
Godine "that negotiations conducted under circumstances 
which do not permit or resort to the strike perhaps may 
not warrant the appelation 'collective bargaining.'
Sterling D. Spero in quoting a passage from Nicholas
M. Butler has presented the epitome of the government's
argument of sovereignty.
Servants of the state in any capacity--military, naval, 
or civil--are in our Government, there by their own 
choice and not by necessity. Their sole obligation is 
to the state and its interests. There is no analogy 
between a servant or employee of the State and the 
State itself on the one hand, and the laborer and pri­
vate or corporate capitalist on the other.
More recently the Civil Service Commission has 
categorically maintained that the government cannot bar­
gain away any of its sovereignty. The Commission using 
the definition of collective bargaining as stated in Secr 
tion 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act states;
that any attempt to apply this definition to the Fed­
eral Service immediately raises the issue of the 
sovereignty of the Government . . .  but for purposes
^^Wilson R. Hart, og. cit., p. 24.
^^Morton R. Godine, _0£. cit. , p. 85.
17Sterling D. Spero, The Labor Movement in Govern­
ment Industry (New York: The Macmillan Company, 192?)$
p. 17.
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of this discussion it can be stated catagorically that 
the Government cannot bargain away any of its sover­
eignty.1°
The Commission does acknowledge that in the large complex 
governmental structure there exists substantial room for 
give and take in matters that do not challenge government 
authority. In effect the Commission has stated that col­
lective bargaining as defined by the Taft-Hartley Act can 
never exist in the government.
A paradox exists when we consider that the govern­
ment employee lives in a democratic society. However, when 
he is in the employ of the same government which guarantees 
and maintains his democratic rights, he finds that his 
rights as an employee are severely limited. Aside from 
the argument that the government has a sovereign status, 
another rationale is used to justify this paradox. This 
other rationale is that the government employees share in 
the control of his working life should be exercised through 
his capacity as voting citizen of the state rather than 
as an employee of the state. The government employee 
through the use of his vote can exert political pressure
upon the legislative and executive branches of govern-
19ment which establish the conditions of employment. This
18United States Civil Service Commission, Employee- Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, Personnel Methods series wo. 15, August, p. i.üj.
19Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, Employee Relations in the Public Service (Chicago: C.S.A.
of the U.S. and Canada, 1942), p. 4?.
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argument is fallacious in that the political activities
of government employees are rigidly controlled by the Hatch
Acts passed by Congress in 1939 and in 19^0 and administered
20by the Civil Service Commission. The Hatch Acts make it 
illegal for government employees to be active in any real 
sense in political affairs. Under the Act they cannot hold 
office nor solicit or handle political contributions.
The practical question is whether or not government 
employees can exert enough pressure upon the government to 
influence the determination of the terms and conditions of 
their employment. Although only one statute gives govern­
ment employees the right to exert limited pressure upon
their sovereign employer, the problem is to what branches
21of the government should the pressure be applied? As 
Hacker noted: in a pluralistic contemporary society sover­
eignty is a circular process. In the government, employ­
ment and personnel responsibilities are shared by Congress,
the president, departments, independent agencies, conunis-
22sions, and even political parties.
The government employee is again limited in his
20Donald R. Harvey, The Civil Service Commission 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970)» p# 16.
^^The Pendleton Act of l883, The Lloyd-LaFollette 
Act of 1912, and Executive Orders IO988 (I962) and 11491 
(1969) establish the basic rights for all government employ­
ees except certain specifically excluded groups as the CIA 
and FBI.
22Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public 
Management at the Bargaining Table, p. 249.
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attempts to collectively bargain with his employer con­
sidering the fact that in the final analysis all the vital 
personnel matters are fixed by legislative action and as 
a rule government employees' salaries come from taxes.
The government's position is a function of the specific 
power and personnel relationships between individuals 
and groups at any one time. Many organized pressure groups 
outside the government have as their main objective the 
reduction of taxes. In effect the reduction of taxes
means either a reduction in the number of government
23employees or the reduction of salary levels. The
organized government employee is but one of many interest
groups attempting to exert pressure upon the government.
For the purposes of this study the concept of
sovereignty remains valid for the "purpose of legitimizing
an ultimate source of authority in the political system to
settle conflicting claims between competing individuals
24and sub-groups." The real question is just how much 
sovereignty the government really requires and whether it 
is absolutely necessary to apply the sovereignty doctrine 
in each and every area of governmental decision making.
We can say that the government must always be in a position 
to protect the national security, but is it also necessary
23Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee 
Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chair­
man, cit. , p. 49.
24Willem B, Vosloo, ô , cit., p. 20.
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for the government to extend the doctrine of sovereignty 
to support the unilateral decision-making power of the 
government in determining the terms and conditions of
25employment for its employees.
On a piecemeal basis the government has enacted
legislation limiting its sovereign immunity.However,
in the area of labor-management relations the government
has remained largely inflexible. This statement is based
upon the fact that the past and present legal framework
of government labor-management relations has been care-
27fully shaped around the sovereignty doctrine. It is also 
based upon the fact that Congress has specifically excluded 
government employees from coverage of all the major statutes 
that facilitate and regulate labor-management relations in 
the private sector.
In the private sector the law is structured to make 
the bargaining parties equal. In the government, the sover­
eignty doctrine makes it impossible to structure laws such
28that management and labor bargain as equals. Congress
^^Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L, Hennessey, Public 
Management at the Bargaining Table, op. cit., p. 250.
26The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 and the 
Tucker Act of 1948 provide judicial redress for persons 
having claims against the government for tort or contract.
27Mans our A. Mans our, "The Legal Rights of Federal 
Employees to Unionize, Bargain Collectively and Strike" 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation. The Ohio State Univer­
sity, 1969), p. 34.
28Willem B. Vosloo, _0£, cit. , p. 159-
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has by deliberately excluding government employees from 
these statutes avoided situations where tests of strength 
between government management and labor could develop.
The Past and Present Legal Environment
The Statutes 
Outside of the statutes and executive orders 
affecting the role of the Civil Service Commission there 
are only a handful of statutes and executive orders that 
apply exclusively to government labor-management relations 
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, enacted in 1912, after 
a campaign of protest against the "gag rule" of Presidents 
Roosevelt and Taft, was the first significant piece of 
legislation pertaining to government employee unionism.
It provides:
. . . That membership in any society, association,
club, or other form of organization of postal employ­
ees not affiliated with any outside organization 
imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage 
in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any 
strike, against the United States, having for its 
object, among other things, improvements in the con­
ditions of labor of its members, including hours of 
labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence, 
by any person or group of persons in said postal ser­
vice, or the presenting by any such person or group 
of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Con­
gress or any member thereof shall not constitute or 
be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or 
removal of such person or groups of persons from said 
service. The right of persons employed in the civil 
service of the United States, either individually or 
collectively, to petition Congress, or any member 
thereof, or to furnish information to either house
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of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, 
shall not be denied or interfered with.29
The postal service is mentioned specifically 
because at the time of the passage of the statute the 
postal service unions were the only unions in the govern­
ment. This statute became the basis for the principle 
that all government employees have the right to join or 
refrain from joining a union which does not assert or 
impose an obligation or duty upon government employees to 
engage in any strike against the United States. It also 
provided that government employees have the right to peti­
tion Congress without fear of management reprisals.
The Act does not encourage government employees to
join unions nor does the Act encourage the development of
any system for the joint determination of the terms and
30conditions of employment for government employees.
In consonance with the sovereignty doctrine and to 
further differentiate private and public sector labor- 
management relations. Congress in Section 305 of the Taft- 
Hartley Act, declared it unlawful for any government employee 
to participate in a strike. Punishment included the forfeit 
of civil service status and noneligibility for re-employment
29Wilson R. Hart, _0£. cit. , p. 33.
30Kurt L. Hanslowe, The Emerging Law of Labor Rela­
tions in Public Employment (New York; Cayuga Press, 19&7), 
P • 37 •
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31by the government for three years.
In 1955 Congress passed Public Law 330 repealing 
Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley Act, The Law made it a 
felony for government employees to strike or assert the 
right to strike the government. Government employees who 
either assert the right to strike or participate in a 
strike must be discharged and are subject to a year in 
jail and/or a fine of 1,000 dollars.
Some Signs of Change
Although President Roosevelt was unalterably
opposed to collective bargaining and strikes by government
employees he was positively disposed to government employee
unions. In the same letter to Mr. Steward previously
quoted, President Roosevelt stated "that employee organi-
33zations have a logical place in government."
The progressive policies of labor-management rela­
tions adopted by the Government Printing Office in the 
1920's, the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930's, and 
the Interior Department in the 1940's gave impetus to the 
government labor movement.
In 1949, The Commission on Organization of the
31Wilson R. Hart, o^. cit., p. 12.
3 2Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, op. cit. ,
"When Bargaining Fails," Jacob Fenkelman, p. 132.
3 30. Glenn Stahl, 0£. cit., p. 273.
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Executive Branch of Government, the Hoover Commission,
proposed that officials of agencies and departments should
be required to provide for employee participation in the
34formulation of personnel policies.
In a 1955 report, the Labor Law Section of the 
American Bar Association censured the government for its 
archiac labor-management relations policies. The Bar 
stated;
A government which imposes upon other employers cer­
tain obligations in dealing with their employees may 
not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public 
servants on a reasonably similar basis, mindful of 
course to meet the exigencies of public services.
In the late 1940's government unions exerted their 
influence in the Congress to bring about legislative changes 
to amend the limited scope of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.
In each session of Congress from 1949 to I96I 
Representative George M. Rhodes (D) of Pennsylvania and 
Senator Clin D. Johnston (D) of South Carolina submitted 
companion bills known as the Rhodes-Johnston Bill provid­
ing for statutory recognition of government unions as the 
representatives of organized government employees. With 
variations the several versions of the bill would have
34Harold S. Roberts, Labor Management Relations in 
the Public Service (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
197O), p. 26.
3 SAllen Wisenfield, "Collective Bargaining by Pub­
lic Employees," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 89 (June, 1966),
p. 610.
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established the following policies
1. The unions would legally represent their mem­
bers in grievances.
2. Agency management was to develop procedures 
whereby union officers and management officials would con­
fer on policy matters that affected the terms and condi­
tions of employment.
3. Union representatives were to be protected 
from management redress while "carrying out any lawful 
activity."
4. Unresolved disputes on these policies were to 
be submitted to an arbitration board whose decision would 
be final. The board's membership would consist of one 
member selected by the union, one member selected by man­
agement, and one member selected by the Secretary of Labor,
5. The checkoff system for union members was to
be implemented.
6. The Civil Service Commission would have the 
authority to enforce the statute. Agency and department 
heads would have been required to take remedial action if 
any of their officials were found by an arbitration board 
to have violated the law.
The bill was opposed by the administration on the
36Kurt L. Hanslowe, _o£. cit., p. 38.
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37following grounds:
1. The legislation was unnecessary. Administra­
tive regulations allowed for consultation with employee 
representatives on all personnel matters over which they 
exercise control. Under the bill the scope of bargainable 
issues was so ill defined that management's rights would 
be encroached.
2. A satisfactory grievance system where appeals
can be made to the highest department level already
o Qexisted. The individual employee freedom of choice in 
choosing a representative in a grievance proceeding would 
no longer exist.
3. The section of the bill granting union officers
the right to "carry on any lawful activity" has no defined
boundaries. In effect, the unions could file a grievance 
any time their activities were questioned by management.
If the union won their case in arbitration management 
risked demotion or termination.
4. Compulsory arbitration would deprive management 
of their authority to direct the agency or department in 
accomplishing its objectives.
5. The Civil Service Commission's authority under
^^Wilson R. Hart, op. cit., pp. l40-l48 and Willem 
B. Vosloo, op. cit., pp. 45-52.
o ACivil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee 
Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, 
op. cit. , p. 2.
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the Veterans Preference Act and the Classification Act 
would be severely undermined if this authority was trans­
ferred to the Secretary of Labor,
Congress adjourned without ever taking action on 
the Rhodes-Johnston Bill.
Late in the I96O presidential campaign John F.
Kennedy in a letter to a postal union official expressed
regret that the Republicans had been largely unsympathetic
to the Rhodes-Johnston Bill which Kennedy had endorsed.
Kennedy implied that a democratic congress and a democratic
39president might be more sympathetic to the union's views.
In 1961 in order to satisfy the demands for change, 
and to find a suitable substitute for the Rhodes-Johnston 
Bill, President Kennedy appointed a Task-Force on Employee- 
Management Relations in the Federal Service. In appointing 
the Task-Force, President Kennedy declared his belief that:
The right of all employees in the Federal Govern­
ment to join and participate in the activities of 
employee organizations, and to seek to improve working 
conditions and the resolution of grievances should be 
recognized by management officials at all levels in 
all departments and agencies. The participation of 
Federal employees in the formulation and implementation 
of employee policies and procedures affecting them con­
tributes to the effective conduct of public business.
We need to improve practices which will assure the 
rights and obligations of employees, employee organi­
zations, and the executive branch in pursuing tjae 
objective of effective labor-management cooperation in 
the public service.^0
39Willem B. Vosloo, c>£. cit. , p. 59»
L q United States Civil Service Commission, Employee- Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, op. cit..
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The mission of the Task-Force under the leadership 
of Secretary of Labor Auth\ir J. Goldberg was to advise the 
President on labor-management relations in the government. 
In meeting its objectives the Task-Force used agency and 
department reports, open hearings with public, management, 
and union officials participating. They also sent ques­
tionnaires to nearly all government agencies and depart­
ments .
The Task-Force issued its report on November 30, 
1961. They concluded that the government’s personnel pol­
icies lagged far behind those in the private sector. The 
principal reason for this shortcoming lay in the fact that 
"at the present time there is no Presidential policy on 
employee-management relations, beyond the barest acknowl-
Zj-iedgement that such relations ought to exist." Because 
no policy existed the separate agencies and departments 
had adopted widely varying policies in their labor rela­
tions. Out of 57 government agencies surveyed by the Task-
Force, 22 had no labor relations program and 11 had only
^2a permissive provision for unions.
The Task-Force gave special attention to the gov­
ernment’s grievance system. Many deficiencies were found
41Letter to the President, November 30, I96I, 
transmitting the Task-Force’s report on employee-management 
relations in the federal service.
42Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public 
Management at the Bargaining Table, op. cit., p. 79»
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in the agency and departments' grievance systems which 
had been established in accordance with the standards pre­
scribed in the Civil Service Commission's Federal Personnel 
Manual. The most important deficiencies were the limits
placed upon unions, the lack of third party advice, and
4 3the discrimination between veterans and nonveterans.
The Task-Force also noted that :
there are great differences between a Federal agency 
as an employer and a private firm so that attempts to 
transfer practices or concepts wholesale from the 
private economy and apply them uniformly to Government 
would be neither wise nor practical, nor in view of 
the sovereign nature of Government would it really be 
possible.
Aside from the doctrine of sovereignty the Task-Force out­
lined the uniqueness of the government's operational envir­
onment on the basis that the authority for decision making 
in government is diffused by the separation of power. This 
observation by the Task-Force is merely a reassertion of 
the practical instead of theoretical aspects of the sover­
eignty doctrine. In discussing the diffusion of government 
authority the Task-Force defended the role of the Civil 
Service Commission and recommended that any new system of 
labor-management relations must be mutually compatible and 
complementary to the civil service system's principles.
43Willem B. Vosloo, oi£. cit., p. 64.
44United States Civil Service Commission, Employee- 
Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, op. cit.,"pi 4.01.
^^Ibid. , pp. 4.01-4.02.
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Executive Orders 1098? and IO988 with Supplements 
President Kennedy accepted the Task-Force's recom­
mendations in full and subsequently issued two executive 
orders.
Executive Order 10987» Agency System for Appeals 
from Adverse Action, signed January 17, 1962, directs 
each government agency to develop a grievance procedure.
The Order also directs the Civil Service Commission to 
issue regulations along specified guidelines that are to 
be used by the agencies in establishing their grievance
46procedures.
Executive Order IO988, Employee-Management Cooper­
ation in the Federal Service, was also signed on January
17, 1962. This order initiated a new area of labor-manage-
4?ment relations at the federal level. In its scope the 
Order covered employee rights, a tripartite scheme for 
recognition of labor unions, the scope and form of employee 
participation, management's rights, grievance and appeals 
procedures, arbitration, coverage, and implementation pro­
cedures. Ultimate responsibility for administering the
48Order was assigned to agency management.
^^Harold S. Roberts, _0£. cit,, pp. 35-6.
47United States Civil Service Commission, Employee- 
Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, op. cit. ,
p. 1.01.
48Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee 
Relations Report, Reference File-1, 21:1051» P* IOI5» 1970.
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The significance of this Order lies in the fact
that "it represents the first government-wide official
employer policy on collective employee representation under
which a wide variety of arrangements for cooperation and
49consultation prevail under a mandatory regulation."
Under the terms of the Order, government employees 
(except those groups of employees specifically excluded) 
are granted the right to form, join, and assist any labor
union or to refrain from such activity. Unions may be
granted one of three forms of recognition provided that 
they meet the following legal conditions :
1. not assert the right to strike the government
2. not assist or participate in a strike against
the government
3. not impose a duty or obligation to conduct, 
assist, or participate in a strike against the government
4. not discriminate with regard to the conditions 
of membership.
Labor unions meeting the legal conditions of the Order were 
granted one of three forms of recognition;
49Willem B. Vosloo, _o£. cit., p. 2.
^^Executive Order IO988 (Section 2) uses the term 
"employee organization" while Executive Order 11491 (Sec­
tion 2) uses the term "labor organization" to describe 
what is commonly referred to as a "labor union." The term 
labor union is germane to the private sector but its mean­
ing is widely understood. The use of different terminology 
is the government's way of differentiating the legal envir­
onment between the public and private sector.
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1. Informal recognition is granted when the union
represents less than 10 percent of the members of the bar-
- 4. 51 gaining unit.^
What constitutes a bargaining unit must be decided on 
a pragmatic basis by the agency concerned. The essen­
tial requirement is that the members of a unit should 
have a clear and identifiable community of interest-^ 
which enables them to deal collectively as a group.
Under informal recognition the union is accorded no more 
rights than the rights of individual employees and manage­
ment is under no obligation to seek the views of the union.
2. Formal recognition is granted to unions with 
at least 10 percent of the employees in a bargaining unit 
where no other union has been granted exclusive recognition. 
The union has the right to speak for its members, but it 
may not speak for its nonmembers. Management is under no 
obligation to seek the views of the union. When agency 
management feels that the union has a sufficient number of 
locals or a significant proportion of total agency person­
nel in its membership it may be accorded recognition at
the national level with national consultation rights. A 
union that has national consultation rights does not
^^The terminology of Executive Orders IO988 and 
11491 use the term "appropriate unit" in lieu of the term 
"bargaining unit." The original interpretation of "appro­
priate unit" under Executive Order IO988 was restrictive 
when compared to the common interpretation of the terra 
"bargaining unit" in the private sector. Under Executive 
Order 11491 the interpretation was expanded and the term 
"appropriate unit" and"bargaining unit" essentially have 
the same meaning.
^^Willem B. Vosloo, _0£. cit. , p. 70.
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represent all of the agency's employees. National consulta­
tion rights means that management must consult with the 
union from "time to time" in matters concerning the formu­
lation and implementation of personnel policies and prac­
tices that affect working conditions. The union may pre­
sent its views on such matters to management but manage­
ment is under no obligation to modify or change their posi­
tion. There are no provisions for collective bargaining 
agreements under this form of recognition.
3. Exclusive recognition is granted to a union 
when it has at least 10 percent of the employees in a 
bargaining unit and receives a majority of all votes cast 
in an election participated in by a majority of the eligi­
ble employees in the unit. In its initial interpretation 
of the Order the Civil Service Commission stated that "at 
least 60 percent of all employees in a unit have to vote
before exclusive recognition can be won by the vote of a
53simple majority." The unions strongly protested the 
rule and it was amended by the Civil Service Commission 
to mean 60 percent of the eligible employees in the bar­
gaining unit who are present at the time of the election.
A union having exclusive recognition represents all of 
the employees in the bargaining unit whether or not they 
are union members.
53United States Civil Service Commission, Federal 
Personal Manual System Letter No. 700-1, April 10, 1962.
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The union under Section 6(B) can collectively 
bargain and enter into an agreement with management on 
matters pertaining to grievances, personnel policies and 
practices and working conditions. Section 6(B) of the 
Order further noted that the obligation to negotiate "shall 
not be construed to extend to such areas of discretion and 
policy as the mission of the agency, its budget, its organ­
ization and the assignment of its personnel, or the tech­
nology of performing its work."^^
The scope of bargainable issues was further cir­
cumscribed by Section 7 of the Order which enumerated "cer­
tain matters" in accordance with applicable laws and regu­
lations that are management's rights. These include the 
right to direct employees, to hire, promote, transfer, 
assign, suspend, demote, discharge or discipline employees, 
to lay off when necessary, and to maintain operational 
efficiency. These subjects are negotiable on a limited 
basis.
In addition to the changes in the government's 
grievance system outlined in Executive Order 10907i Execu­
tive Order IO988 provided that agreements negotiated with 
exclusive representatives may include provisions in accord­
ance with Civil Service Commission regulations for the ad­
visory arbitration of grievances. At first glance the use 
of arbitration appears to be a reversal of the sovereignty
^^Executive Order IO988, Section 6(B).
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doctrine. However, the Order limits the use and authority
*5 *5of the arbitrator by stipulating that arbitration:^^
1. shall be advisory in nature subject to approval 
by the agency head
2. shall only extend to interpretation of existing 
agreements or policy and not changes in agreements or 
agency policy
3. shall be invoked only with employee approval. 
The Order also provides for advisory arbitration for 
settling disputes in connection with the determination of 
the "bargaining unit" and majority status for union repre­
sentation. Once again the arbitrator's decision is subject 
to agency head a p p r o v a l . T h e  Order does not provide for 
neutral arbitration of collective bargaining impasses.
Sections 10 and 11 provide for initial implementa­
tion of the Order by July 1, 1962, and directs agency 
management to establish bargaining units and majority 
representatives.
Section 12 directs the Civil Service Commission to 
provide technical services to assist agency managements in 
implementing the Order.
Section 13 directs the Civil Service Commission 
and the Department of Labor to prepare standards of conduct 
for unions and a code of fair labor practices for
^^Executive Order 10988, Sections 7 and 8.
^^Executive Order IO988, Section 11.
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labor-management relations in the federal service. It 
also establishes the President's Temporary Commission on 
the implementation of the Federal-Employee Relations Pro­
gram.
Section l4 extends to nonveterans the rights of 
appeal in grievances which was formerly the exclusive right 
of veterans under Section 11 of the Veterans Preference Act 
of 1944.
Section I5 preserves the validity of prior labor- 
management agreements.
Section I6 exempts certain classes of government 
employees from coverage under the Order.
On May 21, 1963 Executive Order IO988 was supple­
mented by the Presidential Memorandum, Standards of Conduct 
for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices.
The Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations 
is similar to the Bill of Rights provisions of the Landrum- 
Griffin amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act. The unions 
are required to maintain democratic procedures and prac­
tices, periodic elections, membership participation, pro­
hibit conflict of interests on the part of officers, main­
tain fiscal integrity, and furnish financial reports to 
the members.
The Code of Fair Labor Practices is similar to the 
unfair labor practices provisions of Section 8 of the Taft- 
Hartley Act. The government is barred from interfering
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with individual employee, and union rights, as outlined in 
statutes, executive orders, and agency or Commission poli­
cies and regulations. The unions are barred from inter­
fering with individual employee rights, calling strikes or
slow-downs, picketing, and discriminating against government 
57employees. Authority for the enforcement of the Code of 
Unfair Labor Practices and the Standards of Conduct for 
Employee Organizations rested with agency management.
Executive Order IO988 and the I963 supplements had 
a significant impact upon the growth of government unions.
oTable 2 illustrates this growth. In the nine years 
since Executive Order IO988 was issued union representa­
tion for government employees has grown: from the 26
exclusive units in TVA and the Department of Interior, 
covering about 19,000 employees, which existed prior to 
the Order, exclusive recognition has grown to 3,010 
exclusive units in 35 agencies covering 1,342,000 employ- 
ees--$8 percent of the total Federal workforce subject to 
the Order. Exclusive recognition now covers 8? percent 
of all postal employees, 8l percent of all blue-collar
59employees, and 35 percent of all white-collar employees.
c  *7^Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.). Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, op. cit.,"U'he U.S. Experience in Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," Arvid Anderson, p. 25.
United States Civil Service Commission, Report to the President on the Status of Implementing Executive Order 109dd (Washington, D.C.: 1 6̂ 2 , ±9b4, I965T , and UnitedStates Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: November, 1907, November, 19b8 , Novem-ber, 1969, and November, 1970)•
59United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government, November, 1970, "opl cit., p. 18-Table E. p. 21- TaB'ie 1.--  ---
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TABLE 2
ANNUAL INCREASE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
UNITS WITH EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION
Total Nonpostal
Number Employees Total




1962 26 N.A. 19,000
1962 61 N.A. N.A.
1963" 470 180,000 670,000
1964" 630 231 ,000 730,000
1965" 830 320,000 835,0001966“ 1,174 435,000 1 ,054,000
1967“ 1,813 630,000 1,239,0001968" 2,305 798,000 1 ,416,073
1969* 2,647 843 ,000 1,477,3021970° 3,010 916,000 1,542,000
"Figure for number of units includes only seven 
national postal units; there are also 24,500 exclusive 
local units in the Post Office Department.
Experience and Problems under the Order 
and the Supplements
Despite the accelerated growth of unionism in the 
government and the unrestrained applause initially given 
to the Order by spokesmen for both labor and management 
serious limitations were soon brought to light. In Septem­
ber, 1967, President Johnson appointed a panel to study 
the accomplishments and déficiences of Executive Order IO988. 
The review was not completed, however, until September 10,
^^Message of President Johnson in appointing the 




19&9, when a study committee appointed by President Nixon 
made its report.
During the public hearings before an advisory panel 
to the Committee, union officials, agency managements and 
other groups gave testimony on the problems they incurred 
under the Order. The areas receiving principal attention 
were impasse settlement, scope of negotiations, forms of 
recognition, grievances, and the neutrality of agencies to 
administer the Order.
The Executive Order did not provide for arbitration 
for settling negotiation impasses. Advisory arbitration 
could only be used in cases of disputes on unit determina­
tion and majority representation, and in the interpretation 
of the agreement. The objective of this approach was that 
the absence of a third party would help to establish mean­
ingful direct relationships between labor and management 
and encourage them to bargain in good faith. It was the 
responsibility of the parties to develop techniques other 
than arbitration for settling impasses.
The three most common impasse procedures that
evolved under the Order were fact-finding, mediation, and
referrals to agency or department heads. Fact-finding
was specified most often and mediation was specified the 
least often.Regardless of the technique used to resolve
P. Cohany and H. J. Neary, "Summaries of Studies and Reports of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Federal Service," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 88 (August,
1965), pp. 944-50.
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the impasse, finaJ authority rested in the hands of agency 
management. Without the strike weapon, the procedure Cor 
settling impasses takes on added importance to a union 
which is bargaining from a weak position.
Executive Order IO988 has been interpreted in the 
Civil Service Commission’s rules and regulations to allow 
for collective bargaining at the local level.Although 
the Civil Service Commission's philosophy of personnel 
management centers around decentralization, it appears 
that local management's real authority to negotiate is 
questionable. Stephen N. Shulman, former Assistant Secre­
tary of Defense for Manpower and former chairman, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, stated:
. . . The biggest problem in the Department of Defense
has been collective bargaining. . . .  It is a local 
level problem because employee-management problems 
are there and contracts are negotiated there. Since 
the program will thus succeed or fail there . . . the 
government must get authority to the local level. . . .
The limited authority of local management is further evi­
denced by the fact that except for agency-wide agreements 
in the Post Office and a very limited number of agency- 
wide agreements in other agencies the government, all con­
tracts negotiated at the local level must receive agency
. Macy, "Employee Management Cooperation in the 
Federal Service," Industrial Relations Research Associa­
tion, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, Pro- 
ceedings of the Spring, 19oé, Meeting, p. 63.
61Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee 
Relations Report, No. 54 (September l4, 1964), p. A-I9.
63
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head approval. The limited authority of management and 
the assertion of management's rights in the Order severely 
limits the opportunity for even limited collective bar­
gaining in the government. The present collective bar­
gaining environment has ensured the fact that the unions 
will continue to use other channels to secure their goals.
The three forms of recognition established by the 
Order were intended to serve as a transitional feature in 
order not to disrupt existing relationships with small 
groups of employees. Both labor and management advocated 
the abolition of informal recognition. There was disagree­
ment among the unions as to whether or not formal recogni­
tion should be retained. The unions requested that the 
government clarify the rights of a union having this recog­
nition if it was to be retained. The unions were critical 
of the 60 percent rule for determining exclusive bargaining 
representatives. Their arguments were based on the fact 
that the 60 percent rule was a higher standard than the 
standards established for the private sector.
The unions criticized the grievance system on the 
grounds that too many problems were excluded from the 
grievance procedure and that agency management rarely 
agreed to advisory arbitration proceedings. Agency man­
agement was also criticized by the unions for rarely agree­
ing to arbitration for settling agreement interpretation 
disputes unless they were based on an individual grievance.
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The Executive Order permitted each agency to
determine the bargaining unit, conduct elections, to
interpret the Order and the supplemental orders. The
64unions accused management of being bias.
If the union filed a charge against agency manage­
ment for violating the Code of Fair Labor Practices, the 
agency did not have to conduct a hearing on the charge 
unless it found substantial basis for the complaint. If 
the agency decided to hold a hearing, it appointed an 
impartial hearing officer, which could be one of its own 
employees. If management iras then found to be guilty of 
a violation under the Code and they refused to take action 
to remedy the violation, the Code had no provision for 
recourse by the union.
The fact that each agency interpreted the Order 
and the Civil Service Commission's guidance differently 
led all unions and many agency officials to recommend that 
a single independent board be created to interpret and 
implement the orders.
In summary, the Nixon Committee found that present 
conditions were far different than those that existed at 
the time of Executive Order 10988. Growing dissatisfac­
tion on the part of both labor and management with the
64M. Moskow, J. Loewenberg, E. Koziaria, op. cit.,
p . 71 •
^^Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public 
Management at the Bargaining Table, op. cit., p. 83.
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existing Order led the Committee to recommend that the 
President issue "a new executive order which retains those 
features of the present program that work well but update 
policies and provides new arrangements where needed to 
improve labor-management relations in the future.
Executive Order 11491 
On October 29» 19&9 President Nixon issued Execu­
tive Order 11491, revoking Executive Order 10988 as well 
as the 1963 supplements.
The new Executive Order embodied most of the Com­
mittee's recommendations which were based upon an analysis 
of seven years of labor-management experiences under the 
old Order. The major changes put into effect by the new 
Order are enumerated in the following sections.
Executive Order IO988 used the term "employee 
organization" to describe a "labor union" or a "labor 
organization." The Committee believed that the use of this 
term was needlessly artificial in the present environment. 
They recommended the adoption of the term "labor organiza­
tion," in the new order "since it directly reflects the
relationship of most Federal employee groups with the gen-
6 7eral labor movement."
^^Letter to the President, September 10, I969, 
transmitting the Committee's Report and Recommendations on 
the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program.
^^Report and Recommendations of President Nixon's 
Federal Labor Relations Study Committee, August, I969» p . 33
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Section 2 of Executive Order 11491 is the same as 
Section 2 of Executive Order 10988 in imposing the sover­
eignty doctrine upon government employees and their 
unions. Specifically, government employees cannot hold 
membership in any union that asserts, imposes, assists, or 
participates in a strike against the government.
Section 4 of the new Order established the Federal 
Labor Relations Council consisting of the Civil Service 
Commission Chairman who is chairman of the Council, the 
Secretary of Labor, an official of the Executive Office 
of the President and other officials the President may 
designate. The Council's primary function is to interpret 
and administer the Order. Under the new system, then, 
there is uniform interpretation of the Order for all gov­
ernment agencies and unions. The Order gives the Council 
authority to consider appeals from decisions of the Assis­
tant Secretary of Labor pursuant to his functions as out­
lined in Section 6. The Council also has the authority 
to consider appeals on negotiability issues, exceptions to 
arbitration awards and other matters that it deems appro­
priate.
Section 5 establishes the Federal Service Impasses 
Panel consisting of at least three members appointed by 
the President. The Panel is organizationally located 
within the Federal Labor Relations Council for services 
and staff assistance but it has independent authority. The
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Panel is authorized to take whatever action is necessary 
to settle collective bargaining impasses. The bargaining 
parties may agree on the method for settling the impasse 
but arbitration or third party fact finding may not be 
used unless it is authorized by the Panel.
Section 6 expands the duties of the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations. His 
functions are to decide unit representation disputes, super­
vise elections, and certify results. He also has the 
authority to decide disputes on eligibility for national 
consultation rights, unfair labor practice complaints, and 
standards of conduct cases. At his discretion he can 
issue cease and desist orders from violation of the Order 
and take any necessary action to bring about compliance.
Section 7 abolishes both informal and formal recog­
nition agreements. Existing informal recognition agree­
ments are to be terminated within six months. Existing 
formal recognition agreements are to be terminated within 
one year.
Section 8(a) and 24(c) eliminate national formal 
recognition and substitutes national consultation rights 
with the subject matter limited to personnel policy. 
Eligibility for national consultation rights are estab­
lished by the Federal Labor Relations Council instead of 
agency management.
Section 10 deletes both the 10 percent membership
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requirement and the 60 percent representative vote rule 
as criteria for exclusive recognition. Exclusive recog­
nition is granted to the union selected in a secret ballot 
election by the majority of the employees in the bargaining 
unit. The method for determining the bargaining unit is 
virtually the same as the old Order except that "consider­
ation of effective dealings," and "efficiency of agency 
operations" are considered in addition to "community of 
interest."
Section 11 stipulates that both labor and manage­
ment must "confer in good faith" with respect to negoti­
able issues. The scope of negotiable issues under the new 
Order are the same as those listed under Section 6(B) of 
Executive Order IO988. The nonnegotiable issues listed 
under Section 11 of the new Order are the same as those 
listed in Section 6(B) of Executive Order IO988 except for 
two changes. Management does not have to discuss its 
internal security practices; and the unions have the right 
to negotiate work force changes brought about by automa­
tion or technological change. Under Section 11 the union 
may appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Council for 
adjudication of disputes over negotiability issues, agency 
violations of law, the Order, or the regulations of author­
ities outside of the agency.
Section 12 reasserts management's rights as listed 
under Section 7 of Executive Order IO988 and adds the
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prohibition of any union security clauses except the check­
off from any negotiated agreement. In 1964 the Civil Ser­
vice Commission authorized agency managements to initiate 
a dues checkoff system for unions having either formal or 
exclusive recognition.
Sections 13 and l4 eliminate advisory arbitration; 
formerly subject to agency head approval. These sections 
authorize the use of arbitration for settling disputes 
arising either from employee grievances or interpretation 
and application of the agreement without agency head 
approval.
In Section 15 collective bargaining agreements 
are still subject to agency head approval. However, Sec­
tion 15 limits the agency's authority to disapproving an 
agreement only if it is in conflict with applicable laws 
or valid regulations.
Section l6 authorizes the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service in accordance with its rules to pro­
vide mediation services to assist both labor and management 
in settling collective bargaining disputes.
Section 1? authorizes the Federal Service Impasses 
Panel to settle Â-. collective bargaining impasse on its 
own or to appoint either arbitration or a third party 
fact-finding committee to settle the impasse.
Section l8 embodies the Standards of Conduct for 
Employee Organizations supplement to Executive Order IO988.
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In addition to the I963 supplement section I8 adds Landrum- 
Griffin type financial disclosure requirements and author­
ity to effectuate this section is transferred from agency 
management to the Assistant Secretary of Labor.
Section 19 embodies the Code of Fair Labor Prac­
tices supplement to Executive Order IO988. This section 
adds a new unfair labor practice for unions to parallel 
one existing for management; union refusal to consult, 
confer, or negotiate with agency management. Also added 
is the provision that management and labor must bargain in 
good faith. Authority to enforce the Code is transferred 
from agency management to the Assistant Secretary of Labor. 
The unfair labor practices for government unions are now 
the same as the unfair labor practices provisions for unions 
in the private sector.
In summary, the main changes brought about by Execu­
tive Order 11491 are the following
1. More centralized control of government labor- 
management relations by transferring authority from agency 
heads to the Federal Labor Relations Council, the Federal 
Service Impasses Panel, and the Assistant Secretary of Labor.
2. More standardization of the government's labor- 
management relations policies.
3. Closer conformity of the government's
68M. Moskow, J. Loewenberg, E. Koziaria, op, cit.,
p. 78.
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labor-management relations policies to those in effect in 
the private sector.
In the author's opinion the government's labor- 
management relations programs have progressed more during 
the past nine years than in the past sixty years. However, 
the present program still falls short of the programs in 
effect in the private sector.
The Role of the Civil Service Commission
History
To understand the function of the Civil Service 
Commission in government personnel management it is neces­
sary to briefly review the historical roots.
For more than three quarters of the nineteenth 
century the securing of nearly all government jobs was by 
political patronage. The phrase "to the victors belongs 
the spoils" as one of the rules of politics was widely
69accepted in this century. Because of their political 
nature jobs in the government service were often staffed 
with unqualified personnel. Changes in the political tide 
often caused massive politically motivated turnovers in 
the government service.
Political patronage came to a head when a dis­
appointed office seeker assassinated President Garfield in 
1881. Strong criticism of political patronage in the press 
and the fact that the Republicans after suffering political
69Donald R. Harvey, o£. cit., p. 5.
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defeat in 1882 were apprehensive about their l884 Presi­
dential prospects prompted the Congress to pass the Pendle­
ton Act in 1882.^® The President signed the Act into law 
on January I6 , I883. The Act's basic purpose was to 
remove the "downgrading influence of patronage from Ameri­
can politics.
To eliminate political patronage from the govern­
ment service, the Act provided for the appointment to some 
government jobs on the basis of merit and fitness. They
are determined by open competitive examination, without
72regard to political affiliation. The Act established 
the basic philosophy behind the civil service merit system 
as it is understood today. Under the Act, the President 
has the authority to establish the rules government appoint­
ments to government jobs. To assist the President in carry­
ing out his responsibilities the Act established a three 
member bipartisan Civil Service Commission with not more 
than two of the Commission's members being from the same 
political party. Appointments to the Commission are made 
by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate.
The initial function of the Commission was to develop
70Paul Van Riper, History of the United States 
Civil Service (New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 195#),
pp. 88-98• The Pendleton Act is popularly known as the 
Civil Service Act.
f̂ Ibid., p. 137.
72United States Civil Service Commission, The 
Government Personnel System, op. cit., p. 3.
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regulatory personnel policies and practices that were in 
accordance with the objectives of the Act.
Because of political patronages deep historical
rooting, civil service reform made little progress until
the second decade of this century. By the end of the
first decade the nationwide movement for administrative
reform was reaching its peak. The cumulative effects of
rapid increases in taxation and governmental expenditures,
the impact of scientific management in the private sector,
the expanding roieiüOÊ^tgovernment, and the rising discontent
of government employees caused by inflation and the "gag
rule" were all responsible for the eventual expansion of
73the government's personnel system.
The inadequacy of the government's personnel sys­
tem was brought to light by President Taft's Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency. In I9II the Commission conducted 
an investigation of the administrative practices in the gov­
ernment. In their 1913 report the Commission recommended:
The amendment of the civil-service law so as to 
broaden its functions and give to the Executive a 
bureau of personnel which will not only have charge 
of the examination of applicants and the certification 
of their qualifications for appointment, but also will 
be responsible for developing individual efficiency 
records throughout the service; for submitting recom­
mendations with respect to the classification of posi­
tions according to work done, and the establishment of 
salary grades within each classification; for promul­
gating general rules governing discipline; for making 
inspections to determine the welfare conditions under
73Paul Van Riper, 0£. cit., p. 219»
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which employees are required to work; for arbitrating 
disputes between officials and subordinates, in so far 
as in the opinion of the executive these may involve 
questions affecting the service as a whole ; for giving 
attention to and representing the interests of indi­
viduals in the service as distinct from questions of 
economy of management and the interest of the manager.
The revolutionary concepts embodied in the Commission's 
report although never forgotten were slow in being adopted. 
The bulk of the necessary legislation was not enacted 
for many years. As legislation was enacted the responsi­
bilities of the Civil Service Commission increased and their 
role in the government's personnel system expanded. How­
ever, it was not until the 1930's before the Civil Service 
Commission assumed its full role as the government's cen­
tralized personnel agency.
Employee Welfare and the Civil 
Service Commission
The Congress and the Executive branch under the 
sovereignty doctrines practical application of decentral­
ized authority have historically been responsible for 
developing the government's personnel policies and pro­
grams. These policies and programs initiated either by 
congressional enactment of statutes or presidential execu­
tive orders are often the result of effective lobbying 
efforts by the unions. Presently, the basic rules govern­
ing hiring, hours, leave, job classification, performance 
raing, fringe benefits, retirement, major disciplinary
74'ibid., p. 222.
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actions, and labor-management relations have been estab-
75lished by statute and executive order.
The government's personnel policies and programs
as administered by the Civil Service Commission protects
many of the rights and benefits of government employees
that workers in the private sector gained only through
years of determined collective bargaining. Many of the
statutes, executive orders, and Civil Service Commission
policies and regulations that provide job protection and
fringe benefits for government employees actually preceded
the widespread adoption of collective bargaining in the
76private sector. In the areas of job protection, welfare, 
and fringe benefits the government’s programs have at least 
equalled and in many areas surpassed the programs initiated 
in the private sector.
For many years the wages of white-collar govern­
ment employees covered under the Classification Act of 
1949 were characteristically low in comparison to the pri­
vate sector. This statement has most often been associ­
ated with the wages of higher grade level technical and 
professional personnel. Since the mid-1960's the wage dif­
ferential between the government and the private sector for
7 5'“̂ John R. Macy, Jr., "Employee Management Coopera­tion in the Federal Service," in Industrial Relations Research Association, jO£. cit., p. 6I.
76George W. Taylor, "Public Employment: Strikes or
Procedures," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 20 
(July, 1967), p. 621.
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technical and professional personnel has been steadily
shrinking. For many years the wages and benefits of white-
collar government employees in the middle and particularly
the lower grade levels hayf been comparable to the wages
77paid in the private sector.
The wages of blue-collar government employees were 
historically determined under separate agency wage-board 
systems dating back to 1862. The separate systems have 
been replaced by a Federal Coordinated Wage System. Both 
the old and the new system is based on the philosophy of 
paying the regional going rate for comparable skills in 
the private sector.
Presently, the Civil Service Commission has the 
responsibility for implementing and administering the gov­
ernment's major personnel policies and programs. In imple­
menting and administering these policies and programs the 
Civil Service Commission interprets their language, drafts 
and pronouncaesfor management the guidelines for personnel 
management, and to an increasingly more limited extent the 
guidelines for labor-management relations. In addition 
the Civil Service Commission is the guardian of the older
merit systems principles--open and equal competition and
78equal pay for equal work.
^^0. Glenn Stahl, _0£. cit. , p. 80.
78Frederick Mosher, Democracy and the Public Ser­
vice (London: Oxford University Press, I968), p. 195«
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There has always been some question as to whether 
the bipartisan Commission is an "independent agency pri-
79marily reporting to Congress or an arm of the President." 
Congress, by requiring nonpartisanship and Senate confirma­
tion of appointments to the Commission clearly indicated 
its desire to keep the civil service system free from 
partisan presidential control. On the other hand, "Con­
gress did not intend that the Commission be so independent
as to prohibit executive responsibility for administering
âothe civil service."
Although legislative reform came slowly in the
government service, expansion of the service and coverage
of government employees under the merit system increased
rapidly. Table 3 illustrates the growth and extent of 
8lcoverage.
79Donald R. Harvey, 0£. cit., p. 9»
80Felix A. Nigro, Modern Public Administration 
(New York; Harper and Row, I965), p. 293 •
810. Glenn Stahl, o£. cit., p. 36.
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TABLE 3















1884 131,200 13,800 - 10.5
1900 208,000 94,900 - 45.6
1930 580,500 462,100 — — 79.6
1950 1 ,934,000 1,641,900 - 84.9
1970 3 ,000,000 2,565,000 110,000 89.1
Note: These data are developed from information
supplied by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. All figures 
are rounded to the nearest hundred. The 1970 figures are 
estimates based on data from various periods in 1969»
The total civil service employees include those 
in the General Accounting Office and Government Printing 
Office, which are in the Legislative Branch rather than 
the Executive Branch of the government but are subject to 
the general merit system.
The special merit systems are those provided by 
law for the Atomic Energy Commission, Commissioned Corps 
of the Public Health Service, Federal Bureau of Investiga­
tion, Foreign Service, Libfcary of Congress, Panama Canal 
Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, and the medical and 
nursing employees in the Veterans Administration.
Major Employee Welfare and Fringe Benefit 
Programs in the Government
Legislative reform began in 1916 when Congress 
enacted the Federal Employees Compensation Act providing 
disability benefits for government employees injured on 
the job. The benefits under the Act have been increased
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82over the years.
In 1920 Congress enacted the Retirement Act, estab­
lishing a retirement and annuity schedule for government 
employees based on salary and length of service. The Act 
was extensively revised in 1955 and has been amended 
several times since. The 1955 Retirement Act with amend­
ments permits retirement on annuity at age 55 and 30 years 
of service, with 20 years of service at age 60 and with 5 
years of service at age 62.
The annuity is based on the average of the highest 
three years earnings and can be as high as 56.25% of the 
average earnings. The 1955 amendment has a liberalized 
cost of living increase to permit more frequent annuity
83raises.
Initially administration of the Act was shared by 
the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of Pensions, and 
the Department of the Interior. In 1934 complete adminis­
tration of the Act was put under the Civil Service Commis-
84sion's control.
In 1923 Congress enacted the Classification Act 
which established job classifications and pay scales for 
white-collar government employees. The purpose of the Act
82American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training. 1970, p. 49.
G^Ibid.. pp. 49-52.
84Paul Van Riper, cit., p. 277»
io8
was uo ensure application of the principle of "equal pay 
for equal work." Initially, the Act was administered by 
a tripartite Personnel Classification Board consisting of 
one member from the Bureau of Efficiency, one from the 
Bureau of the Budget, and one from the Civil Service Com­
mission. In 1934 full authority to administer the Act was
8 5transferred to the Civil Service Commission.
The Act was rescinded in 1949 by a completely 
revised statute. The new Classification Act provided for 
preparation of standards, grade increases geared to the 
appraisal system with rights of appeal to the Commission, 
and the establishment of an efficiency award system. In 
attempts to maintain white-collar government employees 
wages at levels comparable to wages in the private sector 
the Act has been amended numerous times since 1949-^^
Grievance and appeals procedures for government 
employees dates back to 1930 when the Civil Service Com­
mission established a Board of Appeals and Review. The 
Board's prewar jurisdiction had been limited primarily to 
cases involving the conduct and rating of examinations, 
civil service status, position classifications, and dis-
Q ̂pûtes over veterans preference.
G^ibid.. p. 301.
^^American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training, op. cit., pp. 49-53.
Q m
'Paul Van Riper, ô .' cit., p. 439.
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To broaden the grievance and appeals system Presi­
dent Roosevelt issued Executive Order 7916 requiring that 
government agencies establish a personnel department and 
an employee grievance system. The order read in part:
Effective not later than February 1, 1939» the 
heads of the Executive departments and the heads of 
such independent establishments and agencies subject 
to the civil service laws and rules as the President 
shall designate, shall establish, in their respective 
departments or establishments à divisibh of personnel 
supervision and management, at the head of which shall 
be appointed a director of personnel. . . .  Subject 
to the approval of the head of such department or 
establishment and of the Civil Service Commission he 
shall establish means for the hearing of grievances 
of employees and present appropriate recommendations 
for the settlement thereof to the head of his depart­
ment or establishment.
Pursuant to the Order the Civil Service Commission in 1941 
established machinery for employee grievances beyond those 
already covered by the Board. Under the Commission's regu­
lations each agency was required to establish a grievance 
system. In I96I Executive Order IO987 directed the Com­
mission to assist agency managements in establishing an
8 9appeals procedure with optional advisory arbitration. ^
The grievance and appeals procedure available to 
government employees is extremely broad in coverage. The 
government's procedure is regulated by the Civil Service 
Commission. Under Executive Order 11491 the unions can
88Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee 
Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, 
op. cit., p. 2.
89̂Kurt L. Hanslowe, _0£. cit. , p. 40.
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negotiate a separate grievance system covering all 
grievances not mandatorially appealable through other 
systems. In effect government employees are covered by 
two separate systems for appelation of their disputes.
In 1934 the Thomas Amendment established the forty 
hour week for blue-collar government employees. It also 
made provisions for overtime past 42 hours. The Amendment 
was amended in 1962 to authorize overtime payments to blue- 
collar employees working directed overtime beyond 8 hours
, 90in a day.
Annual leave of a flat 30 days for government
employees dates back to a statute in 1898.^^ This was
curtailed by executive action in 1932 and superseded in
1936 by the Annual and Sick Leave Act. The Act annually
provided 26 days for annual leave cumulative to 60 days and
13 days of sick leave cumulative to 90 days for all govern-
92ment employees. In the name of economy the Act was 
amended in 1951 to permanently reduce government employees' 
annual leave. Partial restoration has been made by means 
of a graduated plan with 13 days for employees with less 
than 3 years of service, 20 days for those with 3 to 15 
years, and 26 for those with I5 years or more. Not more
90American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training, op. cit.. pp. 50-32.
910. Glenn Stahl, _0£. cit. , p. 239»
92American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training, op. cit., p. 60.
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than 30 days of accumulated annual leave can be carried 
over to the following calendar year. Sick leave is still 
limited to 13 days per year but there is no limit on accu­
mulation.
In 1954 Congress enacted the Federal Employees 
Group Life Insurance Act providing 1,000 dollars worth of 
Life and disability insurance for each 1,000 dollars of 
salary not to exceed 30,000 dollars. In I967 coverage was 
increased to a 10,000 dollar minimum or 2,000 dollars above 
salary coverage, whichever is greatest. Options for pur­
chasing an additional 10,000 dollars worth of insurance at
93a nominal cost was also provided by the amendment.
The 1959 Health Benefits Act authorized the govern­
ment to pay part of the cost of employee health insurance 
plans, including the government-wide plan, labor union
plans, and group practice and individual practice types of 
9 4medical plans.
The Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 increased 
the wages of white-collar government employees by an aver­
age of 5»5 percent. More importantly the Act contained a 
new principle in the government service requiring compara­
bility of government salaries with salaries of comparable 
positions in the private sector. Since the passage of this
93American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training, op. cit., pp. 52-53»
94? Ibid., p. 52.
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Act white-collar government employees have received 
salary increases in every year since 1964.
In 1967 the Civil Service Commission established 
the Federal Coordinated Wage System which established pro­
cedures for insuring that all blue-collar employees in the 
same wage area with the same wage grade are paid the same
96wage rates.'
In 1968 Congress enacted the Monroney Wage Board 
amendment which gives authority to wage survey officials 
to go outside of the designated wage survey area to another 
wage survey area when it is determined that an insufficient 
number of comparable skills exist for a valid survey analy-
sis.97
Major Employee Welfare and Fringe Benefit 
Programs in the Private Sector
The major portion of the welfare and fringe bene­
fits enjoyed by employees in the private sector were non­
existent prior to World War II. The growth of unions in 
the 1930's and two factors in the 1940's are largely 
responsible for the existence of many of the current pro­
grams. One factor is the government's regulations of wages 
during 1942-194$ and ÿhe other factor is Section 9(a)
^^Ibid., pp. 52-54. 
^^Ibid.. p. 54. 
^^Ibid., p. 54.
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q8"Rights of Employees" of the Taft-Hartley Act.
From a modest beginning in 1946, pension plans for
private sector employees have grown rapidly. Negotiated
pension plans exist in more than 68 percent of all labor-
99management contracts.  ̂ Most pension plans provide for 
retirement at age 65 on full pension. Early retirement 
carries reduced benefits. • This typically amounts to 20 
percent or more per month for retirement at age 62 and one- 
third or more for retirement at age 60.^^®
A comparison of the retirement plans in the pri­
vate sector to the retirement plan in the government indi­
cates that the government’s plan is better, especially for 
long-term government employees.
Before World War II paid vacations in Americein 
industry were something of a rarity. Today, nearly all 
firms in the private sector provide paid vacations for 
their employees. Annual five week vacations requiring
98A. Howard Myers, Labor Law and Legislation (New 
York: Southwestern Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 486 and
853. Court decisions have interpreted the "and other terms 
and conditions of employment" under Section 9(a) as includ­
ing welfare and fringe benefits programs. The Supreme 
Court held that pensions were negotiable in a 1949 ruling 
Inland Steel Company v. United Steelworkers of America
(1949), 336 U.S. 960.
99Bureau of National Affairs, ed., "Pension, 
Deferred Profit-Sharing and Savings Plans," Labor and 
Policy Practice, 1963» p. 227:1.
Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, Labor Rela- 
tions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentxce-Hall, I967),
p. 282.
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20 years of service or more are currently found in 2 per­
cent of all contracts. Four week vacations after 20 years 
of service are presently included in 50 percent of all 
agreements. Three week vacations after 10 years of ser­
vice are provided in 84 percent of all c o n t r a c t s . T h e  
vacation benefits provided for the majority of the workers 
in the private sector do not compare favorably with the 
government's present progreun.
Collective bargaining on health and insurance
benefits is one of the most important post World War II
developments in collective bargaining. In 1945 only 0.5
million workers in the private sector were covered under
negotiated health and insurance programs. By I960 this
figure increased to l4.5 million or 78 percent of all
102workers under collective bargaining agreements. Today,
nearly all workers under collective bargaining contracts 
are covered to varying degrees under health and insurance 
programs. The typical life insurance programs for workers 
in the private sector approximates 85 percent of the 
employees annual salary. While the health insurance pro­
grams in the private sector are comparable to those avail­
able in the government, the life insurance programs are not,
During the past 20 years unions in the private sec­
tor have successfully negotiated supplemental unemployment
l^^Ibid.. p. 285. 
^°^Ibid., pp. 286-288.
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benefit plans for their members. These plans are a compro­
mise to the guaranteed annual wage plans that managements 
have strongly resisted. The goals of the supplemental 
unemployment benefit plans are to supplement the states 
unemployment insurance plans and to provide income to 
workers after the states’ plans have expired. About 2.5 
million workers with the largest concentration in the
heavy industries are covered under negotiated supplemental
103unemployment benefit plans.
The government does not provide any comparable 
type plans for its employees since jobs covered under the 
merit system have historically been more stable than jobs 
in the private sector.
In the private sector the establishment and opera­
tion of a grievance system is an important part of the 
negotiated agreement. Most often the grievance is limited 
to the interpretation of the subjects covered by the 
negotiated agreement. Negotiated agreements may allow for 
neutral third party arbitration if the parties themselves 
cannot resolve the grievance.
In individual grievances government employees are 
protected by two systems. One is the government’s 
grievance and appeals system that includes numerous specific 
procedures convening a broad base of grievance subjects.
The scope of the grievance and appeals procedure is broader
^^^Ibid., p. 293.
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in scope than the grievances in the private sector. The 
other is the union negotiated grievance procedure which is 
limited to working condition disputes.
Based on the preceding discussion the comparison 
of the welfare, and fringe benefits programs in the pri­
vate sector to those in the government indicates that in
104nearly all areas the government's programs are superior.
The Dilemma of the Civil Service Commission
The role of the Civil Service Commission within 
the government's personnel management system is to protect 
employees' rights through the interpretation and administra­
tion of congressional statutes and presidential executive 
orders that pertain to personnel matters.
The unions do not view the Civil Service Commission 
as the protector of the employees' rights but rather as 
an extension of management. Recently, John F. Griner, 
President of the American Federation of Government Employ­
ees, stated: "Our experience has found the Civil Service
Commission to be an extension of management. The logic 
underlying Griner's statement is the belief that the Civil 
Service Commission's administration of the government's 
personnel management system is incompatible with collective
104Donald R. Harvey, _o£. cit. , p. 88.
^^^"The Unions View of Public Management's Respon­
sibilities in Collective Bargaining," Public Employees 
Relations Library, No. 26 (Chicago: Public Personnel
Association, 1970), p. 5.
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bargaining. This incompatibility is based on the govern­
ment's sovereignty as reflected in management paternalism 
and the individualism of the merit system.
Some of the actual or potential areas of conflict 
between the merit principles and collective bargaining 
are illustrated in Exhibit 1.^®^
The principles of the merit system have deep 
historical roots. Its maintenance restricts the develop­
ment of collective bargaining in the government.
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Existing Limitations on Collective Bargaining
Limitations of Authority
Decentralization of authority in the government 
constitutionally limits the power of any one branch of 
government through a system of checks and balances. From 
a macro view decentralization of authority causes a limit­
ing of the negotiable subjects because one branch of gov­
ernment Cannot make decisions regarding government employ-
1 oftees when another branch may hold the power of determination. 
This viewpoint is supported by the fact that the President 
may recommend pay increases for government employees but the 
Congress must grant the pay increase.
From a micro view decentralization of authority lim­
its the bargaining authority of local agency management.
Quite often many subject areas covered under collective 
bargaining agreements in the private sector are covered by 
executive orders, statutes, and Civil Service Commission 
policies and regulations. In these areas management often 
finds itself in the position where they "cannot" rather than 
they "will not" negotiate with the union.
The new Order has not solved the problem of the 
limited bargaining authority of management at the local 
level. Local management's authority is not only limited
lo3B. V. H. Schneider, "Collective Bargaining and 
the Federal Civil Service," Industrial Relations. Vol. 3 
(May, 1964), pp. 97-120.
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by both internally and externally imposed policies and reg­
ulations but also by the fact that the negotiated agree­
ments are still subject to agency head approval.
Nonnegotiable Subjects; Wages,
Fringe Benefits, and Hours
In the private sector wages, length of the work 
week, the scheduling of such hours, and fringe benefits 
are all subject to collective bargaining. These areas are 
subject to broad limitations under federal and state min­
imum wage laws and social security legislation. However, 
these laws serve more in setting minimum bases rather than 
collective bargaining constraints. In the government, white- 
collar employees' wages are established under the Classifi­
cation Act of 1949, as amended. Wage rates in job classi­
fications are fixed by law, and are, therefore, not subject 
to collective bargaining. However, there is limited room 
for union representation in determining the wages of blue- 
collar employees.
Blue-collar employees' wages are determined under 
the 1967 Federal Coordinated Wage System. The System is 
centrally controlled by the Civil Service Commission's 
National Wage Policy Committee composed of five agency 
management members, five union members, and a chairman.
The Committee recommends the policies and rules which 
govern the System. The lead agencies, who are designated 
by the Commission, are responsible for planning and executing
121
the area wage surveys, analyzing survey results, and 
developing area wage schedules.
Each lead agency appoints an agency wage committee 
with equal union and management representation to provide 
advice on the establishment of wage schedules and coverage 
of surveys. The committee has no authority; it can only 
make recommendations to lead agency management.
The local wage survey committee consists of three 
members. Two are designated by agency management and one 
by the union having the greatest number of blue-collar 
employees covered by exclusive recognition. The committee 
selects those individuals who will collect the information 
needed to establish the wage scale in the wage area. The 
union representative on the committee selects one-half of 
the people and the management representatives select the 
other half of the people comprising the data gathering 
group. The committee reviews the information collected 
by the data gathering group to establish the wage scale. 
Lead agency management retains the final authority for 
establishing the area wage scales. In effect the System 
does not provide for collective bargaining in determining 
the wages of blue-collar employees.
Only tradition and not statute or executive order 
prevents management from collectively bargaining over the
122
109wages of government employees. The Tennessee Valley
Authority adopted collective bargaining over wages in
1935 for blue-collar employees and in 1943 for white-
collar e m p l o y e e s . T h e  Government Printing Office began
collective bargaining over the wages of printing trade
employees in 1924 under the Kiess Act.^^^ The Department
of the Interior inaugurated collective bargaining for both
1X2white-collar and blue-collar employees in 1948. The
predominately white-collar Postal Service began collective 
bargaining over wages under the 1970 Postal Reorganization 
Act.H^
In the private sector retirement pension plans, 
vacations, sick leave, insurance plans, and other fringe 
benefits must be determined by collective bargaining under 
the Taft-Hartley Act. In the government all of the major 
areas of fringe benefits are controlled by statute and 
Civil Service Commission regulation and are therefore not
^^^R. T. Woodworth and Richard B. Peterson (eds.). 
Collective Negotiation for Public and Professional Employ­
ees (Illinois : Scott , Foresman Company, 19&9), Bob Repas,
"Collective Bargaining Problems in Federal Employment," 
p. 104.
^^^Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.). Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service; Theory and Practice, op. cit.,
"The TVA Experience," Louis J. Van Mol, pp. 87-88,
111Wilson R. Hart, _0£. cit. , p. 86.
^^^Ibid., p. 89.
113Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee 
Relations Report, Reference File 12, p. 41:1, 1971.
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subject to collective bargaining.
In the private sector working hours subject to 
federal and state maximum hour laws are negotiable. In 
the government the total hours in the work day and the 
work week have been established by statute and Civil Ser­
vice Commission regulations. There has been some limited
11^collective bargaining over the work schedules.
Negotiable Subjects: Grievances and
Working Conditions
Under Executive Order 11491 the establishment and 
operation of an employee grievance procedure with optional 
provisions for arbitration is subject to collective bargain­
ing.
A Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 685 negoti­
ated contracts in effect during I967 covering over one 
million government employees indicated that over one-half 
of the agreements studied covering about two-thirds of 
the employees, contained negotiated grievance procedures. 
Seventy percent of the negotiated grievance procedures 
contained advisory arbitration arrangements ; these applied 
to four out of every five employees covered by negotiated
ll4W. Heimback, "Panel Discussion: Is Private
Sector Industrial Relations the Objective in the Federal 
Service," in Industrial Relations Research Association, 
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, Proceedings 
of the Spring, 1966, Meeting, p. 61.
12k
grievance procedures.
The negotiated grievance process for government 
employees has been narrowed in scope by the Civil Service 
Commission's distinction between a grievance and an appeal. 
The Commission regards as grievances only those complaints 
that relate to working conditions. Subject areas excluded 
from grievance procedures fall into five general categories: 
1. Discrimination or national security; 2. Complaints 
caused by an alleged violation of law, Civil Service Com­
mission regulations, agency regulations or directives;
3. position classification cases, and k. adverse and 
disciplinary actions. An appeal is a request for reversing 
an adverse action or an administrative decision.
Appeals are heard either by agency review boards 
or the Civil Service Commission. However, when the Com­
mission or the review board is hearing an appeal, it is 
passing on the application by an operating agency of regu­
lations issued by the Commission pursuant to law. It is
117enforcing its own regulations. ' Neutral third party
R. W. Glass, "Impasse, Grievance, and Arbitra­
tion, in Federal Collective Bargaining," Monthly Labor 
Review, Vol. 93 (April, 1970), p. 56.
^^^Ibid.. p. 609.
117Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.). Developments in Public 
Employee Relations, Legislative, Judicial, Administrative 
(Chicago: Public Personnel Association, I965)» Chapter 7,
"Employee Grievance Procedures," John E, Massey, p. 6$.
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XX darbitration is allowed, but it is rarely used. The
union negotiated grievance procedure can provide for 
neutral third party arbitration.
The term working conditions has been broadly 
interpreted in both the private sector and the government. 
In the government, the following subject areas within the 
scope of working conditions have been subject to collec­
tive bargaining: "1. work environment: rests, cleanup,
clothing; 2. work shifts, tours of duty, and leave;
3. promotion systems; 4. training; 5* safety; 6. employee
119services; ?• parking control.”
Although the negotiable subjects themselves ade­
quately cover the area of working conditions, the scope 
of bargainable issues under each subject is limited by 
management rights under agency regulations and Civil Ser­
vice Commission policies and regulations.
In the Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 209 
contracts covering nearly 600,000 government employees,
109 contracts covering 88,507 employees were in the Depart­
ment of Defense. Nearly all of the 209 negotiated con­
tracts either did not cover a majority of the working con­
dition subjects, noted that Civil Service Commission regu­
lations would be followed, or made broad general statements
xx3Donald R. Harvey, 0£, cit. , p. 112.
119United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Collective Bargaining Agreements in the 
Federal Service, August, 19&5, p. 10.
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120about consulting the union before taking any action.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics Report indicates 
that government management does not collectively bargain 
with the unions over a wide range of working conditions 
subjects. While it is true that local management's author­
ity to collective bargain is limited by internally and 
externally imposed constraints, the attitudes of management 
towards the union has a definite influence upon their flex­
ibility in either negotiations or settling labor-management 
disputes.
The Right to Strike 
In accord with the sovereignty doctrine the gov­
ernment has by statute and executive order denied its
employees and their unions the right to assert, assist,
121or participate in a strike against the government.
The logic underlying the government’s position consists 
of two points;
1. Strikes against the government cannot be 
tolerated since the government is sovereign and cannot 
share its sovereign authority with its employees or their 
unions. Any strike against the government is an attack 
upon the state and a challenge to the government's author­
ity.
^^°Ibid., pp. 10-28.
121 See Public Law 330, p. 73 and Executive Order 
11491, Section 2, p. 94 cited previously.
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The government employer is the -whole society who 
speaks by laws enacted by their representatives in 
Congress. Accordingly, administration officials and 
employees alike are governed and guided, and in many 
cases restricted, by laws which establish policies, 
procedures, or rules in personnel m a t t e r s .
2. In the private sector the use of the strike by 
labor and the lockout by management are economic and social 
weapons used for testing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the bargaining parties when impasses occur. The govern­
ment does not use the politically infeasible lockout because 
the government provides essential services to society.
Any disruption of these essential services by a strike 
would repudiate the function of government. Therefore, 
the strike is not an appropriate means for settling col­
lective bargaining impasses in the government.
Even if some government services are not essential 
it is impossible or infeasible to attempt to differentiate
between nonessential and essential services permitting
123strikes in the former but not in the latter.
On the other side of the coin there are those who
believe that government employees should have the right 
to strike.
One of the earliest writers to express this view 
122Ann M. Ross, "Public Employee Unions and the
Right to Strike," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 92 (March,
1969) , p. 15.
123John F. Burton, Jr., "Can Public Employees Be 
Given the Right to Strike?," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 21 
(August, 1970), pp. 469-70.
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was Sterling D. Spero. He stated:
When the state denies its own employees the right to 
strike merely because they are its employees, it 
defines ordinary labor disputes as attacks upon pub­
lic authority, and makes the use of drastic remedies 
and even armed forces the only method for handling \2.k 
what otherwise might be simple employment relations.
W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor under Presi­
dents Kennedy and Johnson, observed that government employ­
ees are:
employed today on terms dictated by dogma traceable 
directly to the medievil doctrine of the divine right 
of kings y and that employment relations in most public 
agencies in this country are 30 years behind those in 
private employment. . . .  Ten million government 
employees will not accept an employment relationship 
built upon the proposition that their employers exer­
cise a "sovereignty" which makes it lese majeste to 
file a grievance and equates disagreement--at least 
organized disagreement--with disloyalty.^^5
Jerry Wurf, International President of the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
stated :
Strike prohibitions are not simply ineffectual, though 
they are undeniably that. What is far more serious, 
they warp the very vital process of collective bar­
gaining. They bring employees to the bargaining table, 
but as inferiors. Simultaneously, they provide false 
reassurance to management representatives and induce 
less than genuine negotiations. Ironically, they 
create the very tensions, exacerbate the very situ­
ations, provoke the very^strikes they were allegedly 
formulated to prevent.
124Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer, op. cit., p. l6.
125Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table, p. 24$, citing W. Wil­lard Wirtz.
^^^John Bloedorn, "The Strike and the Public Sec­tor," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 20 (March, 19o9), p. 153i
citing Jerry Wurf.
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Although the government continues to assert its 
sovereignty by imposing severe penalties on individuals 
and groups who strike the government, there is some doubt 
as to whether or not government sovereignty is enforceable.
Successful strikes against the government date as 
far back as 1835 when employees of the Washington, D.C.
127Navy Yard went out on strike for the ten hour work day.
In l86l, bookbinders in the Government Printing Office
128successfully struck for higher wages. In 1915» the
entire staff of the Fairmont West Virginia post office 
resigned en mass in a protest against supervisory condi­
tions. The incident known as the "Fairmont Strike" was 
unsuccessful because Post Office officials arrested the 
25 men who had resigned on the charge of "conspiracy to 
obstruct the mails." The men after not receiving any
support from organized labor pleaded guilty to the charge
12Qand were fined accordingly. In 1957, 70 AFGE members
and the Workers' Alliance staged an 11 day strike in the 
San Francisco area in an unsuccessful attempt to get a 10 
percent wage increase. The strike was not sanctioned 
by the AFGE's national office.
127American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training, op. cit., p. 46.
^^^Ibid., p. 85.
129ibid.. p. 19.
130Eldon Johnson, "Unionism the Federal Service" 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Wisconsin,
1938), pp. 199-200.
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During the period I958-I968 eight strikes occurred
in the government. Five strikes in I962 involving 4,190
government employees resulted in 33,800 lost man-days.
Three strikes in 1968 affecting 1,680 government employees
131resulted in 9,600 lost man-days. In only one of these
strikes was a government employee discharged. In I962,
81 blue-collar employees in the Tennessee Valley Authority
132were discharged for their strike activity.
On March I8 , 1970, Postal Service employees in the 
New York City area successfully carried out a week long 
strike for higher wages. The strike affected over 200,000 
postal workers and crippled Post Office Department opera­
tions. It was the most widespread strike in government 
history. Public Law 330 was not invoked and the strike 
was instrumental in hastening enactment of the Postal Reor­
ganization Act which gave to postal employees virtually
every labor relations benefit accorded workers in the
133private sector--except the right to strike.
During the past few years a number of successful 
sickouts and slowdowns have appeared among government
131Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee 
Relations Report, op. cit., Reference File 1, p. 1015, 1971'
132John V. Madden, "To Strike or Not to Strike;
Does the Government Already Have an Alternative,^ Labor 
Law Journal, Vol. 21 (May, 1970), p. 313.
133Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee 
Relations Report, Reference File 12, opl cit., p. 41:1,
1971.
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employees in the Postal Service, the Environmental Sci­
ence Services Administration and among air traffic control­
lers. Although these activities are within the scope of 
the definition of a strike under the Taft-Hartley Act, 
the government has not classified these activities as
s t r i k e s . 1 3 4
In August of 1970 the historically conservative
AFGE followed the precedent set earlier by the postal
service unions and deleted the no-strike clause from its
constitution. The AFGE maintains that the deletion of the
no-strike clause is not an assertion of the right to
strike the government. The national policy of the AFGE
135is to abide by the law. However, deletion of the no­
strike clause was the first step taken toward strike action 
by the postal unions.
Even the courts' historical acceptance of the 
sovereignty doctrine is showing some signs of change.
Until recently government employees as a condition of 
their employment were required to sign a four part appoint­
ment affidavit . Parts A, B, and D pertain to loyalty, 
subversive activities and political patronage. Part C 
denies employment to any government employee who either 
individually or as a member of a union asserts the right
134John V. Madden, _0£. cit. , p. 313.
13 5Comments made by Mr. Kermit Tull, AFGE National 
Vice-President, 9th District in an interview with the 
author on July 1, 1971.
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to strike against the government.
In 1969 two District of Columbia District Court 
decisions declared parts B and C of the appointment affidavit 
unconstitutional. In the first case, Stewart v. Washington, 
part B of the affidavit was declared unconstitutional. In 
the second case, Blount v. National Association of Letter 
Carriers, part C of the affidavit was declared unconsti­
tutional. The latter case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court but was dismissed by stipulation of counsel. On 
September 28, 1970, the Civil Service Commission ordered 
all government agencies and departments to delete parts B
T Q ̂and C from the appointment affidavits.
The events of the past few years gives the impres­
sion that not only is the sovereignty doctrine unenforce­
able but that it is slowly dying.
The other argument that has been advanced by the 
government for denying its employees the right to strike 
is that the government provides essential services to 
society. The essentiality of government services is sub­
ject to some question.
Essentiality of service means that the consumers 
demand for the service is inelastic. Except for some 
limited functions as the armed forces there is no empiri­
cal evidence demonstrating differences in elasticity of
T Q ̂United States Civil Service Commission, Federal 
Personnel Manual System, Letter No. 295-3, September 28,
1970.
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demand between private sector services and government ser- 
137vices. Government services are expanding in scope and
increasingly the services provided are similar to those 
available from private industry. As far as the public is 
concerned, a strike is the same whether it is in a pri­
vately operated hospital or a government operated hospital,
in a transportation system privately operated or government
4.  ̂138 operated.
The government’s denial of strike rights to any 
of its employees in any of its services makes no distinc­
tion between the essentiality or nonessentiality of the 
service. Some state and local governments are a step 
ahead of the federal government in this area of degrees 
of essentiality of services. John F, Burton's analysis 
of Bureau of Labor Statistics strike data for I965-68 
showed that state and local governments' differentiate 
between a strike in an essential service and a strike in
13 9a nonessential service by their use of countersanctions. 
Five states now permit some, but not all of their employ­
ees the right to strike. Recently the Governor's Commis­
sion in Pennsylvania recommended that a limited right to 
strike be given to all public employees except police and
137John F . Burton, Jr., _0£. cit., p. 475»
13 ftGeorge W. Taylor, _o£, cit. , p. 625.





In an attempt to make collective bargaining more 
meaningful while maintaining its sovereignty, the govern­
ment under Section 17 of Executive Order 11491 established 
the Federal Service Impasses Panel with authority to engage 
either third party fact-finding or arbitration to settle 
collective bargaining impasses. Fact-finding or arbitra­
tion by a third party can only be used when specifically 
authorized by the Panel and if the Panel has decided not 
to settle the impasse itself.
Although the government appoints the members of 
the Federal Service Impasses Panel, the seven members pre­
sently serving on the Panel are skilled arbitrators with 
extensive broad based experience outside of government. 
Criticism is not directed at the Panel itself, but rather 
at the fact that in the final analysis either the Panel 
or an independent third party settles the impasse, and not 
the parties themselves.
Some writers believe that compulsory arbitration
in lieu of the right to strike spells an end to collective
bargaining. Herbert R. Northrup stated;
Fearing that to settle will mean a less attractive 
"package" than an arbitrator would give, that it will 
be a sign of weakness, . . .  unions and companies
l^^Ibid., p. 4?4.
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prepare for the arbitration procedure instead of 
for collective bargaining and private settlement.
The aim is to force intervention. The more adamant, 
obdurate, and intransigent the parties, the more pres­
sure upon the arbitrator. The payoff is the greatest 
to those willing to take the most extreme position.^^1
In Chapter V the AFGE National and AFGE Local 916
are discussed to give the reader a further understanding
of the union's role in government labor-management relations,
^^^Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service; Theory and Practice, op. cit.,
"When Bargaining Fails," Jacob Fenkelman, oĵ, cit., pp.
125-126.
CHAPTER V
THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES AND AFGE LOCAL 916
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the his­
tory, growth, strategy, tactics, organization, accomplish­
ments, and goals of the following: 1. The American Feder­
ation of Government Employees, the largest union in the 
government, 2. AFGE Local 916, the largest union local in 
the government and the exclusive bargaining agent for 
nearly all of the civilian employees at Tinker Air Force 
Base.
The AFGE
Jurisdiction over government employees not covered 
by any craft unions was given to the National Federation 
of Federal Employees (NFFE) in 1917 by the American Feder­
ation of Labor (AFL). In 1931 the NFFE, the largest union 
in the government, withdrew from the AFL in a dispute with 
the AFL's Metal Trades Department over support of personnel 
classification legislation pending in Congress. Although 
the split occurred over the classification bill, the under­
lying reason for the split was the mutual fear and
136
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suspicion, that existed between the craft-dominated AFL 
and the industrial NFFE. The craft unions in the AFL 
feared the passage of the bill which had the NFFE's sup­
port would "undermine craft union methods of wage determi­
nation, and otherwise surreptitiously advance the course of 
dangerous industrial unions throughout the federal ser­
vice."^ When the split occurred a number of NFFE local 
lodges voted to remain affiliated with the AFL. "On 
August 15) 1932, the AFL issued a charter to 26 locals to
be known hereafter as the American Federation of Government 
2Employees."
The New Deal programs brought many people with 
strong labor sympathies into the government service. Many 
of these new employees turned to the AFGE rather than the 
NFFE because of the AFGE's affiliation with the AFL.
In its early years the AFGE was beset by internal 
dissention between conservative and militant factions.
This difference in attitudes manifested in the John L. 
Donovan case. Donovan, technical advisor to the Labor 
Advisory Board and president of the AFGE's National Recov­
ery Administration lodge, was fired by General Hugh S. 
Johnson in June, 1934. The reason given for Donovan's 
being fired was inefficiency, insubordination, and
^Eldon Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal 




unauthorized absence from duty. The real reason according 
to the AFGE was Donovan's union activity. As a result of 
Donovan's being fired, AFGE and NFFE members picketed the 
headquarters of the NRA. Donovan was later reinstated when
3his case was heard by the National Labor Relations Board.
The leadership of the AFGE although obliged to 
support Donovan, strongly disapproved of the picketing 
tactics. This split between the militant and conservative 
factions widened at the 1934 national convention when the 
conservative President Babcock was successful in his efforts 
to amend the AFGE's constitution to read: "The American
Federation of Government Employees is unequivocally opposed 
to and will not tolerate strikes, picketing, or other pub­
lic acts against governmental authority which have the
4effect of embarrassing the government." The struggle for 
control of the union continued until 1937 when seven sus­
pended locals founded the Federal Workers of America and 
affiliated with the newly formed Congress for Industrial 
Organizations.^
From its earliest days the AFGEihas been a conserv­
ative union. This conservatism is reflected in the AFGE's 
strategy and tactics for securing benefits from the
3Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New 
York: Remsen Press, 1948), p. 192.
4AFGE constitution Article II, Section 3«
^Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer, op. 
cit., p. 194.
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government for its members.
Government unions and in particular the AFGE con­
sider themselves as devices for unified employee expression 
or as channels of communication, through which collective 
opinion can travel up to the Congress, and government offi­
cials, and information can travel down to individual mem­
bers.^
The unions do not view the government as the all­
wise benevolent employer. There is no denying that for the 
most part government employees are well treated, but the 
unions' contention is that the government's benevolence is 
proportional to the amount of encouragement it receives 
from the unions. "The impetus for reform has come from 
within, not from without, from pressure, not from paternal­
ism.
The AFGE's belief that reform has only taken place
because of union pressure is reflected in AFGE literature.
In its organizing literature the AFGE has taken credit for
every major piece of employee welfare and fringe benefit
olegislation enacted by the government since the 1930's.
The AFGE's strategy and tactics for bringing about
^Eldon Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal 
Service," ^£. cit., p. 37»
7Ibid., p. 37.
gAFGE organizing literature sent to the author by 
Mr. Stephen A. Koczak, Director of the AFGE's Research 
Department.
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reform from within the government is a reflection not only 
of its conservatism but also of the institutional arrange­
ments of its environment. The AFGE's basic strategy still 
in effect today was laid down by President Stengle in 1939 
in the following terms: "We cannot engage in collective
bargaining as the process is commonly understood. We must 
achieve our most substantial gains through legislation
9rather than by negotiation."
This strategy has taken form in four different 
types of tactics: 1. legislative, 2. administrative,
3. publicity, and 4. direct negotiation. The first three 
date back to the 1930's while the fourth originated with 
Executive Order 10988.
Legislative tactics have been and still are the 
most important tactics because of the decentralized author­
ity in the government. All government unions are well 
aware of the fact that Congress is the primary decision 
maker on personnel matters. By petitioning, lobbying, 
and exerting pressure through affiliation the unions have 
brought about legislative reform.
Lobbying techniques have taken various forms over 
the years. The AFGE’s national officers, usually the 
presidents, are the union's chief legislative representa­
tives. Records of congressional testimony indicate 'that
9"Objectives of an Employee Union," Personnel 
Administration, Vol. 2 (March, 1939), p. 5*
I4l
they spend a considerable amount of time testifying on 
behalf of their members before congressional committees.
Other lobbying techniques consist of various 
means of congressional ingratiation; favorable articles in 
union publications, banquets, testimonial dinners, engrossed 
testimonials, and honorary union memberships.^^
Although the unions claim credit for all of the 
reform legislation there is no conclusive evidence to sug­
gest that all or even a majority of the reform legislation 
originated as a direct result of union pressure tactics. 
However, it is safe to state that the unions have influ­
enced the Congress. The degree of influence that they 
exert upon the Congress appears to be contingent upon a 
number of factors such as the social and economic state of 
the country, the strength of the unions, the countervailing 
pressures from other lobby groups, and other political 
exigencies.
An example of the union's success and failure in 
Congress is in the following: Where union pressure was
not strong enough to bring about passage of the Rhodes- 
Johnston Bill, it was strong enough to bring about passage 
of a pay raise bill which the economy-minded Eisenhower 
administration had vigorously opposed. In his veto message 
President Eisenhower made some caustic comments about the
^^Eldon Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal 
Service," cit. , p. 43.
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lobbying activities of the u n i o n s , O v e r a l l ,  lobbying 
tactics have been effective and the AFGE will continue to 
use them as long as authority in the government is decen­
tralized.^^
The main difference between the legislative and 
administrative tactics is the type of government official 
to whom the pressure is directed. Getting a law enacted 
is only half of the battle. The other half is getting 
the law transformed into regulations that assure equitable 
administration of the law. The unions apply pressure to 
the Civil Service Commission, agency management, and at 
times even the President's office to bring about changes 
in the policies, regulations, and procedures that inter­
pret the laws. Union pressure on any one or all three of
these groups often results in amended regulations, pro-
13cedures, and new presidential executive orders.
The AFGE strongly believes in publicizing its 
views for both educational and tactical purposes. At the 
national level the AFGE uses its official publication,
The Government Standard, which is published every two
^^Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the 
Federal Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1962), p. 26.
12Opinion expressed by Mr. Tull, AFGE National 
Vice-President, 9th District during an interview with the 
author on July 2, 197I.
13Each annual report of the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission lists the presidential executive orders issued 
during that year that affect government employees.
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weeks, and the AFGE Washington Letter, which is published 
between issues of The Government Standard» These publica­
tions are used to keep the AFGE's members informed about 
the activities of the Federation. They are also used to 
express the union's official views on personnel matters in 
the government. At the local level, Local 916 publishes 
a monthly AFGE Bulletin and a weekly article in the Tinker 
Take Off, Tinker Air Force Base's house organ. The AFGE 
has also engaged in rallies, published leaflets, and pam­
phlets, and advertised in the media to express its views.
Officials of the AFGE at both the national and local
levels expressed the view that publicity for both educa-
l4tional and tactical purposes has been very effective.
Since some of the AFGE's legislative, administrative, and 
publicity tactics border on politicking the AFGE is pushing 
for amendment of the restrictive Hatch Acts.^^
Direct negotiation with agency management has only 
come about since the issuing of Executive Order 10988. 
Although the present scope of negotiable subject matter 
under Executive Order 11491 is limited, AFGE officials 
believe that the right to negotiate by executive order 
has brought about a significant number of changes in both
^^Opinions expressed during interviews with Mr.
Tull on July 2, 1971, 0£* cit., and Mr. N, J. Nance, Pres­
ident Local 916, AFGE, on July 2, 1971.
cit. ^^Interview with Mr. Tull on July 1, 19711 op.
144
Civil Service Commission and agency policies and regu­
lations. They believe that there is still a long way to go 
because of management's paternalism.^^
The AFGE in an attempt to broaden the limited 
scope of collective bargaining has organized nationwide
bargaining units. At the present time there are six nation-
17wide agreements in effect. In the June 25> 1971» issue 
of The Government Standard» the AFGE announced its drive 
to gain national exclusive recognition for the Veterans 
Administration's l40,000 employees. The AFGE believes 
that when contracts are negotiated at the agency level 
"all regulations and policies which affect the employees 
in relation to their jobs are subject to collective bar-
iSgaining. At these levels important changes can be made."
The acceptance and endorsement of the AFGE's 
strategy and tactics by government employees is clearly 
evidenced by the AFGE's growth. The AFGE's spectacular
l^Ibid.
1?American Federation of Government Employees, 
Collective Bargaining, p. 5* Agency wide agreements exist 
between the following:
1. Council of Field Labor Locals and the Department of 
Labor
2. Council'of BorderjEatrol Locals and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service
3. National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals and 
the Department of Agriculture
4. Council of AFGE Locals and the Railroad Retirement Board
5. National Council of Immigration and Naturalization 
Locals and the Immigration and Naturalization Service




growth since the issuing of Executive Order 10988 is of 
particular significance.
The AFGE represents only nonpostal government 
employees. Table 4 illustrates the AFGE’s growth in terms 
of actual membership and total employees represented in 
relation to the growth of nonpostal government employment.
TABLE 4
GROWTH OF THE NONPOSTAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE, 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE AFGE, AND GOVERNMENT 























6-32 298,795 9-32 550*6-35 460,657 8-35 20,038 ••• — w  mm6-40 707,671 3-40 26,221 mm mm6-45 3,391,837 1-45 39,644 mm ̂m6-50 1,465,769 6-50 56,512 — •  —
6-55 1,885,655 6-55 54,468 — mm mm6-60 1,835,836 6-60 70,714 M  — mm s6-65 1,932,429 6-65 159,817 «0 — N.A.6-66 2,083,596 6-66 197,199 mm N.A.6-67 2,285,858 6-67 239,903 11-67 326,4326-68 2,318,213 6-68 281,929 11-68 453,1556-69 2,337,412 6-69 304,856 11-69 482,3576-70 2,300,000+ 6-70 304,000* 11-70 530,5504-71 N.A. 4-71 305,000* N.A. N.A.
"Estimated number of members.
^The figures for total nonpostal government employ­
ees were developed by subtracting the total number of employ­
ees in the postal service from the total number of govern­
ment employees in the following Civil Service Commission 
annual reports; 1932 Table A, p. 11, 1935 Table A, p. 4,
1940 Table 11, p. 137» 1950 Table 2, p. 65 for 1945 figures 
and Table 1, p. 64 for 1950 figures, 1955 Table A-3, 
p. 176, i960 Table A-1, p. 16, I965 Table A-1, p. 37,
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1966 Table A-1, pp. 26-27, 196? Table A-1, pp. 24-2$, 
1968 Table A-1, pp. 66-67, 1969 Table A-1, p. 52, 1970 
U.S. Civil Service Commission Office of Labor-Management 
Relations Union Recognition in the Federal Government, 
November, 1970, pi 21, Table K.
Membership figures for the AFGE were developed 
from information supplied by Mr. Stephen A. Koczak, 
Research Director, AFGE, and Mr. Kermit Tull, AFGE 
National Vice-President 9th District.
The dues paying membership is approximately 305,000 with 
50 percent classified as white-collar and 50 percent clas­
sified as blue-collar. The 305,000 members are in over 
1400 locals.19
The AFGE represents 530,550 nonpostal government 
employees. Of the 530,550 represented government employ­
ees, 314,657 or 59 percent are white-collar and 215,768 or
204l percent are blue-collar. The AFGE also represents 
a limited number of the government's nonappropriated 
funds (NAF) employees.
The AFGE has successfully negotiated 683 current 
agreements covering 342,233 of the 530,550 government 
employees that it represents. In the Department of the 
Air Force the AFGE represents 128,496 or 4? percent of the 
Air Force's employees. There are presently 60 negotiated
21agreements in effect covering 60,460 Air Force employees.
19Telephone conversations with Mr. Tull on July 7,
1971, and July 16, 1971.
20U.S. Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor- 
Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal 
Government, November, 1970, p. 19, Table H.
21Ibid., Table A, p. 12, p. 30, Table M.
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Under the existing Civil Service Commission regu­
lations the only union security allowable for the unions 
is the dues checkoff system. The net result of the non- 
negotiability of union security clauses is that approxi­
mately 230,000 government employees represented by the 
AFGE are not paying dues to the AFGE's treasury. AFGE 
officials believe that if the Federation is to continue 
to grow that it must obtain the right to negotiate on 
union security clauses. AFGE officials believe that the 
agency shop would be the most acceptable form of union 
security to both labor and management.
The Federation maintains its National Headquarters 
in Washington, D.C. Figure 1 illustrates the organiza­
tion structure and the Federation's relationship with the 
AFL-CI0.22
The basic policies of the AFGE are established 
at the National Convention which is held every two years. 
Each permanently chartered local is entitled to send dele­
gates to the Convention on a prorata basis. The Convention 
also elects the Federation's national officers who presently 
serve for two year terms. Between conventions the National 
Executive Council has been authorized to modify policies
22American Federation of Government Employees, 
Leadership Training, op. cit. , p. 69. The organization 
chart presented in the manual was re-arranged to a more 
esthetic form. None of the relationships were changed.
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FIGURE 1
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*The dotted line indicates that the AFGE's national head­
quarters or the locals as illustrated hold membership and 
participate to varying degrees in these groups.
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to meet changing conditions. The National Executive 
Council consists of the National President, Executive 
Vice-President, National Secretary-Treasurer, and the 
15 National Vice-Presidents.
The AFGE is divided into l4 National Districts and 
1 Overseas District. Each District is headed by an elected 
National Vice-President. Mr. Kermit Tull is the National 
Vice-President of District 9 which has approximately 20,000 
AFGE members and includes the states of Arkansas, Kansas, 
Missouri, and Oklahoma. Aside from serving on the National 
Executive Council, the National Vice-Presidents are respon­
sible for managing their Districts and implementing the 
Federation's programs. Each National Vice-President main­
tains a staff to assist him in carrying out the Federation's 
programs and to assist the Locals on an ad hoc basis.
The National Headquarters in Washington, D. C. is 
staffed by the President, Executive Vice-President, 
Secretary-Treasurer and 13 staff departments. The President 
is responsible for transforming the Federation's policies 
into operational programs. He is assisted by the Executive 
Vice-President and the staff departments. The Secretary- 
Treasurer is responsible for the AFGE's financial integrity. 
The operational budget is derived from membership dues and 
AFGE insurance premiums. The annual budget is between 5 and 
6 million dollars.
The AFGE's organizing department is of particular
150
importance to this study. This department is responsible
for the recruitment of members into the union. They develop
recruiting programs, supply the necessary professional
organizers, and provide promotional material to assist the
district and local union representatives in their recruiting
campaigns. The AFGE's basic recruiting appeal centers
around the psychological and economic need for collective
representation to get better working conditions. The
following quotes from a current AFGE organizing leaflet
23illustrates the tone of the union's appeal:
INDIVIDUALS BENEFIT THROUGH UNITY. History illustrates 
how difficult it is for individual employees to bargain 
effectively with management. But working together 
through their union, employees can make their wishes 
known to management and can obtain justified improve­
ments in working conditions, pay and other benefits. 
Strong, effective, responsible government employee 
unions benefit all concerned— the employees, the gov­
ernment and the public.
YOU CAN CHANGE YOUR FUTURE. As a federal employee you 
now have the opportunity to improve your working con­
ditions by uniting yourself with your fellow government 
employees in the union composed exclusively of and for 
government workers--the AFGE.
AFGE officials believe that membership in a strong union
is the best way for individual government employees to
protect their rights. They also believe that a strong union
is the best way for government employees to get wage and
24fringe benefit increases.
^^AFGE promotional leaflet, "Grow with AFGE," I968. 
24Interviews with Mr. Tull on July 1, 1971, and 
Mr. Nance on July 2, 1971*
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In a number of its promotional leaflets the AFGE 
noted that it has been responsible for the wage and fringe 
benefit increases that government employees have received 
over the past ten years. The literature also noted that 
future goals included the obtaining of more wage and fringe 
benefits for government employees. The AFGE's increasing 
emphasis on wage and fringe benefit increases was brought 
out by Mr. Tull in an interview with the author. Mr. Tull 
expressed the opinion that the AFGE will soon follow the 
postal unions in obtaining wage and fringe benefit col­
lective bargaining rights for all of the nonpostal govern­
ment employees that they represent.
Since the AFGE's actual membership over the past 
2 years has remained stable, the recruiting appeals have 
taken on increased importance. The government's granting 
of negotiable agency shop security rights will certainly 
increase the AFGE's actual membership. However, whether 
or not those who are members or become members maintain 
their membership will depend largely upon the strategy and 
tactics that the AFGE develops.
Local 916 of the AFGE
Local 916 of the American Federation of Government 
Employees is the Federation's largest local. Since I968 
Local 916 has been the exclusive bargaining agent for
25Interview with Mr. Tull, July 1, 1971.
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civilian government employees at Tinker Air Force Base. 
Presently, Local 916 represents 21,000 of Tinker's 23,078 
civilian e m p l o y e e s . T h e  21,000 Tinker employees repre­
sented by Local 916 are covered under a two year negotiated 
contract that expires on December 14, 1972.
From its official charter date, June 26, 1946,
Local 916 has had a sporadic growth rate. In I963 member­
ship was estimated to be between 200 and 250. By I965 
membership had increased to between 5OO and 600. In late 
1965 the Local initiated a membership drive to gain formal 
recognition under Executive Order IO988 which would entitle 
it to the dues checkoff system. This goal was met in May,
1966, when membership exceeded 2000. By I966, Local 916
27was the largest union local at Tinker Air Force Base.
Shortly after formal recognition was granted the 
AFGE's National Headquarters sponsored an intensive organ­
izing campaign to increase the Local's membership for eli­
gibility for exclusive recognition. On September 25, 1968, 
the date of the representation election, 19,651 Tinker
^^This figure was quoted to the author in a tele­
phone conversation with Mr. David Brown, Assistant Labor 
Relations Officer TAFB on July I6, 1971.
27Ronald Merrill, "Collective Bargaining at Tinker 
Air Force Base, Oklahoma" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, 
University of Oklahoma, I966), p. 62. Although the author's 
Local 916 membership figures do not agree with Merrill's, 
they are believed to be correct since they were obtained in 
interviews with AFGE officials. Merrill's figures were 
obtained from management estimates.
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employees were eligible to vote. Of the 16,869 votes cast
15»352 were valid and unchallenged. The results of the
election indicated that 11,424 or 73 percent of the workers
voted for representation by the AFGE. At the time of the
granting of exclusive recognition, Local 9l6’s actual
membership was estimated to be 8,300 to 8,500. Shortly
thereafter, the Local's membership peaked at a record high
of 8600. Since 1969 Local 916's membership has fluctuated
28between 7OOO and 8OOO dues-paying members.
At the time this study was conducted the dues-paying
membership was 7»555«^^ Of the 7,364 actual employed dues-
paying white-collar and blue-collar members, 5,156 or 70
percent are blue-collar and 2,209 or 30 percent are white-
30collar employees at Tinker Air Force Base.
In comparison to the National's white-collar and 
blue-collar membership proportion of 5O-5O, Local 916 is 
atypical with its 30 percent white-collar and 70 percent 
blue-collar membership. At Tinker Air Force Base the
28Membership figures were obtained in interviews 
with Mr- Tull on April 28, 1971 and July 1, 1971 and with 
Mr. Nance on July 2, 1971.
29Local 916's membership report as of June 1, 1971. 
This figure included 25 new members not in the records, 68 
nonappropriated fund members, and 98 retired members.
30Because of the limited information contained in 
the Local's records these figures are subject to a 1 percent 
error margin.
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white-collar and blue-collar employee distribution is
approximately 55 percent white-collar and 45 percent blue-
31collar. Comparison of Local 916's white-collar and blue- 
collar membership distribution with Tinker's white-collar 
and blue-collar employee distribution indicates that Local 
916 has a greater percentage of Tinker's blue-collar 
employees than its white-collar employees. Local 916 has 
approximately 17.4 percent of Tinker's white-collar employ­
ees and 49.5 percent of Tinker's blue-collar employees in 
its membership. Although the 17.4 percent actual white- 
collar membership figure is far below the AFGE's national 
average of 50 percent white-collar membership, it is still 
more than double the 8.8 percent white-collar union member­
ship in the private sector.
As exclusive bargaining agent for 21,000 of 
Tinker's 23,078 employees. Local 916 has the same membership 
and representation problems that plague the National.
Most of Tinker's employees are represented by Local 
916 without any obligation to pay membership dues. Since 
the Local must serve all of the members of the bargaining
31Ray Grimes, Economic and Social Characteristics 
of the Oklahoma City Air Material Area Labor Force, U. S.
Air Force, Oklahoma City: August, I96Ô , p. 3- Grimes notes
that his figures are approximations for the following rea­
sons: 1. respondent reporting errors, 2. 1,584 of
Tinker's 23,885 employees were unavailable and 3- 3,099 did
not respond to the survey. Mr. Ken Lowe, Branch Chief of 
Employee Relations at Tinker expressed the opinion that 
Grime's I968 figures are accurate for 1971 employee charac­
teristics .
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unit it often finds its financial and human resources
strained to their limits. Mr, Nance, President of Local
916, believes that the union would be more effective if
it could negotiate a union security clause (agency shop)
32in the contract.
For a union local the size of Local 916, it main­
tains a relatively small full-time staff. The full-time 
salaried staff consists of the President, First Vice- 
President, Business Agent, Chief Steward, Personnel Repre­
sentative, and two secretaries. The Chief Steward has 
approximately 200 part-time stewards reporting to him. 
Under the conditions of the current agreement a maximum of 
243 stewards can be appointed. Mr. Nance expressed a 
strong need for a comprehensive steward training program.
The Local is assisted on an ad hoc basis by both the Dis-
3 3trict and National staffs.
The Local schedules an open membership meeting 
at the end of each month. Attendance at these meetings 
rarely exceeds I50 members. The Local's general policies 
are established by the 12 member Executive Council which
32Opinion expressed by Mr. Nance during an inter­
view with the author on July 2, 1971, 0£. cit.
^^Ibid.
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meets twice a month. The members of the Executive Council 
are elected for two year terms by the membership.
Local 916 officials are concerned about their 
inability to increase the dues-paying membership. Aside 
from the agency shop they believe that an expansion of the 
scope of bargainable issues would attract more members.
They feel that the AFGE's influence in getting the Monroney 
Amendment through Congress despite strong Air Force opposi­
tion is one of the reasons why approximately 50 percent of 
Tinker's blue-collar employees are AFGE members. The 
Local's influence in the operation of the area wage-board 
under the Federal Coordinated Wage System is also credited 
for the high percentage of blue-collar members. Local 916 
officials are satisfied with the wage-board's present 
operation although they admit that a collective bargaining 
arrangement does not exist. In the area of wages of 
Tinker's white-collar employees the Local's influence is 
confined mainly to representing employees in position 
classification grievance cases.
At the local level, the Local's primary appeal and 
role is protecting the rights of all represented Tinker 
employees. Local 916 officials believe that since they
3^ibid.
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liave been the exclusive bargaining agent for Tinker 
employees that management's attitudes towards both its 
employees and the union has changed. They believe that 
the major problem at Tinker was management's either over­
looking or misinterpreting Air Force and Civil Service
Commission regulations. This situation was particularly
35true in appraisal, promotion, and grievance procedures.
Both Mr. Nance and Mr. Holloway believe that the 
union has been instrumental in bringing about a number of 
changes in Air Force policies and regulations. Changes in 
the Air Force's AFR 40-771 Appraisal and Grievance Proce­
dure revised May 1, 1971» and the OCAMA Merit and Promotion 
Program revised August 31 » 1970 were cited as examples of 
the union's influence. Mr. Nance believes that the 
changes in Air Force policies and regulations over the 
past few years have been so gradual that the average Tin­
ker employee does not realize that without the union's 
steady pressure these changes would have never occurred.
Both Tinker management and Local 916 officials 
believe that the present merit promotion program estab­
lished in 1962 at Tinker has its problems. However, their 
views on the nature of the problems differ. The System's
3 5Opinions expressed by both Mr. Nance and Mr. 
Holloway--Local 916's Personnel Representative during a 
number of informal conversations with the author between 
June 2, 1971 and July 2, 1971.
^^Ibid.
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operation centers around an EDP Civilian Skills Locator 
System, commonly referred to as the "Profile System" by 
Tinker employees. The System is designed to maintain pro­
motion information on a master tape for every employee.
This information includes experience, education, test 
scores, appraisals, and many more items which are used 
to determine the best qualified for promotion. This 
system automatically compares qualifications and 
requirements for each position against the qualifi­cations of employees.37
Available positions can be filled by any qualified govern­
ment employee but qualifying rules effectively limit the 
System to Tinker employees only. The pamphlet describing 
the System’s operation does not disclose the exact weight­
ing that is given to the promotion eligibility factors.
The Air Force's Merit Promotion Program regulation 
40-l notes that the supervisors appraisal is the first of 
the primary factors for promotion eligibility. Education, 
training, and experience (TRAEX) are ranked second and 
tests are ranked third. Secondary factors include three
o Qcategories of performance awards. Management indicated 
to the author that the factors were not evenly weighted 
and that seniority had a low weighting while the super­
visor's appraisal had a high weighting. Management believes 
that the System is basically sound and that the problems
37Civilian Personnel OCAMA Merit Promotion Program, 
Tinker Air Force Base, 1970, p. Foreward. This pamphlet 
was distributed to all Tinker employees.
^^OCAMA-TAFB Regulation 40-l, September l8, 1970, 
pp. 7-8, OCAMA-TAFBR (CL), no date or page number.
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have arisen because of employees "distrijst of computers"
and that consideration of all eligible Tinker employees
for any promotion or open position often encompasses too 
39many people.
Local 916 officials believe that the System is 
biased against the employees because of the high weighting 
given to the supervisor's appraisal. They feel that many 
of the supervisors' appraisals are subjective rather than 
objective. One of the union's goals is to negotiate the 
modification of promotion system to give the seniority
40factor the highest weighting.
Relations between Tinker management and Local 9l6's
officials are cordial. Both Mr. Barnett and Mr. Nance
expressed mutual respect for each other's personal attri-
4lbutes and abilities. Although the personal atmosphere 
is cordial, management's overall attitude of sovereign 
paternalism still follows the theme expressed by Merrill 
in 1966. "Tinker officials encourage worker participation 
and are diligent in adhering to the spirit and letter of 
the executive order. True, they have not rushed forth to
39Opinion expressed by Mr. Ken Lowe, branch chief 
of employee relations, during an interview with the author 
on July 1, 1971.
40Interview with Mr. Nance on July 2, 1971.
41The author was privileged to sit in on an infor­
mal discussion between Mr. Barnett, Mr. Brown, Mr. Nance, 
and Mr. Holloway on settling a grievance condition. In 
separate interviews Mr. Nance and Mr. Barnett expressed 
their mutual respect for each other.
l6o
42give away anything; nothing requires them to."
Local 916's officials are well aware of management's 
attitudes. The union's countervailing power is manifested 
in either one of two courses of action. When the union 
secures no cooperation from first and middle-level manage­
ment they circumvent these levels and negotiate directly 
with the Commanding General. This method has proven to be 
very effective. When this course of action either fails or 
is blocked the union gives publicity to their problem either 
in the Tinker Take Off which is widely circulated outside 
the base area. On occasion the union has used the local 
media. The Local's use of publicity as a political weapon 
has been especially effective since Air Force management is
very image conscious, both nationally and in the Oklahoma 
43City area.
The Air Force's continued sovereign paternalism 
is reflected in the current labor-management agreement.
The spirit of the agreement parallels the spirit of Execu­
tive Order 11491. Sovereignty transformed as management's 
rights and nonnegotiable subjects paraphrase Sections 11 
and 12 of the Order. However, the overall subject matter 
covered in the agreement is broad when compared to the 
agreements negotiated by other AFGE Locals and other unions.
42Ronald Merrill, o£. cit. , p. 127»
4 3Informal discussions between the author and Mr. 
Nance during the period June 2, 1971 to July 2, 1971, op.
cit.
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The agreement has 37 articles with 23 of these articles
pertaining specifically to the terms and conditions of
employment at Tinker. A few of the subjects covered are
charity drives, tests, disciplinary action, health and
44safety, publicity, and reductions in force. Although 
the agreements coverage is broad,management's major con­
cession to the union in most of the articles is that they 
will consult with the union before taking action, and that 
applicable Air Force and Civil Service Commission regula­
tions will be followed.
The union's only real success in the agreement is
45the negotiated employee and union grievance procedures.
The Civil Service Commission and the Air Force's distinc­
tion between a grievance and an adverse action appeal is 
applied to limit the scope of the negotiated grievance
46procedure. Under the terms of the agreement Tinker employ­
ees may choose either the negotiated grievance procedure 
or the Air Force's 40-771 grievance and appeal procedure 
but not both. The negotiated grievance procedure has three 
intermediary steps and a fourth step of binding arbitration. 
Arbitration extends only to the application and interpre­
tation of the agreement and the Air Force's policies and
44Labor-Management Agreement, between Tinker Air 
Force Base and Local 9l6 American Federation of Govern­
ment Employees.
^^Ibid., Articles 35 and 36.
46Ibid., Article 35» Sections B and C.
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regulations. Exceptions to the arbitrator's award may
be filed by either the union or management with the
Federal Labor Relations Council subject to their regula- 
47tions. Under the terms of the agreement the union may
refer disputes over the interpretation and application
48of the agreement to arbitration.
Summary
The AFGE stands at a crossroad. Its conservative 
strategy and tactics in representing government employees 
by working through legislative and administrative channels 
has been effective for many years in attracting members and 
getting welfare, and fringe benefits for government employ­
ees. The question is; Are these conservative strategy 
and tactics in need of re-evaluation? The AFGE's dues- 
paying membership in absolute numbers has been stable for
nearly two years while the number of government employees
4qthat it must represent has increased by 50,000. One 
possible reason for the laçk of real growth may be that the 
AFGE's tactics bring slow results when compared to the 
results recently gained by the more militant postal unions.
Local 916 also has the same problem of static 
growth that plagues the National. In fact, Local 9l6's
47Ibid., Article 35i Step 4, D-E.
4flIbid., Article 36.
^^See Table 4, p.145.
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growth has actually declined. In the past three years 
they have lost nearly 1,000 members. The Local's strategy 
and tactics parallels those of the National except for 
modifications to meet local conditions. Again, it appears 
that there is a need to re-examine those strategy and 
tactics that have in the past appealed to Tinker employees.
Local 916 also suffers from internal dissention.
The Local's officers expressed concern for the fact that 
internal dissention diverts the union from properly repre­
senting its members. Management also expressed concern 
for the stability of the union. They believe that a stable 
union helps to maintain labor-management harmony. They 
expressed concern about the possibility of unqualified 
people assuming the union's leadership. An unqualified 
leader's lack of knowledge about labor-management relations 
could cause the leaders to adopt unreasonable positions.
In the following chapter the reasons why the sam­
pled Local 916 members joined the union will be examined.
^^This concern by both Local 916 officers and Tin­
ker management was expressed during separate interviews on 
July 2, 1971.
CHAPTER VI
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTORS THAT 
CAUSED THE SAMPLED UNION MEMBERS 
TO JOIN AFGE LOCAL 916
The primary research for this study centered around 
a Confidential Questionnaire that was sent to the homes 
of 736 AFGE Local 916 members.^ The sample was established 
by a systematic random sample of every tenth blue-collar 
and white-collar union member. The questionnaire was 
sent on two separate occasions; June 3» 1971 and June 17» 
1971. To complement the study the union published a series 
of articles in the Tinker Take Off. The articles described 
the purpose of the study and urged the sampled members to 
participate.
This chapter is devoted to the presentation and 
analysis of the sampled AFGE Local 9l6 members' responses 
to the Confidential Questionnaire. The responses to the 
questionnaire will be analyzed to determine why the sam­
pled blue-collar and white-collar union members joined 
the AFGE. The results of the data analysis will be used
^Confidential Questionnaire, Appendix 1.
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to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The reasons why the sampled members
joined the AFGE are different from 
the reasons why workers in the pri­
vate sector join unions.
Hypothesis 2: The reasons why the sampled blue-
collar and white-collar members 
joined the AFGE are the same.
Each individual's response to the 25 questions in 
the Confidential Questionnaire was coded for frequency 
distribution and statistical analysis. The nature of the 
population sample limited the design of the questionnaire 
to discrete responses. Therefore the shape of the frequency 
distributions are nonparametric.
In many cases a cursory examination of the data 
was sufficient to indicate whether the sample groups' 
responses were significantly different. In some cases a 
cursory examination of the data did not indicate whether the 
responses were significantly different than what might 
have been expected from some theoretical or expected . 
response. In these cases Chi-Square analysis was used.
Nonparametric or distribution-free statistics are 
limited in terms of the useful statistical tests that can .
be used for data analysis. The Chi-Square test for sig­
nificance is an excellent test for analyzing discrete
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nonparametric statistics because Chi-Square assumes no
2assumptions about the shape of the parameter distribution.
Chi-Square analysis provided a method whereby sig­
nificant differences in the responses of the sampled blue-
collar and white-collar members could be determined. This
analysis provided information to determine if the fre­
quency distribution observed in the sample groups' responses 
deviated significantly from some theoretical distribution.
The general formula for Chi-Square is:2
■ ■ O = observed frequency
E = expected frequency
To test whether the observed frequencies deviate 
significantly from some theoretical frequency, an expected 
frequency distribution was necessary. This was accom­
plished by two methods.
Using the first method the frequency distribution 
of each question, listed separately the expected frequency 
distribution based on the hypothesis that the total number 
of responses per question would occur an equal number of 
times in each cell. The formula used in the analysis is:
”s*<total of responses per cell)
Except for question 5 this method was used in analyzing the 
responses to the questionnaire as shown in Tables 34 through
2N, M. Downie and R. W. Heath. Basic Statistical 
Methods (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 160-175»
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60 in Appendix II, In Question 5» "Is your job classified 
as: 1. wage-board, 2, general schedule?," the sample con­
sisted of 70 percent blue-collar and 30 percent white-collar 
AFGE members. The expected response distribution from the 
sample was 70 percent blue-collar and 30 percent white- 
collar instead of the 50 percent blue-collar and white- 
collar based upon the formula. The exception occurs in 
this question because the expected response distribution 
was known.
By using a second method the existence of signifi­
cant differences in the blue-collar and white-collar members' 
responses were determined. Their responses were compared 
to each of the 24 questions. To test whether a significant 
difference exists between the proportional responses of 
the blue-collar and white-collar members to each question 
a null hypothesis was formulated. The null hypothesis 
became: there is no significant difference between the
observed and expected responses of the sampled blue-collar 
and white-collar members. The following general format 
is used to test the null hypothesis :
Blue-Collar and (O) (O)
white-collar Observed Expected
AFGE Members Frequency Frequency
1, Blue-collar 0^ E^
2, White-collar 0^ Eg
Total (N) 0^ E^
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= 2 #-- (N)
Where (O) is the observed frequency in each cell 0
Where (E) is the expected frequency in each cell E
Where (N) is the total number of responses 0^=E^=N
Expected cell frequencies for any size matrix are 
obtained by using the following formula:
Expected cell frequency =
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Based upon the Chi-Square value obtained, the null 
hypothesis of no significant difference between the propor­
tion of observed and expected responses of the blue-collar 
and white-collar members is either rejected or accepted. 
The results of the Chi-Square test based on this null 
hypothesis are shown at the bottom of Tables 5 through 
33 in this chapter. The minimum probability value for 
rejection of the null hypothesis of this study is P ̂  .05.
Using this nondirectional method of statistical
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analysis the survey results as discussed in this chapter 
■will be used to determine which factors either influenced 
or did not influence the sampled members' decision to join 
the union and whether the reasons of the blue-collar and 
white-collar members differed significantly.
Survey Findings and Analysis 
The sampled AFGE members' responses to each of the 
25 questions in the Confidential Questionnaire are compiled 
in Tables 34 through 60 in Appendix II. Unless specifically 
noted as being otherwise, all of the responses discussed 
in both Appendix II and this chapter are only those of the 
sampled union members who responded to the questionnaire.
The data in Tables 34 through 60 in Appendix II show the 
distribution of the responses for the blue-collar members, 
the white-collar members, and the total for both groups.
The distribution of responses for each group, and the 
group totals are tested separately using Chi-Square 
analysis. The total response to each of the questions, 
except questions 4, 6, and 25 as shown in Tables 391 4l, 
and 60 (Appendix II) respectively, are significantly dif­
ferent from the theoretical or expected distribution.
The responses to questions 4 and 6 when presented in 
Tables 11 and 13 respectively in this chapter will be com­
pared to the related distributions for all Tinker employ­
ees to determine if the data are representative of the 
population. If significant comparisons exist then the 
responses to all of the questions except number 25 will be
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significant. If all of the relevant data are significant 
then valid conclusions can be drawn from the data.
In highly industrialized states collective associ­
ation is a way of life. Early in life children raised in 
labor intensive industrial areas or major population cen­
ters are exposed to group values and associations. As 
population centers have become more concentrated depend­
ence upon group associations has become a means for sur­
viving. In states such as West Virginia, Washington, 
Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, Indiana, Missouri, and 
Illinois either labor intensive industries or major popu­
lation centers exist. In these states unions have histori­
cal roots and union membership among nonfarm workers is the
3highest in the country. In these states the children of 
families where either or both parents may belong to a union 
are more inclined to join unions than children raised in 
states where industrial bases or populations centers do 
not exist and unionism is low.
Oklahoma is a predominately rural state where 
neither labor intensive industries nor major popula­
tion centers exist. As a general rule Oklahomans do 
not join unions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 
that Oklahoma ranked number 4l in the nation with 16.7 
percent of the nonagricultural labor force having
3U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta­
tistics, Directory of National and Internatidnal Labor 
Unions in the United States. Bulletin No. 1665, P. 76.
Table 10, 1970.
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4union membership. Being either born and educated or edu­
cated in Oklahoma is viewed as a factor that might retard 
union growth at Tinker. The proportion of the sample who 
were born and educated in Oklahoma and the proportion of 
all Tinker employees who were born in Oklahoma are shown 
in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.
TABLE 5 
WERE YOU BORN IN OKLAHOMA?*







Blue-Collar 175 122 70 53 30
White-Collar 137 81 59 56 4i
Total 312 203 65 109 34
Chi-Square 4.208 Significant Level .05
*A11 of the members who were born in Oklahoma were 
also educated in Oklahoma.
From the data presented in Table 5 the null hypothe­
sis is rejected. A significant difference exists in the 
birth places of the blue-collar and the white-collar mem­
bers. A comparison of the data in Tables 5 and 6 shows 
that the sampled distribution of native-born Oklahomans 




PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL TINKER 
EMPLOYEES BORN IN OKLAHOMA




^Ray Grimes, Economic and Social Characteristics of 
the Oklahoma City Air feterial Area~ Table È2, pT 44,
This means that the sampled data are representative of all 
Tinker employees.
Table 7 shows the proportion of the sampled members 
who were educated in Oklahoma schools during their forma­
tive years 7 through l8.
TABLE 7
WHILE YOU WERE BETWEEN 7 AND l8 YEARS OLD:
DID YOU ATTEND SCHOOL IN OKLAHOMA?







Blue-collar 175 142 80 33 20
White-collar 137 99 72 38 28
Total 312 241 77 71 22
Chi-Square 3.209 Significant Level N.S.
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A cursory examination of the data shows that there 
is no significant difference in the responses of the blue- 
collar and the white-collar members.
The data presented in Table 5 show that 65 per­
cent of the members are native-born Oklahomans. All of 
those members born in Oklahoma were educated in Oklahoma.
Of the 109 who were not born in Oklahoma, 38 were educated 
in Oklahoma. In total 77 percent of the sampled members 
were either born and educated or educated in Oklahoma. No 
significant difference in the distribution of the two groups 
exists.
Whereas only I6.7 percent of Oklahoma's nonfarm 
labor force are union members, 33 percent of Tinker's 
employees are AFGE members. Considering that 77 percent 
of the respondents were either born and educated or edu­
cated in Oklahoma, and that 63 percent of all Tinker employ­
ees were born in Oklahoma, the fact that the union received 
a majority of all of the votes cast in the election to be 
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for Tinker 
employees is significant.
Seidman, London, and Karsh in their study about 
why workers in a steel mill joined the union concluded 
that family background was a factor. The workers parents' 
membership and satisfaction with unions had a positive 
effect upon the workers views about unions.^
cSee Chapter 111, p. 4,3? of this study.
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If the sampled members parents were union members 
during the members' childhood it is assumed that the par­
ents attitudes had some effect on the childrens' values.
If the parents' experience with unions was beneficial to 
them their children are believed to be more inclined to 
join a union than children whose parents either were not 
union members or were dissatisfied with their experiences 
with unions.
Table 8 shows if the members came from a union or 
a nonunion family.
TABLE 8
DID EITHER OF YOUR PARENTS BELONG TO A UNION?
Group
N









Blue-collar 175 31 18 124 71 20 11
White-collar 137 21 15 106 77 10 7
Total 312 52 l6 230 73 30 9
Chi-Square 2.429 Signi ficant iLevel N.S.
The data show that 73 percent of the respondents 
did not come from a family with a union background. The 
230 respondents who came from nonunion families were not 
favorably predisposed toward joining the AFGE because of 
any influences from their parents being union members.
The Chi-Square value shows there is no significant
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difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the 
white-collar members.
Table 9 shows the parents' experience with unions 
for the 52 members whose parents had been union members.
TABLE 9
IF YES, DID THEY FEEL THAT THE UNION WAS 
HELPFUL TO THEM?
Group








Blue-collar 31 26 84 1 1 4 13
White-collar 21 16 76 0 0 5 24
Total 52 42 80 1 1 9 17
Chi-Square 2.573 Significant Level N.S.
The data show that 42 of the 52 members; believe
that their parents were satisfied with their union exper­
iences. Only one person indicated that his parents were 
dissatisfied with their union experience. The only conclu­
sions that can be drawn from the data are that 42 members 
of the sample group probably had favorable attitudes about 
unions before joining the AFGE. There is no significant 
difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the 
white-collar members.
Past union membership is a factor that influences 
a persons decision to join another union. If a persons
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past experience with a union was beneficial, then he. is 
inclined to join a union again. If a persons past experi­
ence with a union was not beneficial, then that person 
is less inclined to join another union.
Table 10 shows if past union membership was present 
in the sample groups background.
TABLE 10
BEFORE YOU CAME TO WORK AT TINKER
DID YOU EVER BELONG TO A UNION0







Blue-collar 175 70 4o 105 6o
White-collar 137 45 33 92 67
Total 312 115 36 197 63
From the data we can infer that 115 of the members 
who belonged to a union before coming to Tinker were sat­
isfied with their past union membership. Otherwise, they 
would not have joined the AFGE since no union security 
clause such as the union shop or the agency shop exists at 
Tinker. For the 197 members who had no experiences with 
unions it can be said that past union membership was not 
a factor in their joining the AFGE. There is no signifi­
cant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and 
the white-collar members.
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The data presented in Table 11 will be analyzed 
to see if there is any relationship between the number of 
years a sampled member has been employed at Tinker and his 
joining the AFGE.
TABLE 11




less than 5 5- 10 11- 15 Over 16N # % % # % # %
Blue-Collar 175 43 25 50 29 20 11 62 35
White-Collar 137 14 10 33 24 26 19 64 47
Total 312 57 18 83 26 46 14 126 4o
Chi-Square 15. 269 Significant Level .01
The null hypothesis is rejected. A significant dif­
ference exists in the responses of the blue-collar and the 
white-collar members.
A comparison by number of years employed at Tinker 
(Table 11) of the sampled members with all Tinker employees 
(Table 12) will show if any relative proportional differences 
in the union's membership exists. Table 12 shows the number 
of years employed at Tinker distribution for all Tinker
7employees.
^Ray Grimes, op. cit., Table 18, p. 4l.
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TABLE 12
NUMBER OF YEARS EMPLOYED AT TINKER 










Blue-collar 100 39,9 12.1 10.0 37.9
White-collar 100 32.7 20.2 13.5 33.7
Total 100 36.7 15.8 11.6 36.0
Results of the comparisons indicate, with one 
exception, that the proportion of sampled blue-collar 
members corresponds proportionally for all blue-collar 
Tinker employees. The exception occurs in the 5 to 10 
years interval where the proportion of the blue-collar 
respondents is two and one-half times greater than the 
proportion of all Tinker employees.
A comparison of the sampled white-collar members 
with all white-collar Tinker employees shows that propor­
tional differences exist in all intervals. In the less 
than 5 years interval the respondents percentage is less 
than one-third the interval percentage of all Tinker 
employees. As the number of years employed at Tinker 
increases the proportional membership in the AFGE increases 
and in all cases exceeds the interval percentage for all 
Tinker employees. The data show the AFGE has had a 
higher proportional success in organizing white-collar
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members who have worked at Tinker for more than five 
years, than with those who have worked at Tinker for less 
than five years.
Since the union membership sample was determined 
by systematic random sampling and the characteristics of 
the nonrespondents are known it can be inferred that the 
longer a white-collar worker is employed at Tinker the 
greater his chances are of joining the AFGE,
The survey data presented in Table 13 will be 
analyzed to determine if there is any relationship between 
the respondents' ages and their joining the AFGE.
TABLE 13 




less than 30 30- 4o 41- 51 Over 50N # % # % % %
Blue-Collar 175 28 16 32 18 56 32 59 33
White-Collar 137 10 7 22 l6 52 37 53 38
Total 312 38 12 54 17 108 34 112 35
Chi-Square 6 .030 Significant Level N .3.
A cursory examination of the data shows that there 
is no significant difference in the blue-collar and the 
white-collar members' responses.
A comparison by grouped age intervals of the sampled
l8o
members with all Tinker employees will show if any propor­
tional differences in AFGE membership exists in the inter­
vals. Table l4 shows the age distribution for all Tinker 
8employees.
TABLE 14












Blue-collar 100 20.8 21.4 33.3 24.5
White-collar 100 18.8 25.8 34.9 20.6
Total 100 19.9 23.4 34.0 22.7
The results of the comparisons indicate that only 
in the over 50 years of age group of the sample does the 
proportion of blue-collar membership exceed the correspond­
ing age group proportion of all blue-collar Tinker employ­
ees. The survey data show that 24 percent of the sampled 
over 50 years of age blue-collar members have been employed 
at Tinker from 5 to 10 years. This partially explains 
the high proportional success that the AFGE has had in 
organizing the 5 to 10 years group.
Comparisons of the sampled white-collar members 
with all Tinker white-collar employees show that the AFGE 
has not been proportionally successful in organizing
^Ibid., p. 41.
l8l
white-collar employees under 40 years old. The highest 
proportional success has been with those Tinker employees 
who are over $0 years old. The data was further analysed
to show that for the members in the sample over 50 years
old 27 percent have worked at Tinker between 5 and 10 
years, 38 percent between 11 to I5 years and 48 percent 
over 16 years. This explains the higher proportional 
success that the AFGE has had in organizing white-collar 
Tinker employees in those intervals.
From the data it appears that the AFGE's member­
ship appeals are most likely to attract Tinker employees
over 50 years old and least likely to attract Tinker 
employees under 30 years old. The importance of these 
findings is that the median age of Tinker employees has 
been decreasing since i960. The latest figures indicate 
that the median age for all employees is 43 years.  ̂ If 
this trend continues and the AFGE's organizing appeals 
continue to hold the highest proportional attraction for 
Tinker employees over 50 years old then Local 916 will con­
tinue to lose members.
The data presented in Tables I5 and I6 are used as 
checks upon the representativeness of the sample's respond­
ents. Local 916 records indicate that approximately 70 
to 80 percent of the current members joined the union within 
the past 5 years. According to Local 916 officials attendance
^Ibid., p. 3.
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at the Local's monthly meetings is usually less than 15O.
TABLE 15
HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN 




less than 2 2-5 6-10 





Blue-collar 174 46 26 89 51 33 18 6 3
White-collar 137 20 14 82 59 30 21 5 3
Total 311 66 21 171 54 63 20 11 3
Chi-Square 7*300 Significant Level N. S.
TABLE 16
HOW MANY OF 
AFGE
THE SCHEDULED MEETINGS OF 






less than 3 4-7 
# % # %
8-12
# %
Blue-collar 175 122 69 41 23 12 6
White-collar 137 116 84 15 10 6 4
Total 312 238 76 56 17 18 5
Chi-Square 9*438 Significant Level .01
The responses to these questions she w that the
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distributions of the sampled members membership and par­
ticipation in the union are representative of the popula­
tions membership and participation distributions. No sig­
nificant difference exists in the number of years either 
the blue-collar or the white-collar members have been mem­
bers of the union. A significant difference exists in the 
blue-collar and the white-collar members attendance at the 
union's monthly meetings. The data show that the blue- 
collar members' active participation in the Local is twice 
that of the white-collar members. This observation cor­
responds with the fact that the majority of the Local's 
present administration are blue-collar workers.
It can be stated that in the private sector, social 
factors, i.e., group associations and group pressures, are 
reasons that influence workers joining unions. Chamberlin, 
Bakke, Seidman, et al., and Rose all found that social 
pressures were a factor in workers joining unions. Cham­
berlin found that 7 percent of the union members that he 
studied joined the union because of their friends. How­
ever, he discounted the social factor and concluded that 
the union members reasons for joining the union were 
economically b a s e d . B a k k e  found that workers were 
inclined to join the union if "association and participation 
in the union would reinforce normal group attachments and
^^Chapter III, _o£. cit. , p. 40-
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interests. . . Seidman, _ê  al. , conducted their
study in highly organized steel plants and found that a
large number of inactive union members reported joining
12the union because of informal group pressure. They con­
cluded that the strongest reasons for the workers joining
13the union was based upon existing social pressure. Rose, 
in his study of the highly organized Teamsters found that 
almost one-half of the workers indicated that they had
l4joined the union involuntarily.
The data presented in Tables 17, l8, and 19 will 
be analyzed to determine if either informal, group formal, 
or external formal pressures were reasons for the sampled 
members joining the union.
TABLE 17
DID YOU JOIN THE AFGE BECAUSE YOUR FRIENDS 
WERE MEMBERS? (INFORMAL PRESSURE)







* t know 
# %
Blue-collar 175 19 10 154 88 2 1
White-collar 137 14 10 123 89 0 0
Total 312 33 11 277 88 2 0
Chi-square 1.095 Significant Level N.S.
^^Ibid., p. 4l.
^^Ibid., p. 43.
^^Ibid., p. 43. 
l4Ibid., p. 4$> Reasons: number 1,
1Ô5
The data s h ov? that only 11 percent of the members 
feel that informal social pressure was a factor in their 
joining the AFGE. This figure approximates the 7 percent 
that Chamberlin found in his study. Compared to the 
findings of Seidman _et al, and Rose the proportion is 
low. A cursory examination of the data in Table 17 
shows that there is no significant difference in the 
blue-collar and the white-collar members' responses.
TABLE 18
DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE PRESSURED BY YOUR FRIENDS 
INTO JOINING THE AFGE? (GROUP FORMAL PRESSURE)
Group
N





Don ' t know
%
Blue-collar 175 1 0 172 98 2 1
White-collar 137 2 1 135 98 0 0
Total 312 3 0 307 98 2 0
Chi-Square 2.007 Significant Level N.S.
From the data it can be stated that formal pressure 
from the social group was not a factor in the members join­
ing the union. This statement is true for both the blue- 
collar and the white-collar members because no significant 
difference exists in their responses.
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TABLE 19
DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE PRESSURED BY PEOPLE 
OTHER THAN YOUR FRIENDS INTO JOINING 









Don ' t Know
%
Blue-Collar 175 15 8 158 90 2 1
White-Collar 137 4 2 131 95 2 1
Total 312 19 6 289 92 4 1
Chi-Square 5«797 Significant Level N.S.
From the data it can be stated that formal pressure 
outside of the social group was not a factor in joining the 
union for 92 percent of the members. This statement is 
true for both the blue-collar and the white-collar members 
because no significant differences exist in their responses, 
The responses shown in Tables 17, I8, and 19 indi­
cate that informal and external social pressure was a fac­
tor for only 11, 0, and 6 percent of the sampled members 
respectively. Bakke, Seidman, ejt aT. , and Rose in their 
respective studies concluded that social pressure was a 
causal factor for significantly higher percentages of the 
workers joihing the union. This study concludes that the 
sampled members did not join the AFGE for social reasons.
The responses to questions 12 through 21 in Tables 
20 through 31 examine the presence of psychological and
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economic reasons for joining the AFGE. The responses to 
question 12 are presented in Table 20. This is a broad 
question and the responses do not provide clues to any 
specific psychological or economic reasons for the indi­
viduals joining the union. This question was included in 
the study to allow for comparison with the responses given 
to Chamberlin and Rose in their studies. The responses to 
questions 12 and 13 cannot be compared with the findings 
of Bakke, and Seidman ejt aj.. because they did not ask simi­
lar questions.to their study groups.
TABLE 20
DID YOU JOIN THE AFGE BECAUSE YOU BELIEVE 












Blue-collar I75 150 85 17 9 8 4
White-collar 137 112 81 18 13 7 5
Total 312 262 83 35 11 15 4
Chi-Square I .165 Significant Level N.S.
Because there is no significant difference in the 
responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members, 
it can be stated that over 80 percent of the members believe 
that there is something to be gained by having membership 
in the AFGE.
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There is a significant difference in the findings 
of this study when compared to the findings of Chamberlin 
and Rose in their studies. Chamberlin found that 36 per­
cent of the union members joined the union for some form 
of personal gain.^^ Rose found that 42.8 percent of the 
workers joined the union for some form of personal gain.^^
TABLE 21
DID YOU JOIN THE AFGE BECAUSE YOU BELIEVE 
IN THE PURPOSES OF LABOR UNIONS?











Blue-collar 175 152 86 14 8 9 5
White-collar 137 110 8o 15 10 12 8
Total 312 262 83 29 9 21 6
Chi-Square 2.827 Significant Level N.S.
The responses show that 83 percent of the members 
joined the union because they believe in the purposes of 
unions. At this point the specific purposes of unions are 
not known ; therefore the only conclusion that can be made 
is that the members believe in the purposes of unions.
There is no significant difference in the responses of the 
two groups. There is a significant difference in the
^^Ibid., P» 39» Reasons: total for nos. 2 and 4.
^^Ibid., pp. 45-46. Reasons: total for nos. 2 ,4,5,6,7*
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findings of this study when compared to the findings of 
Chamberlin and Rose. Chamberlin found that 8 percent of 
the union members joined the union because "they like to 
belong to such organizations.'^^ This is inferred to mean 
that they believe in the purposes of unions. Rose found 
that 16.3 percent of the members joined the union because 
of some form of impersonal benefit which is inferred to
x8mean a general belief in the purposes of unions. From 
the data it appears that a larger percentage of the sam­
pled members in this study joined the union because they 
believe in a union's purposes than the percentages found 
by either Chamberlin or Rose.
The surveys findings for questions l4 and 15 as 
presented in Tables 22 and 23 respectively will be used to 
determine if the members joined the union because of a 
need for protection against management's authoritarian 
and paternalistic attitudes.
17Ibid., p. 39. Reasons; number 3.
18Ibid., p. 45. Reasons: number 3.
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TABLE 22
BEFORE JOINING THE AFGE, DID YOU FEEL THAT 











Blue-collar 175 140 80 21 12 14 8
White-collar 137 90 65 35 25 12 8
Total 312 230 73 56 17 26 8
Chi-Square 10.296 Significant Level .01
The responses show that 73 percent of the members
believe that management is unfair in dealing with Tinker
employees. These results are significant because one of
the functions of the Civil Service Commission is to pro-
19tect the rights of government employees. These findings 
suggest that the members may feel that the Civil Service 
Commission does not adequately protect them from unfair 
treatment by management.
Although there is a significant difference in the 
responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members, 
the need for protection is a reason for joining the union 
for the majority of both groups. However, the need for 
protection is strongest among the blue-collar members.
The difference in the groups responses was not unexpected
^^Chapter IV of the study, The Role of the Civil 
Service Commission, pp. 99rJ-19«
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since white-collar workers have historically identified
20with management.
TABLE 23
BEFORE JOINING THE AFGE, DID YOU FEEL THAT 
MANAGEMENT WOULD NOT PAY ATTENTION 
TO WHAT WORKERS HAD TO SAY?







Don ' t Know
%
Blue-collar 175 147 84 17 9 11 6
White-collar 137 95 69 32 23 10 7
Total 312 242 77 49 15 21 6
Chi-Square 11.784 Significant Level .01
The data show that 77 percent of the members do
not believe that management allows for worker participation
in decision making. The significant difference in the
responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members
was not unexpected because of white-collar workers histori-
21cal identification with management.
The data in Tables 22 and 23 clearly show that a 
majority of the blue-collar and the white-collar members 
believe that management is unfair and does not listen to 
the workers.
20Chapter 111, _0£. cit., footnote 84, p. 56.
Ibid.
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Chamberlin, Bakke, Seidman _et a^. , Rose, and 
Walker and Guest all to varying degrees found that psy­
chological reasons for joining the unions existed. Cham­
berlin found that 8 percent of the union members joined
22the union for job security. Bakke indicated the workers'
frustrations and anxieties were secondary reasons for
23their joining the union. Seidman, _et al. found that
experiences in the plant were reasons for joining the union
24for between 15 and 39 percent of the workers. Rose found
that l4.2 percent of the workers joined the union for
numerous psychological reasons.However, 52.8 percent
of the workers in Rose's study indicated that the unions
purpose was to "get job security," a psychological factor.
Walker and Guest stated that the workers joined the union
because the union met in part the social and psychological
27needs of workers that the work environment left void.
Comparison of the findings of this study with the 
findings of the studies conducted in the private sector show 
that union members in this study joined the union for psy­
chological reasons in larger percentages. It appears that
2^lbid. P* 39* Reason : number 4.
2^Ibid. p. 4l.
2^Ibid. p:. 43.
25ibid. p. 46. Reasons ; numbers 5> 6, and ?•
^^Ibid. P . 46. Opinions : numbers 2, 3» and ?•
^^Ibid. P. 49.
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the psychological factor is a major reason for the members 
in this study joining the union.
Questions l6 and 17 were asked to see if the mem­
bers feel that labor-management relations at Tinker have 
improved since they joined the union. Tables 24 and 25 
present the members’ responses to questions l6 and 17.
TABLE 24
SINCE THE AFGE HAS BEEN THE EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING 
AGENT FOR TINKER EMPLOYEES, HAS MANAGEMENT 
TREATED THE EMPLOYEES MORE FAIRLY?
Group
N







Blue-Collar 175 128 73 21 12 26 14
White-Collar 137 66 48 30 21 4i 29
Total 312 194 62 51 16 67 21
Chi-Square 20 .845 Significant Level .001
The responses show that 62 percent of the members 
believe that since they joined the union that there has been 
some improvement in working conditions at Tinker. A sig­
nificant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and 
the white-collar members exists. Forty-eight percent of 
the white-collar members believe that Tinker's employees 
are being treated more fairly. Seventy-three percent of 
the blue-collar members believe the same. It appears that 
a larger percentage of the white-collar members are still 
either dissatisfied with working conditions at Tinker or
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believe that union membership has not benefited them.
TABLE 25
SINCE YOU JOINED THE AFGE, DO YOU FEEL THAT 
MANAGEMENT PAYS MORE ATTENTION TO WHAT 
YOU HAVE TO SAY?
Group
N
AFGE Members ' Responses
Yes No
%
Don ' t Know
# 96
Blue-Collar 175 97 55 52 29 26 l4
White-Collar 137 55 4o 52 37 30 21
Total 312 152 48 104 33 56 17
Chi-Square 7*543 Significant Level .05
The data show that 48 percent of the members feel 
that since they joined the union that management pays more 
attention to what they have to say. A smaller percentage 
of both the blue-collar and white-collar members believe 
that the changes in working conditions at Tinker that have 
come about since they joined the union have directly affec­
ted them. It appears that some of the improvements have 
been indirect rather than direct. A significant difference 
in the responses of the two groups exists. The smaller 
percentage response of the white-collar members is inferred 
to mean that a majority of the white-collar members are either 
dissatisfied with working conditions at Tinker or believe 
that union membership has not benefited them. When the 
responses presented in Table 25 are compared with the 
responses in Table 24 a larger percentage of the blue-collar
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members view the improvements in conditions at Tinker as 
being more indirect.
In the analysis of the responses presented in 
Table 22 it was suggested that the members may feel that 
the Civil Service Commission does not adequately protect 
the rights of government employees. Questions l8 and 19 
were included in the questionnaire to determine if the 
members feel that the civil service system as administered 
by the Civil Service Commission protects their rights and
28whether the system should be discontinued.
A negative response to question I8 and a positive 
response to question 19 will indicate that the members feel 
that the civil service system does not protect the rights 
of government employees and should be discontinued. This 
would mean that the union when acting to protect the mem­
bers rights is fulfilling a void left by the civil service 
system. A positive response to question I8 and a negative 
response to question 19 will indicate that the members 
feel the need for both the civil service system and the 
union to either protect government employees rights and/or 
give government employees a more effective voice in deci­
sion making. Table 26 shows the members' responses to 
question I8 and Table 27 shows the members' responses to 
question 19.
28Confidential Questionnaire, Appendix 1, _o£, cit.
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TABLE 26
DO YOU FEEL THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM PROTECTS 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES?
AFGE Members' Responses
Group Yes No Don ' t Know
N % # % %
Blue-collar 175 61 34 85 48 29 16
White-collar 137 63 45 59 43 15 10
Total 312 124 39 144 46 44 14
Chi-Square 4.877 Significant Level N.S.
The data show that 46 percent of the members feel 
that the civil service system does not protect government 
employees rights. No significant difference exists in the 
responses of the two groups. Based on the responses to 
this question it appears that most of the members are 
either dissatisfied with the civil service system or are 
not sure about its ability to protect the rights of govern-
29ment employees.
29Table 53, Appendix II, Chi-Square values.
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TABLE 2?
DO YOU FEEL THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE 
SYSTEM SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED?
Group
N





Don ’ t Know
%
Blue-coIIar 175 19 10 113 64 43 24
White-collar 136 11 8 101 74 24 17
Total 311 30 9 214 68 67 21
Chi-Square 3«801 Significant Level N.S.
The data show that 68 percent of the members feel 
that the civil service system should not be discontinued. 
From the data in both Tables 26 and 27 it appears that the 
members are not sure about the system’s ability to protect 
their rights but they do not want to see the system dis­
continued. The data suggests that the members want both 
the union and the Civil Service Commission to safeguard 
their rights.
Question 20 will be analyzed to determine if the 
members joined the union for economic reasons. Table 28 
presents the responses to this question.
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TABLE 28
DO YOU FEEL THAT MEMBERSHIP IN THE AFGE IS THE 
BEST WAY TO GET WAGE AND FRINGE BENEFIT 
INCREASES FROM THE GOVERNMENT?
Gr oup
N




Blue-collar 175 146 83 14 8 15 8
White-collar 137 105 76 15 10 17 12
Total 312 251 80 29 9 32 10
Chi-Square 2.362 Significant Level N.S.
The responses show that economic reasons, i.e. , 
wages and fringe benefits were factors in 80 percent of the 
members joining the union. Chamberlin, Bakke, and Rose in 
their studies found the workers joined the unions 
for economic reasons. Chamberlin found that 36 percent of
30the workers had joined the union to get economic "results."
He concluded that the main reason that the workers joined
the union was to get economic benefits. Bakke found that
within a social framework the workers need for "more wages,
and more regular wages" was a significant reason for their
31joining the uni on. Rose found that 7*7 percent of the
workers joined the union to get higher wages but 75*3 per­
cent of the total sample believed that the union's purpose
30 _Chapter III, _0£. cit. , p. 39. Reasons: number 2.
31Ibid. , p . 41.
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32■was to "get specific economic benefits." It should 
be noted that neither Seidman al. or Walker and 
Guest in their studies found that workers joined the union 
for economic reasons.
The findings of this study were compared with the 
findings of the studies conducted in the private sector. 
The results of the comparisons show that economic factors 
had a higher appeal for the sanpled members joining the 
union than for the sampled workers in the private sector 
joining unions. This is true for the blue-collar and 
the white-collar members since there is no significant 
difference in their responses.
The responses to Question 21 will be analyzed to 
determine if the members expect the AFGE to secure the 
right to collectively bargain with management for 
wage and fringe benefit increases. Lobbying and not 
collective bargaining is the only real way that the AFGE 
can get wage and fringe benefit increases for blue- 
collar and especially white-collar government employees.
A positive response to Question 21 will add significance 
to the economic reason for joining the union. Table 29 
presents the responses to Question 21.
^^Ibid., Reasons: number 4, p. 46, and Opinions:
number 1, p. 46.
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TABLE 29
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE AFGE ACTING FOR YOU 
SHOULD BARGAIN WITH MANAGEMENT TO GET 
WAGE AND FRINGE BENEFIT INCREASES?
Group
N





Don ' t Know
%
Blue-collar 175 157 89 11 6 7 4
White-collar 137 110 80 11 8 16 11
Total 312 267 85 22 7 23 7
Chi-Square 7-059 Significant Level .05
The data show that 85 percent of the members believe 
that the AFGE should collectively bargain with management 
over wages and fringe benefits. Although a significant 
difference exists in the responses of the blue-collar and 
the white-collar members 89 and 80 percent respectively 
believe that the union should have the right to collectively 
bargain over wages and fringe benefits. These findings 
add significance to the economic reason for joining the 
union.
The right to strike as a social and economic weapon 
in labor-management relations has been legally accorded 
unions in the private sector since 1935» Without the 
right to strike, unions in the public sector are limited 
in their ability to effectively negotiate with management.
By law government unions are expressly denied the right
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to strike. In lieu of the right to strike the AFGE has 
used political pressure to meet its objectives. The lim­
itation of political pressure is that it does not bring 
about results as quickly as striking.
Question 22 was included in the questionnaire to 
find out if the members believe that the AFGE should have 
the right to strike the government. The members' responses 
to this question are shown in Table 30.
TABLE 30
DO YOU FEEL THAT, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO ON STRIKE THE 
SAME AS WORKERS OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE 
ALLOWED TO STRIKE THEIR EMPLOYERS?
Group
N









Blue-collar 175 62 35 94 ■ 53 19 10
White-collar 137 35 25 87 63 15 10
Total 312 97 31 l8l 58 34 10
Chi-Square 3.718 Significant Level N.S.
Fifty-eight percent of the members do not believe 
that they should have the right to strike the government. 
The fact that this response is not higher is significant 
because 80 percent of the sampled members have worked at 
Tinker for over 5 years, and all signed the loyalty oath
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33when they were first employed by the government. There 
is no significant difference in the responses of the two 
groups. However, the data show that the white-collar mem­
bers are less inclined to want the right to strike. This 
appears to substantiate the belief of the United Steel­
workers that white-collar workers have strong feelings
34against the use of strikes.
Question 23 was included in the questionnaire to 
see if the members would be willing to participate in a 
strike in spite of the severe penalties for striking. The 
members responses to this question are shown in Table 31-
TABLE 31
IF THE AFGE CALLED A STRIKE, BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM 
WITH MANAGEMENT, WOULD YOU GO OUT ON STRIKE?











Blue-collar 175 46 26 80 45 49 28
White-collar 137 25 18 72 52 40 29
Total 312 71 22 152 48 89 28
Chi-Square 3.282 Significant Level N.S.
The data show that a lower percentage of the
^^Chapter IV, _0£. cit. , pp. I3I-I32.
34Chapter III, _0£. cit. , p. 57,
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blue-collar and white-collar members who indicated that 
they should have the right to strike are willing to partici­
pate in a strike. This result was not unexpected consider­
ing the severity of the penalties for striking. There is 
no significant difference in the responses of the blue- 
collar and the white-collar members.
As a check against a possible deficiency in the 
questionnaire as a tool for measuring why the members 
joined the union, Question 24 was included in the ques­




THE MAIN REASON THAT I JOINED THE AFGE WAS:
AFGE Members* Reason Given;
1. Protection of individual rights from being violated by 
management. This desire for protection exists because of 
1) a past or present problem or 2) a possible future prob­
lem.
2. Protection against the unfair promotion system at Tin­
ker. The system's rules are violated either by politics 
or by management's overlooking the regulations.
3. Representation (strength in numbers) either at the 
local or national level to improve working conditions or 
to get better treatment. It is inferred that improvements 
in working conditions and better treatment may include 
wages and fringe benefits. This is because of the AFGE's 
use of pressure politics by lobbying in Congress for wage 
and fringe benefit increases.
4. Representation either at the local or national level 
to get wage and fringe benefit increases. In this case 













Blue-collar 125 56 45 4 3 37 29 28 22
White-collar 112 51 45 14 13 34 29 13 11
Total 237 107 45 18 7 71 29 4l 17
Chi-Square 12 • 553 Significant :Level .01
♦Reasons number 1 and 2 are psychological. Reason 
number 3 is either psychological, economic, or a combina­
tion of psychological and economic. Reason number 4 is 
economic. Not one of the 237 members who answered this 
question indicated that he joined the AFGE for social 
reasons.
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The data show that $2 percent of the 237 respond­
ents to this question joined the union because of their 
belief that management is unfair in dealing with Tinker's 
employees. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents joined 
the union to get improvements in working conditions and/or 
better treatment. This can be inferred to mean that the 
29 percent believe that working conditions at Tinker could 
be improved. Better treatment can also be inferred to 
mean higher wages and fringe benefits. Seventeen percent 
of the respondents joined the union specifically to get 
wage and fringe benefit increases.
The null hypothesis is rejected because a signifi­
cant difference in the members' responses exists. The 
data show that a larger percentage of the white-collar 
members joined the union for economic reasons. The 
responses to this question are inconsistent with the 
findings for questions l4, 15» 20 and 21 where the sam­
pled blue-collar members indicated in larger percentages 
than the white-collar members psychological and economic 
reasons for joining the union. The inconsistency in the 
data can be explained in a number of ways. Twenty-nine 
percent of the responses were classified in reason number
3. The members meaning of improved working conditions 
and better treatment could be either psychological, economic, 
or both. The nature of the question itself, i.e., "The 
main reason that I joined the AFGE was: " placed the
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members in a position where they had to make a choice. 
Lastly, the fact that 29 percent of the blue-collar mem­
bers -who participated in the study did not answer this 
question. This could have easily changed the response 
percentage to be consistent with earlier findings.
Question 25 was included in the questionnaire to 
give the members an opportunity to express their opinions. 
Their opinions could provide additional information for 
the study that was not specifically covered in the ques­
tionnaire, No conclusions can be made from the members' 
responses to Question 25 because of the following condi­
tions. The Chi-Square value for the responses to Question 
25 show that the data are not statistically significant. 
Questions k and 6 were the only other questions in the 
questionnaire whose responses were not statistically sig­
nificant .
The data became representative only when it was 
compared with the social and economic characteristics of 
all Tinker employees. The data in question 25 cannot be 
compared to any other data to determine its validity. 
Lastly, only percent of the members who participated 
in the study answered this question. Table 33 shows the 
responses of the members who answered this question.
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TABLE 33
IS THERE ANYTHING YOU MIGHT TELL ME 
THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL?
AFGE Members' Reasons Given:
Comments about the Union
1. The union does not represent the members; it does not 
do enough for them. The union is mismanaged; too much 
internal fighting.
2. The union's stewards are unqualified; they do not stand 
up for the worker.
3. The union either at the local or national level has 
helped government employees by protecting workers rights 
and improving working conditions.
Comments about Management
4. Tinker management is unfair in dealing with Tinker 
employees. They discriminate against the workers.
5. Tinker's personnel system is unfair to the workers in 
the following respects: a. promotion system, b. job
classification, or c. performance appraisals.
Additional Comments
6. The Civil Service Commission does not protect the 
workers' right s.















Blue-collar 66 16 4 13 12 13 5 3
White-collar 70 13 2 19 21 9 3 3
Total 136 29 6 32 33 22 8 6
Chi-Square 8.044 Significant Level N.S.
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The data show that 64 percent of the sampled mem­
bers who answered this question believe that either manage­
ment is unfair in dealing with the workers or that the 
union protects their rights. There is no significance in 
the data even though the responses correspond with those 
responses discussed earlier in this chapter.
The following chapter will summarize the study and 
propose conclusions to be drawn from the findings.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was developed around 312 responses from 
the 736 Local 916 members who were mailed a Confidential 
Questionnaire « The findings of the survey were used to deter­
mine if the reasons for their joining the union differed from 
the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions.
The findings were also used to see if the reasons for join­
ing the union expressed by the blue-collar members differed 
significantly from the reasons expressed by the white-collar 
members.
Chapter II shows that only a limited amount of 
research has been conducted in the field of government 
labor-management relations. The majority of the publica­
tions examined in this chapter have been published since 
Executive Order IO988, the event that signalled the incred­
ibly rapid expansion of unionism in the government.
Chapter III reviews the reasons why workers in the 
private sector join unions. The reasons why white-collar 
workers have historically been less inclined to join unions 
were also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter IV developed the basic framework for the 
study centering around the author's belief that government
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labor-management. relations are unique when compared to 
labor-management relations in the private sector. This 
uniqueness was studied from a number of bases. It was 
this belief in the uniqueness of government labor-management 
relations that sparked initial interest in the study.
Chapter V provided insight into the AFGE, Local 
916, and the environment of labor-management relations at 
Tinker Air Force Base. The AFGE was selected for this 
study because it is the largest union in the government. 
Local 916 was chosen for the study because it is the largest 
local in the AFGE. Union officials and management at Tinker 
are of the opinion that the environment of labor-management 
relations at Tinker sets the tone for labor-management rela­
tions in the Air Force. This study has not investigated 
this condition.
Chapter VI presents the findings of the survey.
The survey findings centered around the responses of 312 
of the 736 Local 916 members who were mailed a copy of the 
Confidential Questionnaire. The responses were analyzed 
and tested for statistical significance and used to deter­
mine why the sampled members joined the union. The reasons 
why the members joined the union were compared with those 
reasons discussed in Chapter III to test Hypothesis 1: 
the reasons why the sampled members joined the union 
are different than the reasons why workers in the private 
sector join unions. The responses were further analyzed
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to lest Hypothesis 2: that the sampled blue-collar and
white-collar members joined the union for the same r<u»sons.
The Coni’iden t xa 1 Questionnai re was developed with 
the assistance of a number of professionals with extensive 
academic and field experience. The questionnaire was pre­
tested to determine its validity. The results of the pre­
test indicated that the questionnaire is a valid instrument 
for determining why the sampled members joined the union.
Even though the sample was structured using a systematic 
random sampling technique and demographic information as 
well as AFGE and Local 9l6 officials' opinions suggest that 
there is no difference between the respondents and the non­
respondents, implications for the entire Local or other
groups of government employees must be made with caution.
The findings of this study show that the 33 per­
cent of all Tinker employees are members of the AFGE.
The appeals of union membership are strongest with Tinker 
employees over 30 years old, the age group where the 
union has the highest proportional membership when com­
pared to the percentage of all Tinker employees in the 
same age group.
Enough evidence exists to suggest that previous 
union membership had some influence on 36 percent of the 
members joining the union. The possibility of a member's 
joining the union because he may have been influenced by 
either of his parents' experiences with unions was present 
in only 16 percent of the responses. The l6 percent
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response is very small when compared to the members' 
responses to other questions in the survey and the find­
ings of the studies conducted in the private sector. For 
these reasons this factor is discounted as a reason for 
the members joining the union.
The researchers who conducted studies in the pri­
vate sector found that workers join unions for multiple 
reasons. However, Chamberlin, Rose, and Walker and 
Guest in each of their respective studies were able to 
conclude that a single reason was responsible for a major­
ity of the workers joining the union, Chamberlin con­
cluded that economic "results" was the main reason for 
the workers joining the union. Rose concluded that a 
workers joining the union was a function of social pres­
sure but the workers' perception of the union's function 
was the satisfaction of economic needs. Walker and Guest 
concluded that the workers joined the union for psycho­
logical reasons. Bakke and Seidman, et al,, in their 
studies, were unable to conclude that a majority of the 
workers expressed a dominant reason for joining the union, 
Bakke concluded that interrelated social, economic, and 
psychological reasons in that order were responsible for 
the workers joining the union. The strongest reasons cen­
tered around the need for economic gains, Seidman, et al,, 
concluded that the workers joined the union for social 
and psychological reasons. They did not join the union
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for economic reasons.
The findings of this study show that nearly all 
of the sampled members joined the union for psychological 
and economic reasons. A maximum of 15 percent of the mem­
bers joined the union because of some form of social pres­
sure. The 15 percent response is very small when compared 
to the members' responses to the psychological and economic 
related questions and the findings of the studies conducted 
in the private sector. For these reasons the presence of 
some form of social pressure as a causal factor for the 
members joining the union is discounted.
Eighty-three percent of the members believe in the 
purposes of unions and that membership in the union can 
personally benefit them. The responses to question 24 
were used to infer that the members see the purposes of the 
union and the benefits from membership as psychological, 
i.e., protecting their rights, and economic, i.e., wage and 
fringe benefit increases. This conclusion was further 
validated by the members' responses to the questions that 
related to psychological and economic reasons for joining 
the union.
Seventy-three percent of the members believe that 
management does not treat them fairly. Seventy-seven per­
cent of the members believe that management does not give 
them a chance to participate in decision making. Although 
significant differences exist in the responses of the
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blue-collar and the white-collar members to both questions, 
a clear majority of each group feel the same way towards 
management.^
Eighty percent of the members believe that member­
ship in the union is the best way to get wage and fringe 
benefit increases. No significant difference exists in 
the responses of the two groups. Eighty-five percent of 
the members believe that the union should have the right 
to collectively bargain with management over wages and 
fringe benefits. A significant difference does exist in 
the responses of the two groups. However, in each group
a clear majority believe in the unions having the right to
2negotiate over wages and fringe benefits.
For both groups of members a higher percentage 
response occurred in the economic related questions (20,
21) than in the psychological related questions (l4, 15).
A comparison between the groups and the questions shows 
that the percentage differences are not large enough to 
conclude that one reason was more significant than the 
other. This study concludes that both the economic and 
the psychological reasons were the major reasons for the 
sampled members joining the union.
Based on the findings of this study Hypotheses 1
^Chi-Square values in Tables 49 and 50 in Appendix 
II show that the responses of each group are significant.
2Chi-Square values in Tables 55 and 56 in Appendix 
II show that the responses of each group are significant.
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and 2 are accepted. Hypothesis 1 is accepted because the 
findings of this study when compared with each of the 
findings of the studies conducted in private sector indi­
cate that the sampled workers did not join the union for the 
same reasons that workers in the private sector join 
unions. The almost total absence of social pressure as a 
reason for joining the union and the close relationship 
between the psychological and the economic reasons were 
not present in any of the findings of the studies, conducted 
in the private sector. Hypothesis 2 is accepted because 
the reasons for the blue-collar and white-collar members 
joining the union are the same. Although a significant 
difference in the two groups' responses occurred in ques­
tions l4, 1 5 , and 21, examination of the data shows that 
for each question a high majority of each group answered 
"yes."
The findings of this study show that 62 percent 
of the members believe that since the union has exclu­
sively represented Tinker employees that they have been 
treated more fairly. Only 48 percent of the members 
believe that since they joined the union that their personal 
relations with management have improved. Significant dif­
ferences in the responses of the two groups exist in both 
questions. The significant differences show that a lower 
percentage of the white-collar members believe that member­
ship in the union has helped to improve their personal
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relations with management. The reason for their feelings 
may be because initially their working conditions were 
better than the working conditions of the blue-collar mem­
bers .
Forty-six percent of the members feel that the 
civil service system does not protect their rights.
Although the 46 percent are not a majority of the mem­
bers this response is significant because the Civil Ser­
vice Commission's operational philosophy has centered 
around the protection of workers rights and sound princi­
ples of personnel management. Considering that another l 4  
percent of the members "don't know" if the system protects 
their rights it can be concluded that a majority of the 
members have some doubts about the Commission's ability 
to meet one of its basic objectives.
The members' dissatisfaction with the civil ser­
vice system is not deep enough for them to feel that the 
system should be discontinued. Nine percent of the mem­
bers believed that the system should be discontinued while 
21 percent indicated that they "don't know."
Fifty-eight percent of the members do not believe 
that they should have the right to strike. In effect 
only a slight majority of the members believe that strikes 
should not be allowed in the government. Considering the 
government's position on strikes, this response is signifi­
cant because it is not higher.
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To examine the strength of the members belief in 
having the right to strike, they were asked if they would 
participate in a strike. Only 48 percent of the members 
indicated that they would not. Twenty-eight percent 
(which was the highest "don't know" response to any ques­
tion in the survey) of the members did not know if they 
would participate. This indicates that the members who 
did not know if they would participate in a strike would 
have to examine the conditions that led to the strike 
before making a decision. The fact that a smaller per­
centage of the members indicated that they would not strike 
than those who did not even want the right to strike is 
somewhat inconsistent with logical expectations. The 
only explanation that is offered is that some of the mem­
bers feel a deep sense of loyalty to the union. Even 
though they do not want the right to strike, some of the 
members are willing to consider participating in a strike.
These results are very significant considering 
that government employees who participate in a strike are 
subject to very severe penalties under Public Law 330.
The responses to the opinion question were grouped 
into 7 categories. The responses were not significantly 
different than the expected distribution of responses and 
are therefore not statistically significant. The majority 
of the responses paralleled the responses to other related 
questions in the survey. This added some validity to the
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conclusions that were drawn from the findings.
Concluding Remarks 
The findings of the survey indicate that a majority 
of the respondents are dissatisfied with management's 
paternalistic attitude toward them. Obviously the Air 
Force's opinion of itself as a good employer is not shared 
by the respondents.
As discussed in Chapter V, the union is constantly 
trying to revise and amend the Air Force's personnel poli­
cies and practices. Although they have had a moderate 
degree of success in bringing about changes, they have 
not been as successful in seeing that the changes have 
become part of management's standing operating procedure. 
While a majority of the members believe that working con­
ditions at Tinker have improved in recent years there is 
enough evidence to suggest that more could be accomplished.
Management's attitudes toward the union are mani­
fested in the present negotiated contract which is largely 
a repetition of Executive Order 11491. If management con­
tinues to maintain this paternalistic attitude towards 
the members they can expect the union to negotiate for 
more changes. Union officials indicated that they intend 
to negotiate for a more equitable contract in the next 
bargaining session. Management indicated that they do 
not intend to relinquish any of their authority to the 
union. If this trend continues, labor and management may
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eventually reach a serious impasse.
The union is a voluntary organization and as with 
all voluntary organizations membership and participation 
is a function of the organization’s ability to satisfy 
individual needs. Since the union has been losing members 
over the past few years it is quite possible that the 
present policies governing their relations with management 
are not accomplishing the results expected by the workers.
In order to survive and grow the union must attract 
more members. Although the needs of nonunion Tinker employ­
ees are not known, the adoption of more militant policies 
and the winning of a confrontation with management may 
give the union the opportunity to add new members. There 
is some evidence to support this conclusion. Air Force 
management was opposed to the Monroney Amendment which 
expanded the blue-collar workers' wage survey area to include 
similar skills. This eventually meant substantial retro­
active pay raises for Tinker's blue-collar employees.
Because of the union's influence the Amendment passed 
through Congress despite the Air Force's strong opposition. 
The immediate result was that the union's membership 
increased in substantial numbers.
The government's adherence to the policy of estab­
lishing wages and fringe benefits for its employees appears 
to be headed for problems. A significant majority of the 
members indicated that membership in the union is the best
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way to get wage and fringe benefit increases. They also 
feel that the union should have the right to negotiate 
directly with management over wages and fringe benefits.
It appears that the members feel that the present methods 
of lobbying in Congress are not as effective as direct 
negotiations with management. Union officials indicated 
that within the next few years they expect to have the 
right to collectively bargain with management over wages 
and fringe benefits. There is little doubt that the unionts 
securing of this right will increase its membership.
Union officials stressed the need for the right to 
negotiate with management for union security agreements 
beyond the present negotiable checkoff system. They feel 
that many workers do not join the union because the union 
already represents them by having exclusive recognition.
The workers rightfully feel that there is little to be 
gained by paying union dues. The union officials believe 
that they will have the right to negotiate union security 
within the next few years based on comparable developments 
at the state and local levels of government. When this 
occurs, social pressure will become a more prevalent reason 
for workers joining the union.
The findings of this study have implications for 
the Civil Service Commission. The Commission is trapped 
in a box. On one side the members are dissatisfied with 
the civil service system's ability to protect their rights.
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On another side the union sees the Commission as an exten­
sion of management. On a third side some authorities 
believe that the Commission has failed to properly dis­
charge its responsibilities to either labor or manage- 
3ment. On a fourth side the Department of Labor to an 
increasing extent is assuming the major role in labor- 
management relations. From the findings of this study it 
is concluded that as the scope of collective bargaining 
expands, the need for more decentralized authority will 
cause the Commission to continue its policy of forcing 
decision making, at the lowest level possible.
For nearly 200 years the government has asserted 
its sovereignty over its employees. The findings of this 
study and the events of the past few years indicate that 
government employees are redefining this doctrine. The 
recent successes of the postal unions resulting from the 
successful mail strike have certainly affected all of the 
other government unions. The AFGE has been a conserva­
tive union. However, the deletion of the no-strike clause 
from the constitution and the findings of this study sug­
gest that the conservatism of the union may be lessening.
If the government continues to assert its sovereignty there 
is a real possibility that the AFGE on a local level may
O
Daniel H. Kruger and Charles J. Schmidt, Jr. (eds.), 
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (New York:
Random House, 19&9),pp. 139-1Ô1; Wilson R. Hart, "The 
Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service."
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test the applicability of this doctrine.
The implications for government management, the 
Civil Service Commission, and the AFGE National are exten­
sions of this study. Without the benefit of more research 
these implications can only be accepted as generalizations.
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APPENDIX I
CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE




Were you born in Oklahoma?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No
While you were between 7 and l8 years old:
A. Did you attend school in Oklahoma?
( ) Yes ( ) No
B. Did either of your parents belong to a labor union? 
( ) Yes ( ) No { ) Don't Know
C. If yes, did they feel that the union was helpful 
to them?
( ) Ye: ( ) No ( ) Don't Know
Before you came to work at Tinker, did you ever belong 
to a union?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No
4. How long have you worked at Tinker?
A. ( ) less than 5 years
B. ( ) 5 to 10 years
5. Is your job classified as: 
( ) Wage Board
6. How old are you?
A. ( ) less than 30 years
B. ( ) 30 to 40 years
C. ( ) 11 to 15 years
D. ( ) over l6 years
( ) General Schedule
C. ( ) 4l to 50 years
D. ( ) over 50 years
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7. How long have you been a member of the American Federa­
tion of Government Employees (AFGE)?
A. ( ) less than 2 years C. ( ) 6 to 10 years
B. ( ) 2 to 5 years D. ( ) over 10 years
8. How many of the scheduled meetings of the AFGE do you 
attend each year?
i ) less than 3 C. ( ) 8 to 12
B. t : 4 to 7
9. Did you join the AFGE because your friends were mem­
bers?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
10. Did you feel that you were pressured by your friends 
into joining the AFGE?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
11. Did you feel that you were pressured by people other 
than your friends into joining the AFGE?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
12. Did you join the AFGE because you believe that it can 
help you personally?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
13. Did you join the AFGE because you believe in the pur­
poses of labor unions?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
14. Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management 
had been unfair in dealing with workers?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
15. Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management 
would not pay attention to what workers had to say?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
16. Since the AFGE has been the exclusive bargaining agent 
for Tinker employees, has management treated the 
employees more fairly?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
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17. Since you joined the AFGE, do you feel that management 
pays more attention to what you have to say?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
1 8 . Do you feel that the Civil Service System protects 
the rights of individual government employees?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
1 9. Do you feel that the Civil Service System should be 
discontinued?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
20. Do you feel that membership in the AFGE is the best 
way to get wage and fringe benefit increases from 
the government?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
21. Do you believe that the AFGE acting for you should
bargain with management to get wage and fringe benefit
increases?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
22. Do you feel that, when all else fails, government
employees should be allowed to go on strike the same 
as workers outside of the government are allowed to 
strike their employers?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
2 3. If the AFGE called a strike, because of a problem with
management, would you go out on strike?
A. ( ) Yes B. ( ) No C. ( ) Don't Know
24. The main reason that 1 joined the AFGE was:
25. Is there anything else that you might tell me that 
might be helpful?
The University of Oklahoma
236
307 West Brooks Street, Room 4 Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Bureau for Business 
and Economic Research 
(405) 325-2931
Dear M
As a student studying about labor unions under 
Dr. Donald A. Woolf at the University of Oklahoma, I 
am writing a paper on federal government union members' 
attitudes and opinions. You can help me learn more 
about your problems.
The enclosed questionnaire will only take a minute 
to answer and requires only that you check the best 
answer. Your answers will be strictly confidential and 
will in no way be related to you individually. Please 
do not sign your name to the questionnaire.
Since I need to complete this work by early June, 
your completing and returning the questionnaire to me 
at the University in the addressed postage paid envelope 
will be greatly appreciated.
Thank you very much.
Enclosure
Sincerely,
Louis V. Imundo, Jr.
The University of Oklahoma
237
307 West Brooks Street, Room 4 Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Bureau for Business 
and Economic Research 
(405) 325-2931
Dear M
This letter is a follow-up to the introductory letter and 
confidential questionnaire that I recently sent to your home.
Since the questionnaires are uncoded I have no way of know­
ing whether or not you answered it. If you did, then I 
would like to take this opportunity to express my apprecia­
tion. If you did not answer the first questionnaire would 
you please take a moment to complete this questionnaire?
We have sent a second questionnaire because the results of 
the first mailing were a little short of the percent that 
we feel is necessary to know the feelings of the majority.
As you know from the recent articles in the Take-Off, this 
study has the backing of the AFGE's officers. They are very 
interested in your opinion. Your feelings when put together 
with the feelings of many other AFGE members will help the 
AFGE in determining future policies.
Would you please take a minute to complete this question­






FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 1.





Group Yes No Yes No
Blue-Collar 122 53 87 87
White-Collar 81 56 68 68






Blue-Collar 1.302 0.460 13.605 1 .001*
White-Collar 1.408 0.493 2.284 1 N.S.
TOTAL 1.349 0.477 14,160 1 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 35
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 2A.
While you were between 7 and 18 years old:





Group Yes No Yes No
Blue-Collar 142 33 87 87
White-Collar 99 38 68 68






Blue-Collar 1.188 0.392 33.948 1 .001*
White-Collar 1.277 0.449 13.583 1 .001*
TOTAL 1.227 0.419 46.314 1 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 36
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 2B.
While you were between 7 and 18 years old:












Blue-Collar 31 124 20 58 58 58
White-Collar 21 106 10 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.937 0.537 37.308 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.919 0.470 40.306 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.929 0.508 77.102 4 .001*
*Signiflcant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 37
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 20.












Blue-Collar 26 1 4 10 10 10
White-Collar 16 0 5 7 7 7






Blue-Collar 1.290 0.692 12.032 4 .015
White-Collar 1.476 0.872 6.380 4 N.S.
TOTAL 1.365 0.767 18.173 4 .001
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TABLE 38
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 3.
Before you came to work at Tinker, 
did you ever belong to a union?
Number Number
Observed Expected
Group Yes No Yes No
White-Collar 70 105 87 87
Blue-Collar 45 92 68 68






Blue-Collar 1.600 0.491 3.502 1 N.S.
White-Collar 1.671 0.471 8.065 1 .005
TOTAL 1.631 0.483 10.775 1 .001
244
TABLE 39
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 4.













Than 5 5-10 11-15
Over
16
Blue-Collar 43 50 20 62 43 43 43 43
White-Collar 14 33 26 64 34 34 34 34






Blue-Collar 2.577 1.205 5.365 9 N.S.
White-Collar 3.021 1.060 9.963 9 N.S.
TOTAL 2.772 1.163 12.160 9 N.S.
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TABLE 40
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 5.

















175 137 218 94
Std. Sig.
Group N Mean Dev. X2 df Level
TOTAL 312 1.439 0.497 28.304 1 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 41
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 6.













Than 30 3040 41-50
Over
50
Blue-Collar 28 32 56 59 43 43 43 43
White-Collar 10 22 52 53 34 34 34 34






Blue-Collar 2.834 1.067 4.405 9 N.S.
White-Collar 3.080 0.916 10.255 9 N.S.
TOTAL 2.942 1.009 13.564 9 N.S.
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TABLE 42
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 7.
How long have you been a member of the 













Than 2 2-5 6-10
Over
10
Blue-Collar 46 89 33 6 43 43 43 43
White-Collar 20 82 30 5 34 34 34 34






Blue-Collar 1.994 0.771 20.655 9 .015
White-Collar 2.145 0.702 24,503 9 .005
TOTAL 2.061 0.744 43.437 9 .001*
‘Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 43
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 8.
How many of the scheduled meetings of the AFGE 







Than 3 4-7 8-12
Less 
Than 3 4-7 8-12
Blue-Collar 122 41 12 58 58 58
White-Collar 116 15 6 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.371 0.610 37.148 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.197 0.497 54.467 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.294 0.569 88.641 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 44
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 9.
Did you join the AFGE because 







No Know Yes No
Don't
Know
Blue-Collar 19 154 2 58 58 58
White-Collar 14 123 0 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.902 0.333 79.274 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.897 0.304 43.364 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.900 0.320 145,429 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 45
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 10.
Did you feel that you were pressured by 












Blue-Collar 1 172 2 58 58 58
White-Collar 2 135 0 45 45 45
























^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 46
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 11.
Did you feel that you were pressured by people 












Blue-Collar 15 158 2 58 58 58
White-Collar 4 131 2 45 45 45
























*Significant beyond the .001 * level.
2 5 2
TABLE 47
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 12.
Did you join the AFGE because you believe 












Blue-Collar 150 17 8 58 58 58
White-Collar 112 18 7 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.188 0.495 72.257 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.233 0.532 48.627 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.208 0.511 120.660 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
253
TABLE 48
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 13.
Did you join the AFGE because you believe 












Blue-Collar 152 14 9 58 58 58
White-Collar 110 15 12 45 45 45
























^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 49
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 14.
Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management 











Blue-Collar 140 21 14 58 58 58
White-Collar 90 35 12 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.280 0.603 57.308 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.430 0.650 23.459 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.346 0.627 77.769 4 .001*
‘Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 50
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 15.
Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management 












Blue-Collar 147 17 11 58 58 58
White-Collar 95 32 10 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.222 0.548 67.491 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.379 0.619 28.42Î 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.291 0.585 92.814 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 51
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 16.
Since the AFGE has been the exclusive bargaining 
agent for Tinker employees, has management 
































Blue-Collar 1.417 0.737 41.674 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.817 0.867 4.978 4 N.S.
TOTAL 1.592 0.820 39.352 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 52
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 17.
Since you joined the AFGE, do you feel that 
management pays more attention to 
































Blue-Collar 1.594 0.735 14.748 4 .01
White-Collar 1.817 0.769 2.729 4 N.S.
TOTAL 1.692 0.757 14.769 4 .01
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TABLE 53
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 18.
Do you feel that the Civil Service System protects 







No Know Yes No
Don't
Know
Blue-Collar 61 85 29 58 58 58
White-Collar 63 59 15 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.811 0.698 8.760 4 N.S.
White-Collar 1.649 0.670 10.364 4 .035
TOTAL 1.740 0.689 17.826 4 .01
2 5 9
TABLE 54
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 19.








No Know Yes No
Don't
Know
Blue-Collar 19 113 43 58 58 58
White-Collar 11 101 24 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 2.142 0.574 28.348 4 .001*
White-Collar 2.095 0.500 34.801 4 .001*
TOTAL 2.122 0.542 62.109 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 55
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 20.
Do you feel that membership in the AFGE is the 
best way to get wage and fringe benefit 







No Know Yes No
Don't
Know
Blue-Collar 146 14 15 58 58 58
White-Collar 105 15 17 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.251 0.601 65.880 4 .001*
White-Collar 1.357 0.693 38.569 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.298 0.644 103.903 4 .001*
‘ Significant beyond the ,001 level.
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TABLE 56
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 21.
Do you believe that the AFGE acting on your behalf 
should bargain with management to get 










Blue-Collar 157 11 7 58 58 58
White-Collar 110 11 16 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 1.137 0.446 85.171 4 a o i*
White-Collar 1.313 0.672 45.416 4 .001*
TOTAL 1.214 0.563 129.314 4 .001*
^Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE 57
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 22.
Do you feel that, when all else fails, government employees 
should be allowed to go on strike the same as workers 
































Blue-Collar 1.754 0.636 16.188 4 .005
White-Collar 1.854 0.588 20.175 4 .001
TOTAL 1.798 0.616 34.865 4 .001
‘Significant beyond the .001 level.
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TABLE %8
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 23.
If the AFGE called a strike, because of a problem 







No Ki.Dw Yes No
Don't
Know
Blue-Collar 46 80 40 58 58 58
White-Collar 25 72 40 45 45 45






Blue-Collar 2.022 0.734 4.451 4 N.S.
White-Collar 2.109 0.682 8.423 4 N.S.
TOTAL 2.060 0.712 12.121 4 .015
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TABLE 59*
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 24.
The main reason that i joined the AFGE was:
AFGE Members' Responses Given:
1. Protection of individual rights from being violated by management. This 
desire for protection exists because of 1. a past or present problem, or 2. a 
possible future problem.
2. Protection against the unfair promotion system at Tinker. The systems' r ules 
are violated by politics or by management's overlooking the regulations.
3. Representation (strength in numbers) either at the local or national level to 
improve working conditions or to get better treatment. It is inferred that 
improvements in working conditions and better treatment may include wages 
and fringe benefits. This is because of the AFGE's use of pressure politics by 
lobbying in Congress for wage and fringe benefit increases.
4. Representation either at the local or national level to get wage and fringe 
benefit increases. In this case wage and fringe benefits were specifically given.
Number Observed Reason Number Expected Reason
Group 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Blue-Collar 56 4 37 28 31 31 31 31
White-Collar 51 14 34 13 28 28 28 28
TOTAL 107 18 71 41 59 59 59 59
‘ Note: 125 of the 175 blue-collar sampled AFGE members responded to this question.






Blue-Collar 2.296 1.250 11.192 9 N.S.
White-Collar 2.080 1.108 8.803 9 N.S.
TOTAL 2.194 1.187 18.789 9 .025
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TABLE 60
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 25.
Is there anything else you might tell me 
that might be helpful?
Comments about the Union:
1. The union does not represent the members; it does not do enough for them. 
The union is mismanaged; too much internal fighting.
2. The union's stewards are unqualified; they do not stand up for the worker.
3. The union either at the local or national level has helped government 
employees by protecting workers' rights and improving working conditions.
Comments about Management:
4. Management is unfair in their treatment of Tinker employees. They 
discriminate against the workers.
5. Tinker's personnel system is unfair to the workers in the following 
respects: (a) promotion system, (b) job classification, and (c) performance 
appraisals.
Additional Comments:
6. The Civil Service Commission does not protect the workers' rights.
7. Emphatically against strikes in the government.
Number Observed Reason Number Expected Reason
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Blue-Collar 16 4 13 12 13 5 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
White-Collar 13 2 19 21 9 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
TOTAL 29 6 32 33 22 8 6 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
*Note: 66  of the 175 bluo-collar sampled AFGE members responded to this question.








Blue-Collar 3.439 1.807 2.530 36 N.S.
White-Collar 3.457 1.575 5.342 36 N.S.
TOTAL 3.448 1.685 6.860 36 N.S.
